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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the first strategic response to performance decline (i.e., the
retrenchment stage in the turnaround process) in family-owned businesses (FOBs). Specifically,
I study how the interplay between financial and non-financial objectives in FOBs affects the
strategic preferences of family-owners when circumstances put the wealth (financial and nonfinancial) of the family at stake. In this three-essay dissertation, I employ the behavioral agency
model (BAM) or the socioemotional wealth (SEW) preservation perspective to explain and
predict the effect of SEW on an FOB’s retrenchment strategies. While the SEW construct was
used by previous studies, its direct measurement and the methodologies to capture its multidimensional nature became available only through recent advances in the literature. Thus, this
dissertation builds on these latest findings to directly investigate whether or not SEW
considerations affect a family-firm’s response to performance decline. Additionally, this study is
the first to investigate the differential effect of SEW dimensions on the response of an FOB to
performance decline. The hypotheses were tested on a panel of US publicly-traded family-firms
in need of turnaround. The data analysis was performed though the Feasible Generalized Least
Square (FGLS) on 416 firm-observations. The results suggest that the desire to preserve SEW
significantly affects an FOB’s decisions concerning its response to performance decline.
Additionally, there is evidence, which shows that each SEW dimension affects the family-firm’s
response to the decline in financial performance in a different manner. By integrating the BAM
with insights from other theoretical lenses, this dissertation provides significant contributions and
meaningful implications for theory and practice.
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Summary of Research
Little is known about how firms respond to significant performance decline. Turnaround,
or the set of strategies that a firm deploys in order to halt the decline in financial performance
and strive to return to pre-decline levels of profitability (Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Robbins,
Pearce, & John, 1992), has been studied for over three decades, but our knowledge remains scant
(Arogyaswamy, Barker, & Yasai-Ardekani, 1995). The knowledge gap is even wider when it
comes to family-owned businesses (FOBs) (Cater & Schwab, 2008). This is surprising for
multiple reasons. First, FOBs are a relevant organizational form across the world (Colli, Perez, &
Rose, 2003). In addition, the interplay between financial and non-financial objectives (Chua,
Chrisman, & Steier, 2003), typical of family businesses, may generate unique challenges for the
family owner of the business when the firm is in jeopardy (Rosenblatt, 1991). Lastly, family
firms suffer from frequent crises, and have a high degree of failure (Cater & Schwab, 2008).
To bridge this research gap, this study employs an emerging ‘homegrown’ perspective,
the behavioral agency model (BAM) or socioemotional wealth (SEW) preservation perspective
as a driving theory for this dissertation. This theoretical prism contends that the pivotal
differences between family and non-family firms lie in socioemotional wealth (SEW), a
construct used to describe the complete set of non-economic benefits that the family derives from
the firm’s management (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & Castro, 2011; Gomez-Mejia, Makri, &
Kintana, 2010; Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). As
such, FOBs frame their decisions in terms of SEW and are particularly adverse to its potential
loss. Therefore, non-financial objectives permeate the firm’s strategic behavior (Berrone, Cruz,
& Gomez-Mejia, 2012). However, how the interplay between financial objectives and SEW
shapes the strategic behavior of a family firm, when the firm’s existence is in jeopardy, still
presents open research questions.
In an effort to enhance our knowledge in this area, I investigate the FOBs’ first response
to performance decline with a three-essay project. In the first essay, I borrow from previous
1

investigations which argued against the application of knowledge acquired from the study of
large non-family firms to FOBs (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009). Thus, I question whether
FOBs are any different from their non-family counterparts when it comes to responding to
performance decline, a situation of enhanced risk and uncertainty that puts the family (financial
and socioemotional) wealth at stake. The ability to answer such a question is hindered by two
factors. First, extant knowledge on turnaround is ambiguous due to the lack of unitary
vocabulary/definitions, the absence of a common language, and the coexistence of diverging
views on the issue (Dah-Kwei, & Smith, 2006). Second, the vast literature on FOBs has often led
to mixed results, suggesting that FOBs display both agency and stewardship-driven behaviors
(Le Breton-Miller, & Miller, 2009). Therefore, this specific essay offers a review of the
significant turnaround literature in tandem with the latest advances in the SEW literature. I argue
that the recently proposed multi-dimensional definition of the SEW construct (Berrone et al.,
2012), and the availability of direct measures for those dimensions, might provide a novel and
meaningful perspective on this topic. Looking at the intersection of the two literatures (i.e.,
turnaround and SEW), I identify the meaningful gaps concerning corporate turnaround in family
firms and propose a research agenda, which offers a set of testable research questions.
The second essay builds on the BAM’s (behavioral agency model) assumption that
FOBs shape their decision making in such a way so as to preserve the family SEW, although this
often comes at the expense of a firm’s performance (Berrone et.al.,2010; Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2010). This holds true unless a significant threat to the firm’s survival is recognized by the
family-owner as a potential complete loss of the inextricably linked SEW (Dębicki, 2012).
However, it is still unclear how much of a threat will prove necessary to alter the FOB's strategic
preferences. Thus, the second essay investigates the relationship between SEW considerations
and FOB turnaround strategies through the analysis of a panel of declining publicly-traded
family-controlled firms (N= 416). The essay also addresses contingencies, which shape the SEW
consideration-turnaround strategy relationship. Specifically, I consider the role of urgency of the
organizational decline and organizational slack. The findings suggest that SEW is negatively
2

associated with retrenchment intensity. In addition, slack was confirmed to be potentially selfdeceptive for FOB owners. However, the results for the moderating effect of urgency appears to
suggest that, under conditions of significant threat to a firm’s survival, an FOB’s principal is
willing to sacrifice its financial well-being and take the firm under his stewardship, effectively
doing what is necessary to save the company.
The third essay takes a reductionist approach to investigate how SEW affects FOB
turnaround strategies. Specifically, I account for the recently proposed definition of SEW as a
multidimensional construct (Berrone et al., 2012). I draw from the behavioral agency theory with
insights from stakeholder theory and develop hypotheses regarding the differential effects of the
SEW dimensions on turnaround strategies implemented by FOBs. This study is the first
empirical investigation to directly measure the multiple dimensions of SEW and connect them to
the strategic behavior of FOBs. The study of a panel of declining publicly-traded familycontrolled firms (N = 416) provides partial support for my hypotheses. That is, FOBs appear to
frame their decisions so as to preserve the support of those stakeholders that the owning-family
considers salient, in order to keep deriving SEW from their firm. In addition, FOBs were found
to define their decline-stemming strategies (i.e., cost retrenchment intensity and sales increase
intensity) neither for purely instrumental motives nor for purely normative motives. My findings
substantiated Cennamo et al.’s (2012) findings concerning proactive stakeholder engagement
strategies. I provide empirical, albeit indirect, support to the propositions advanced in that
particular study. FOB behavior appears to be driven by a combination of instrumental and
normative motives (Cennamo et al., 2012). Specifically, the study of the saliency of stakeholders
appears to be suitable in defining which set of motives would prevail.
All in all, the topic addressed in this dissertation and the theoretical and empirical
approaches allow me to make a significant contribution and provide meaningful implications for
theory and practice.

3

Essay 1: Turnaround in Family Firms a Research Agenda
1 INTRODUCTION
What should firms do when they face significant performance declines? This managerial
conundrum has driven over three decades of research, yet we have fallen short of a clear solution
to this fundamental business issue (Arogyaswamy, Barker, & Yasai-Ardekani, 1995). The lack of
prescription concerning the appropriate reaction to organizational decline is more evident when it
comes to family-owned businesses (FOBs) (Cater & Schwab, 2008), an organizational form with
unique characteristics given the embeddedness of business relationships in family relationships
(Chua, Chrisman, & Steier, 2003). This is particularly puzzling for multiple reasons. Family
businesses are the predominant type of business across the globe (Colli, Pérez, & Rose, 2003;
Gersick, Lansberg, Desjardins, & Dunn, 1999; Gersick, 1997). Recent estimates indicate that
there are 5.5 million family-businesses in the USA (FEUSA, 2011), they make up over fifty
percent of the national gross domestic product (GDP), nearly $8.3 trillion, and employ about
63% of the national workforce (FEUSA, 2011). In addition, family-controlled publicly-traded
firms represent over 35% of the total number of the S&P 500 firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).
Lastly, family firms suffer from frequent crises, and have a high degree of failure (Cater &
Schwab, 2008). Therefore, given the significant economic role that FOBs play across the globe,
the question of how managers of FOBs should govern their companies to turn them around
represents a significant area of inquiry for both managerial and research perspectives.
The prescriptions on how a firm should go about severe performance decline are, to date,
ambiguous. Over time scholarly opinions on turnaround responses, the set of strategies
undertaken by firms in attempting to halt and revert the performance declines that significantly
jeopardize firm survival, have changed (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Firstly, a strand of research
made the case for the existence of the content of successful turnaround (Hofer, 1980). That is,
the existence of a combination of strategies which need to be defined as a function of the causes
of decline. Such strategies, once implemented – in a cross sectional fashion – allow the
discrimination between successful and unsuccessful turnaround (Hofer, 1980; O’Neill, 1986;
4

Schendel & Patton, 1976; Sutton, Eisenhardt, & Jucker, 1986; Thiétart, 1988). Secondly, an
opposing stream of research argued for the turnaround as a multi stage process. According to this
perspective, firms should first halt and stabilize the financial bleeding through retrenchment (i.e.,
asset divestment, cost reduction, downsizing and down scoping), and subsequently return to
growth though recovery strategies (investment in order to reposition the firm) (Pearce &
Robbins, 1993; Robbins, Pearce, & John, 1992). As such, retrenchment is a universal and
necessary stage in the turnaround process, and a strategy able to revert the decline of the firm
(Pearce & Robbins, 1994b). Thirdly, evolutions of the turnaround process perspective supported
the multi stage nature of turnaround (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Barker & Mone, 1994), but this
perspective proposed also that retrenchment could actually be detrimental for a firm’s turnaround
performance (Barker & Mone, 1994). In fact, retrenchment and recovery are considered
independent strategies. Nevertheless, each one of them is necessary but not sufficient to turn the
firm around (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Lastly, empirical evidence provided a set of
contingencies and various contextual variables deemed able to shape turnaround strategies:
cultural context (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Wan, 2003; Falkenberg, Chong, & Prinz, 2004), economic
conditions (Chakrabarti, Vidal, & Mitchell, 2011; Francis & Desai, 2005; Pearce & Michael,
2006; Rosenblatt, 1991), industry (Morrow, Johnson, & Busenitz, 2004), and the firm’s size and
life cycle (Francis & Desai, 2005; Rasheed, 2005). Despite the relatively vast number of studies,
researchers have generated scant knowledge, whose advancement is hindered by the lack of
unitary vocabulary/definitions, the absence of a common language, and the coexistence of
diverging views on the issue.
In this study, I borrow from previous investigations which argued against the mere
application of knowledge acquired from the study of large non-family firms to FOBs. By so
doing, I question whether FOBs are any different from their non-family counterparts when it
comes to responding to performance decline, a situation of enhanced risk and uncertainty that
puts the family wealth at stake. Conflicting arguments can be invoked to inform this question (Le
Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009). In fact, scholars made the case for family firms as organizations
5

guided by dysfunctional families, driven by egoistic and self-serving objectives (Schulze,
Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003) while also embedded with nepotism — wherein the family-owner
strives to curb managerial decisions in order to impose a risk adverse family’s agenda over the
business (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Conversely, others made the case
for family firms as driven by higher order values (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997), a
desire of generational succession that spurs the long-sighted management of the firm’s resources
(Zahra, 2003). These scholars framed family-managers as organizational stewards who strive to
pursue what is good for the business’ survival and foster the business prosperity in the long run
(Davis et al., 1997; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008). The vast literature on FOBs
has often led to mixed results, suggesting that FOBs display both conflicting behaviors.
To reconcile the opposing perspectives, an emerging ‘homegrown’ perspective will
contend that the pivotal differences between family and non-family firms lie in the
socioemotional wealth (SEW), a construct used to describe the complete set of non-economic
benefits that the family derives from the firm’s management (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, &
Castro, 2011; Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel,
Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). In other words, being a family firm is not merely a matter
of equity holding (Brooks, 2002). FOBs frame their decisions in terms of SEW and are
particularly adverse to its potential loss. Therefore, non-financial objectives permeate the firm’s
strategic behavior (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). However, how the interplay between
financial objectives and SEW shapes the family firms strategic behavior, when the firm’s
existence is in jeopardy, still presents open research questions.
To bridge the abovementioned gaps regarding turnaround in family-owned businesses, I
offer, in this paper, a review of the significant turnaround literature in tandem with the latest
advances in the SEW literature. I contend that the recently proposed multi-dimensional definition
of the SEW construct (Berrone et al., 2012), and the contextual availability of direct measures for
those dimensions, might provide a novel and meaningful perspective on this topic. Therefore,
looking at the intersection of the two literatures (i.e., turnaround and SEW), I strive to detect the
6

meaningful gaps concerning corporate turnaround in family firms. The aim is to spur further
investigations on the topic by proposing a research agenda, which offers a set of testable research
questions.
The present research offers multiple contributions. First, I strive to attract scholarly
attention to an extremely critical but comparatively understudied topic. Indeed, theoretical and
empirical obstacles challenge the study of FOB response to performance decline (Arogyaswamy
et al., 1995; Morrow et al., 2004; Whetten, 1980). However, the topic is particularly salient since
turnaround strategies are critical to guarantee the survival of firms suffering from significant
organizational decline (Cater & Schwab, 2008). In fact, failing to understand the strategies
needed to revitalize an ailing business translates into managers who are poorly equipped on how
to react and turn the firm around in the face of decline (Brooks, 2002; Sutton et al., 1986), an
inability to face decline, regardless of whether the decline originated by the firm’s inefficiencies
(i.e. firm-based decline) or by economic downturn1 (i.e. industry based decline) (Sutton et al.,
1986). Second, relying on the relevant literature in family firms and corporate turnaround, I
address the following two research questions: 1) are FOBs any different from their non-family
counterpart in their turnaround process?, and 2) if this is so, whose priorities come with regard to
turnaround strategies, the family or the business? While I anticipate the existence of significant
differences between the two organizational types, much more still remains to be unveiled, as
shown by the research questions above. Third, I give continuity to the quest for the validation of
the SEW perspective as a ‘theory of the family firms’(Berrone et al., 2012; Cennamo, Berrone,
Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012), and propose ways in which scholars could find its boundaries. In
addition, I anticipate that each sub-dimension of SEW might affect the turnaround process
differently. This is consistent with those who argue against a mere dichotomy of family versus
non-family business, and make the case for heterogeneity within family firms (Litz, Pearson, &
Litchfield, 2011; Yu, Lumpkin, Sorenson, & Brigham, 2011).
1

In the USA over 500,000 declining firms went bankrupt during each one of the recession waves that have hit the
country since 2000 (Pearce & Michael, 2006), as the downturn exacerbated the speed of decline.
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The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 provides an
overview of the theory of family firms and a review of the SEW-related literature. Section 3
provides the ontology of corporate turnaround and a comprehensive model of the turnaround
process. Section 4 sheds light on the juncture between the two above-mentioned literatures. More
specifically, this last section suggests how insight from the SEW perspective could be used as
analytical tools to study turnaround in family firms. I conclude the last section of this paper by
proposing an agenda for future research on the topic and offering a series of testable research
questions.
2 THEORIES OF FAMILY FIRMS
A family-owned business (FOB) is defined as a “…business governed and/or managed
with the intention to shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition
controlled by members of the same family or a small number of families in a manner that is
potentially sustainable across generations of the family or families (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma,
1999, p. 25). This definition implies that 1) a major premise of FOBs is the inclusion of a
family’s values and vision of the business in the firm’s management, and 2) family firms have
objectives that are beyond simple financial success. Therefore, scholars have considered it as
inappropriate to simply apply the knowledge developed outside the family firm realm to this
organizational form and adapted available theoretical backgrounds.
The theoretical prisms employed by scholars to explain and predict the strategic behavior
of FOBs have changed over time. While early studies conceived of family firms as a superior
organizational structures, given the absence of managerial opportunism and alignment of
ownership and management interests (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983), subsequent investigations
made the case for the existence of a different type of opportunism in FOBs. The latter refers to
lateral opportunism associated with a majority shareholder (i.e., blockholder) expropriating
wealth from minority shareholders (e.g., Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The evolution of family
business as a scholarly field has led to the recognition of the importance of the family-owner’s
8

emotional involvement with the firm. By doing so, scholars moved away from considering the
family-owner as a self-serving constituency engaged in opportunistic behaviors to achieve
financial success at the expense of non-family constituencies. As such, researchers included
additional components (besides the family-owner, the management, and the non-family
shareholders) in the FOB research domain, such as the altruism of a family-owner towards other
family members (e.g., Jensen, 1994; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2002; Schulze et al., 2003). In
addition to the arguments made by invoking the conflicting relationships between a firm’s owner
and its managers, an opposing stream of research considered managers in family business as
family stewards, driven by higher order needs as opposed to self-serving, egoistic and
opportunistic motives (Davis et al., 1997). Consequently, arguments based on theoretical
frameworks built on opposite assumptions led scholars to be unable to explain the inconsistent
empirical evidence, supporting at one time an agency perspective and at another time a
stewardship perspective.
A different stream of research suggested that the interaction of family members with the
business unit and the family unit creates an idiosyncratic set of resources and capabilities which
may affect FOBs’ ability to generate economic rent. Such a unique set of resources and
capabilities, referred to as the familiness of the firm (Habbershon & Williams, 1999), was
deemed to be a source of advantage by some scholars, and as a constraint to the firm’s wealth
creation by others (Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003). Indeed, scholars employed a
resource-based view (RBV) argument to support the claim that familiness is a source of
sustained competitive advantage, whereby FOBs are able to over-perform their non-family
counterparts (Habbershon et al., 2003). The ultimate goal of an FOB was considered to be
transgenerational wealth creation. However, others questioned the notion of familiness as
distinctive resources, making the case for familiness as potentially “constrictive” (Chrisman,
Chua, & Litz, 2003, p. 470). In other words, relying on the assumption that wealth creation may
not be the sole or the pivotal goal of an FOB, scholars inherently acknowledged that a family
firm owner pursues the maximization of a utility function, which includes both economic and
9

non-economics objectives, or value creation (Chrisman et al., 2003; Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua,
1997). As such, the involvement of the family in the business and its interaction with the firm
may lead the family firm to pursue value creation as opposed to wealth generation. This implies
that an FOB’s owner may divert the firm’s resources in order to create non-economic benefits
(Chrisman et al., 2003). The abovementioned conflicting arguments opened the necessity for the
development of a “homegrown” theory of FOBs, the socioemotional wealth perspective.
The remainder of this section discusses the prevailing theories adopted by scholars in the
FOB research domain and offers a review of the intellectual arguments present in the field of
family business that led to the development of the socioemotional wealth perspective.
2.1 The Agency Theory Based Perspective of Family Firms
Agency theory originates in the field of economics and addresses the emergence of
opportunism in cooperative relationships between individuals with conflicting interests.
Specifically, agency theory contends that when an individual (the principal) delegates work to
another subject (the agent) who will perform the work on the principal’s behalf, there is potential
for conflict of interest (agency cost type I) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This conflict is defined as
the agency problem, and it results from the agency relationship (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). This particular type of conflict relies on two premises: 1) the principal’s and
agent’s interests are always divergent, and 2) the agent’s and principal’s risk preference
divergence may lead to conflict in strategic preference and decision making (Fama & Jensen,
1983). The information asymmetry between an agent and a principal triggers two agency
problems: moral hazard and adverse selection (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004). In particular, a
principal may contract an agent who is unable to fulfill the contract’s obligations (i.e., adverse
selection), or the agent can take advantage of asymmetric information and misuse the principal’s
resources for personal benefit (Alchian, 1988). Although an agent’s opportunism can be
contained though monitoring or incentives, the imperfect nature of contracts implies that agency
problems can merely be reduced, not eliminated (Alchian, 1988). Therefore, a principal can only
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reduce an agent’s opportunism, but this generates managerial inefficiencies or agency cost of
type I.
In family firms the firm’s ownership and management are aligned. The presumed absence
of conflicting interests led scholars to infer the absence of an agency problem in FOBs (Fama &
Jensen, 1983). However, a deeper understanding of the agency issue in FOBs has emerged with
more recent studies (Chrisman et al., 2004), which make the case for the existence of multiple
types of agency cost.
The evolution of agency assumptions in FOBs accounted for a different type of
opportunism, lateral opportunism (i.e., principal to principal). Indeed, both agents and principals
are driven by economic and non-economic goals (Perrow, 1986; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
Hence, principals might behave opportunistically in regards to other principals, and pursue noneconomic utility maximization (Giddens, 1979). Lateral opportunism results from moral hazard,
a form of opportunism arising from asymmetric distribution of information. Majority
shareholders may impose their will over the firm’s management, and hinder its ability to pursue
decisions driven by economic rationality (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Further, a firm’s resources
might be invested in a project, leading to the maximization of majority shareholders’ returns
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006). A strategic decision might be stopped or changed in order to
preserve the control that a majority shareholder enjoys over the firm, regardless of the
implications that this may have on the firm’s overall financial performance (Gomez-Mejia,
Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001). In order to contain these agency issues, specific corporate
governance mechanisms, such as the board of directors, need to be put in place to oversee the
family-owner, who holds large blocks of the firm’s stocks (the owner of a large block of stocks is
often referred to as the firm’s blockholder; Lane, Astrachan, Keyt, & McMillan, 2006). This
action, of course, will increase the bureaucratic costs of the organization (the agency cost type
II).
Altruism, an individual’s utility connected to a second individual’s welfare, is used to
provide a deeper insight into the agency relationship in family firms. On the one side, several
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studies expound the positive outcome of altruism by considering it as an incentive for family
members to be less selfish and more thoughtful in their relationships with others. This is possible
by fostering a sense of collectivity among the family members involved in the firms, increasing
the information sharing among family members, and enhancing willingness to take strategic risk
(Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Jensen, 1994; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005; Schulze et al.,
2003). However, other studies show how altruism might generate different agency costs
(Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001; Schulze et al., 2003). More specifically, altruism
triggers nepotism, biased strategic decisions toward the preservation of family bonds, and
encourages the managers’ career advancement based on kinship ties (Chrisman, Chua, &
Sharma, 2005; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). This evidence suggests altruism can be a “double edge
sword” (Dyer & Handler, 1994, p. 405), which can reduce or enhance agency cost depending
upon contingencies. Therefore, in contrast with the early agency theory predictions, family firms
are not organizational forms free from agency problems; they just suffer from a different type of
agency problem.
2.2 The Stewardship Theory Perspective of Family Firms
Stewardship is an additional theoretical prism able to provide useful insights regarding
the ownership and management relationships in family firms. The theory contends how
managers aim at higher order objectives while performing their duty. Thus, they are conceived as
self-actualizing individuals, driven by collective serving and higher order needs as opposed to
opportunism (Davis et al., 1997). Managers are a firm’s stewards, who act with altruism towards
their organization and the stakeholders in general (Davis et al., 1997; Davis, Schoorman, Mayer,
& Tan, 2000). Stewards draw their satisfaction and sense of fulfillment of higher order needs by
embracing the firm’s objectives and goals, maximizing the return for the firm’s owners, and
staying committed to their firm’s success even though this requires sacrifice of self-interest
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). Employing stewardship theory to describe executives’
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attitude is particularly meaningful in FOBs, where the firm’s leaders are often family members,
or strongly emotionally tied to the family owner.
FOB managers are family stewards, and as such they manage the business making longsighted decisions in the firm’s best interests. Studies employing stewardship theory show how
leaders in family firms are deeply committed to the firm’s goals, value the firm’s human
resources, nurture the relationship with the firm’s stakeholders, and strive to maximize the firm’s
and family owner’s success (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005, 2006). In a stewardship
perspective, both FOB managers and owners carry an emotional endowment in the company that
leads them to invest in enhancing the success of the firms (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005).
Indeed, their personal satisfaction is a function of the firm’s longevity, reputation, and prosperity
(Corbetta & Salvato, 2004).
Agency and stewardship theories provide significant insight regarding the strategic
behavior and risk preferences of FOBs. Nevertheless, both suffer from a fundamental
shortcoming. Indeed, scholars employing the two competing theoretical prisms have often
arrived at inconsistent results, and have been unable to explain why FOBs appear to behave some
times as stewards and at other times as agents (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Over time, scholars
have struggled to adapt the existing theoretical paradigms to account for the overlap of three
subsystems in FOBs: the family, the ownership, and the business (Davis & Tagiuri, 1982;
Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). For instance, Schulze and colleagues (2001; 2002; 2003) proposed
altruism as a component of the agency relationship in family firms. However, their research
effort did not fully predict and, then, explain the strategic behavior of FOBs. According to the
early definition of altruism, family agents were altruistic towards the family members running
the business by ensuring the firm’s prosperity (Schulze et al., 2001). In turn this implied a wise
management of the firm’s resources and the pursuit of economic rationality and efficiency in
family firms as a way to perpetuate the family members’ welfare (Le Breton-Miller & Miller,
2008). An additional stream of research defines altruism in family firms as a set of non-economic
facets of the business, whereby family-agents receive satisfaction from being altruistic and
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granting privileges to family employees regardless of whether those privileges are deserved
(Lubatkin et al., 2005; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007). Hence, following
this perspective, altruism is the seed for nepotism. In this case, FOBs prioritize the fulfillment of
obligations based on blood-ties over business needs (Lubatkin et al., 2005). Despite the
shortcomings of the current theory and its application in the FOB research context, empirical and
theoretical endeavors in the field of family business identified a common thread: emotions in
family firms play a significant role given the intertwined nature of the business itself and family
embeddedness in that business.
2.3 RBV and Familiness
The RBV represents an additional theoretical prism used in the FOB research domain. It
attempts to explain the behavior and the performance of FOBs themselves. Habbershon and
Williams (1999) first employed systems theory thinking to identify the “unique bundle of
resources a particular firm has because of the systems interaction between the family, its
individual members, and the business” (p. 11). These authors refer to such a set of unique
characteristics as to the “familiness of the firm” (p. 12). From an RBV perspective, familiness
represents a set of idiosyncratic resources and capabilities which are unique to a specific firm,
and thereby may allow the FOB to implement the value-creating strategies not simultaneously
implemented by other firms (Barney, 1991), known as competitive advantage. However, further
advances in the RBV-familiness perspective suggested a diverging view on the issue.
In a follow up study, Habbershon et al. (2003) suggested the role of familiness as both a
distinctive and a constrictive influence on firm performance, depending upon a specific
contingency. That is, familiness was seen to be a source of competitive advantage (i.e.,
familiness as a distinctive factor) for the enterprising family, or those FOBs engaged in
transgenerational wealth creation. In fact, an FOB’s owner engaged in wealth creation for future
generations strives to identify, preserve, or develop the necessary resources for the creation of
family-based advantage. In other words, the family-owner maximizes a utility function to
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achieve transgenerational wealth creation, and by so doing increases the value of the entire
system (i.e., family, individual family members, and the business). Conversely, for those FOBs
not engaged in transgenerational wealth creation, the same factors ‒ or resources and capabilities
‒ able to generate competitiveness, become a constrictive factor with negative influence on a
firm’s competitiveness (Habbershon et al., 2003). When the objective is the mere generation of
wealth for the family, the idiosyncratic characteristics due to the interaction of multiple
subsystems in FOBs have a negative influence on value creation.
The contribution of the ‘family factor’ on the competitiveness of FOBs was further
investigated in subsequent studies. Chrisman and colleagues (2003) posited how the contingency
that moderates the effect of familiness on competitive advantage should not be ‘enterprising’
versus ‘non-enterprising’ family firms. The positive or negative role of familiness on an FOB’s
competitive advantage depends upon the ultimate goal of the FOB itself. Specifically, Chrisman
et al. (2003) suggested how FOBs may pursue the goal of either value creation or wealth
creation. Specifically, family-owners engaged in value creation strive for more than mere wealthcreation. In fact, they aspire to achieve both economic and non-economic goals, which are both
components of value for the family business. When striving for value creation, wealth creation
represents a means to achieve such an objective. Simply put, the contingencies influencing
whether familiness is constrictive or distinctive are the presence or absence of transgenerational
intention and the owning-family’s vision on the firm’s ultimate goal (Chrisman et al., 2003;
Habbershon & Williams, 1999). In summary, familiness may trigger a competitive advantage
that allows a firm to generate wealth. The wealth generated is instrumental to value-creation for
the dominant coalition of family stakeholders (Chrisman et al., 2003).
Despite the relevant theoretical advances concerning familiness, the literature has
suffered from significant empirical challenges. The pivotal challenge has been the lack of a valid
measure of familiness; scholars have not agreed upon a universal measure for the construct
(Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 2008). This resulted in empirical studies arriving to conflicting
results with respect to the effect of familiness on FOBs performance. Some scholars made the
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case for a positive relationship between familiness and firm performance (e.g., Anderson &
Reeb, 2003; Lee, 2006; Rutherford, Muse, & Oswald, 2006), while others made the case for a
negative or non-significant effect (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2004; Jaskiewicz, González, Menéndez,
& Schiereck, 2005; Westhead & Howorth, 2006). The inconsistency of empirical findings has
led to the development of competing theoretical frameworks regarding the relationship between
familiness and firm performance, which in turn hindered the advancement of a theory of the
familiness of the firm (Rutherford et al., 2008).
2.4 The Socioemotional Wealth Perspective
2.4.1 Definition of Socioemotional Wealth
Family firms differ from their non-family counterparts in as much as the former
experience an intertwined relationship between the family and the business, due to the
embeddedness of the family-owner in the firm. Scholars have stressed how the family-owner,
through the firm’s ownership, draws more than mere financial rewards from the firm (Tagiuri &
Davis, 1996). Indeed, Tagiuri and Davis (1996) developed a set of additional non–financial
benefits which resulted from the power and control that the family was able to exert over the
firm. Those benefits are typically referred to as socioemotional wealth (Gómez-Mejía et al.,
2007). The family-owner brings into and develops various emotions with the business (Dyer &
Whetten, 2006; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008). Family businesses are social groups that carry a
long history and set of memories, whereby the identity of family members is strictly connected
with the existence and prosperity of the family firm and the family’s name (Zellweger & Dehlen,
2012). The family-owner, over time, may develop a desire for generational succession
(Zellweger & Dehlen, 2012). Further, the opportunity for the creation of a family legacy is a
source of emotional satisfaction because it allows a firm’s owner to be altruistic with family
members and strengthen the ties with relevant firm stakeholders (Schulze et al., 2001).
Therefore, the pivotal difference between family and non-family businesses is essentially the role
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that the firm’s management plays with regard to the strategic direction of the firm and the impact
of the family’s socioemotional endowment.
The SEW latent construct underwent several developments over time. Indeed, this broad
construct, which encompass all the utilities that the family owner draws from the non-economic
aspects of the business (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011), has been defined as the set of “benefits that
are non-economic, and yet critical for the family principal welfare” (Cennamo et al., 2012, p. 5).
Other studies describe SEW as a “stock of affect-related value that the family has invested in the
firm” (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010, p. 82). In a similar vein, Berrone
et al. (2012, p. 2) refer to SEW as the “nonfinancial aspects or affective endowment of family
owners.” Nevertheless, unlike previous research, Berrone and colleagues (2012) contend that
SEW is a multi-dimensional construct that refers to various non-financial benefits addressing a
set of specific family-owners’ needs. However, despite the burgeoning development of SEW,
only a handful of studies have attempted to directly measure this construct, and no published
work has employed a direct measure of SEW for empirical investigation.
2.4.2 The Behavioral Agency Model: An SEW-Based Theory
The origin of the SEW perspective lays in the behavioral theory of the firms (Cyert &
March, 1963). Its use in the context of behavioral preferences of family firms required the
inclusion of components from prospect theory and the behavioral agency model (BAM) (GomezMejia et al., 2011).
BAM is an evolution of agency theory, developed in an attempt to relax the restrictive
assumption concerning the agent and principal risk preferences (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia,
1998). BAM contends that the risk preferences of decision makers are contingent upon their
expected outcomes as well as the context itself. Unlike agency theory, BAM does not assume
agents to be risk averse and principals to be risk seekers (Eisenhardt, 1989). Rather, the risk
preferences of the two players change depending on the framing of the problem they are required
to address. Decision makers frame the problems as positive or negative relying on a comparison
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of potential expected outcomes of a decision versus a reference point (Gomez-Mejia, Welbourne,
& Wiseman, 2000; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The reference point is often labeled as
point of indifference, and is a situation whereby the decision maker judges that there are neither
gains nor losses connected with the expected outcome; the point of indifference is, in other
terms, a situation of neutrality.
The notion that negatively-framed problems trigger risk-seeking behavior while
positively-framed problems enhance risk aversion results from the inclusion of prospect theory
principles in BAM. Indeed, prospect theory argues that a loss has a stronger psychological
impact (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), whereby facing problems in the domain of gain leads to
risk aversion. In other words, the decision maker believes that a sure gain is worth more than an
uncertain gain resulting from a gamble (Bromiley, 2010). However, the same problem framed in
the domain of loss triggers risk-seeking preference in a loss-adverse decision maker (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979).
The behavioral agency model route of the SEW perspective suggests that, as the SEW
consideration increases, the family firm will tend to display risk aversion when facing decisions
potentially resulting in a loss in the accumulated endowment associated with the firm. In fact, as
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) proffer, “loss aversion explains a preference of riskier
actions to avoid an anticipated loss altogether . . . risk preferences of loss-averse decision makers
will vary with the framing of problems in order to prevent losses to accumulated endowment”
(Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998, p. 135). Accumulated endowment in this context is defined
as something that: 1) the decision makers deem significant for their personal welfare, 2) has
already been accumulated over time, and 3) is currently at the disposal of the decision maker. For
the family-owner, the accumulated endowment is the affective endowment embedded in the
firms, namely the socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Hence, a family firm
decision maker who faces venture risk (e.g., corporate diversification), because of the SEW, will
shift the framing of this reference point towards increased aversion to risk taking (Gomez-Mejia
et al., 2010). The importance that the family ascribes to the SEW will therefore define the gravity
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of the potential risk associated with corporate diversification and results in differences in the
extent to which an FOB undertakes corporate diversification.
In the context of SEW, the notion of gain and loss deviates from the general literature
that connects them to the concept of financial risk. Following Gomez-Mejia et al.’s (2011)
argument, FOBs define gain and loss in terms of SEW, which is a pivotal frame of reference for
the management of the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). This implies that we need to refrain
from considering family firms as irrational decision makers. Indeed, family firms appear to be as
rational as their non-family counterparts; the significant differences are in the strategies
undertaken by this organization type. It is important to understand that their risk preferences
emanate from the FOBs’ reliance on the SEW frame of reference. As a result, the selection
among available managerial choices relies on the judgment of whether or not the SEW
embedded in the firms will be preserved. While for non-family firms financial objectives serve
as the most relevant drivers of decision making, in FOBs this role is played by the family’s
affective endowment (Berrone et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2011). Central to SEW-based arguments is the concept that FOBs are highly sensitive to the loss
of affective endowment, whereas they are relatively more tolerant for the loss of financial
welfare (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Therefore, FOB managers, when faced with alternative
strategies, would be willing to sacrifice financial wealth in order to avoid a loss of SEW
(Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; GomezMejia et al., 2010). Although this might seem to suggest that financial objectives and SEW are
always in trade-off, scholars are currently investigating the conditions under which the familyprincipal in pursuit of SEW impacts the firm’s financial performance positively (Cennamo et al.,
2012).
Evidence of the SEW perspective of family firms was first provided by Gomez-Mejia and
colleagues (2007). In an empirical study concerning family-owned olive mills, Gómez-Mejia et
al. (2007) took an SEW perspective to explain the trade-off that FOBs experience between the
risks associated with financial and non-financial outcomes. Specifically, the authors explained
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the manner in which FOBs weighed potential losses of SEW vis-à-vis potential losses of
financial performance resulting from a strategic decision. In their study, Gomez-Mejia et al.
(2007) used SEW to show the various elements of affective endowment that families derived
from their firms: family control and influence over the firm, identification of family members
with the firm, altruism towards family and non-family members, emotional attachment, and the
ability to perpetuate the dynastic succession. Additionally, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) studied the
willingness of Spanish family-owned olives mills to join a cooperative — a strategy associated
with the loss of control over the family business — and showed that FOBs experiencing
performance hazards were willing to accept loss of control over their firms in an attempt to avoid
the firm’s failure, and prevent the complete loss of the affective endowment. In other words, a
family principal facing abrupt performance decline will ascribe higher importance to the firm’s
continuity rather than to his personal benefit (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). These results were
echoed by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010), among others, in an empirical investigation concerning the
diversification strategies of family firms. The authors showcased how family agents were
typically adverse to corporate diversification, including international diversification, in order to
preserve their socioemotional endowment in the firms. However, under conditions of high
systematic risk, high unsystematic risk, and decline in performance, the concern for the firm’s
continuity triggers a higher risk propensity and mitigates the desire to enhance SEW. All in all,
the SEW-based domain of research developed by Gomez-Mejia and colleagues (2007; 2010;
2011) suggests that family firms are neither less nor more risk adverse than their non-family
counterparts; rather, a different set of priorities shapes their willingness to bear risk.
Additionally, whether their risk preference is beneficial for or detrimental to the firm’s financial
performance might be contingent upon the context faced by the family-owner.
The central role that the SEW preservation instinct plays in shaping the strategic behavior
of FOBs is incontrovertible. Indeed, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) contend that the main difference
between family and non-family firms is largely based upon the desire of family-owners to
preserve the emotional endowment embedded in the firms. However, while a multitude of
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studies invoke the SEW preservation rationale in order to explain the differences in the strategies
undertaken by FOBs versus their non-family counterparts, the nexus between the importance of
SEW for the family and the FOBs’ strategic behavior still remains unexplained. Indeed, many
scholars maintain that the extent to which family-principals deem SEW important shapes the
problem framing and decision making in FOBs (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Zellweger & Dehlen,
2012). However, only a handful of empirical investigations studied the causal relationship
between the degree of importance ascribed to SEW and its outcomes (e.g., risk preference,
strategic choices, etc.) (Berrone et al., 2010; Dębicki, 2012). Furthermore, previous empirical
efforts tested these relationships by measuring SEW using proxies, which overlooked part of the
complexity of the SEW construct. This particular shortcoming can now be addressed by
employing a more complete and precise measurement of the SEW construct in all its multiple
sub-dimensions (Berrone et al., 2012). Therefore, future investigations should be able to make a
stronger case for the relationship between SEW intensity and the strategic behavior of FOBs.
Ultimately, this would enable the development of a more robust understanding of the
heterogeneity among FOBs.
2.4.3

Operationalization the SEW Construct
The lack of a standard definition and operationalization of SEW has led to the

development of an array of different measures in the construct’s operationalization. Indeed, some
studies rely on a dichotomization of SEW, performing a comparison between family and nonfamily firms. As such, FOBs are seen as a homogeneous category in which the family that owns
and manages the firm experiences socioemotional endowment (Berrone et al., 2010; GómezMejía et al., 2007). For example, Mesquita et al. (2012) performed a comparison between listed
and privately-held Brazilian firms, assuming a homogenous presence of SEW concerns across
private firms deemed to be family-owned (Mesquita et al., 2012). Miller et al. (2012) measured
SEW by employing the percentage of family ownership complemented with corporate
governance variables (i.e., family chairman of the board, family CEO duality, and family
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members seated on the board of directors), family involvement in the firm’s management
(number of family officers), and generational involvement in the firms. Other studies,
meanwhile, relied on a dummy variable to perform family versus non family business
comparisons. To do so, they attributed the presence of the desire for SEW preservation to all
those firms where two or more directors were members of the owner-family, and where the
family ownership was at least equal to 10 percent (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). In an attempt to
assess the value ascribed by family firms to their SEW endowment, Zellweger and colleagues
(2011) opted for an operationalization of SEW based on proxies such as family ownership
(percentage of family’s controlling shares), duration of family ownership, and intention of
transgenerational control. However, in a follow up study, Zellweger and Dehlen (2012)
suggested how a family’s affective endowment in the firm biases their perception of the value of
the stakes in the firms. Therefore, these authors conceptualized SEW as the absolute difference
between the value ascribed by the family to the firm’s ownership and the market value of the
firm’s shares (Zellweger & Dehlen, 2012). Despite the valuable insights provided by the indirect
empirical evidence based on SEW proxies, a significant call has been made in the family
business field for research with a more direct measurement of SEW and its consequences on the
management of FOBs.
2.4.4 Limitations of Extant Literature on SEW
The reliance on family ownership and family involvement in the firm’s management as a
proxy for SEW might represent an oversimplification. Indeed, Berrone et al. (2012) proposed
how SEW can be considered a multidimensional construct, and family power and control over
the business were just two of these dimensions. Studies that measured SEW through family
power and control over the business have justified such choices by invoking a positive
correlation between those variables (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Examples of variables being
used as approximations of SEW are: percentage of family voting share, number of family
members on the board of directors, and numbers of family officers (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011).
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Others posit that the family’s socioemotional endowment is strictly dependent on the family’s
ability to exert power and control over their business (Zellweger et al., 2011). Hence, power and
control are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the SEW to exist (Zellweger et al., 2011).
In addition, family-owners with equal degrees of control and ownership over the business might
perceive SEW differently (Salvato & Aldrich, 2012). Therefore, in order to account for the
heterogeneity among FOBs, scholars should refrain from dichotomizing the SEW preservation
desire (absence versus presence), and avoid using just one of the SEW dimensions as an
approximation of a far more complex construct.
2.4.5 The FIBER Model: A Future Direction for SEW-Based Research
Recent studies in the family business research domain proposed a multidimensional
definition of the SEW construct. Berrone et al. (2012) contended that SEW perception in family
business might differ from firm to firm, in spite of the FOBs’ common corporate governance and
ownership structure. Berrone and colleagues (2012) disentangled SEW, and posited how family
control and influence, identification of family members with the firm, binding social ties,
emotional attachment of family members, and renewal of family bonds to the firm through
dynastic succession are all pivotal non-financial benefits that the family-owner can derive from
the family venture (Berrone et al., 2012; Cennamo et al., 2012). This “FIBER” model suggests
that the FOB’s risk-bearing preferences, strategic and managerial decisions, might be affected
differently according to which among the five dimensions the family-owner considers more
important and that he/she must urgently fulfill.
Family control and influence. The first SEW sub-dimension is family control and
influence. This refers to the non-financial benefit that the family-owners derive from the ability
to exert control over the business and impose their decisions, in spite of whether those are driven
by self-serving desire or economic rationale (Berrone et al., 2012; Jones, Makri, & GomezMejia, 2008). The significance of this dimension has been addressed in studies which examined
the role of altruism in family firms (e.g., Lubatkin et al., 2005). Studies have shown that FOBs
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can impose unorthodox decisions over the business (e.g., being altruistic towards family
members by offering blood-related managers career advancement). Additionally, scholars
developed a measurement scale, the F-PEC (family power, control and experience), to document
family influence and control over the business (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002; Klein,
Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005). In more recent studies, family control and influence were closely
approximated by the commonly used proxy for SEW (e.g., family officers, family directors, and
family ownership) (Berrone et al., 2012). The power and control over the firms are necessary to
be able to enjoy the socioemotional endowment in the firms; accordingly family-owners are
particularly sensitive to the preservation of their ability to impose their will on the business
(Zellweger et al., 2011). Such priority is supported by multiple empirical studies. Family firms
have the tendency to avoid strategies potentially able to dilute the family ownership (e.g. merger)
(Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010); FOBs appoint a family CEO and a family chairman
of the board, and train intensely and socialize non-family officers to preserve the family’s culture
and values. Additional studies found that FOBs rely on kinship ties for promotion decisions, and
display aversion to external debt financing that might expose the firm to an enhanced pressure
from external stakeholders (e.g., lenders) (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). An FOB’s loss aversion
for their power and control over the business might outweigh the financial considerations when
making a strategic decision. In other words, in their SEW accounting, the family-owner is
willing to bear with the cost of a decline in financial performance in exchange for the
preservation of their ability to arbitrarily exert power and control over the firm.
Family members’ identification with the firm. A further dimension of the SEW construct
is the family members’ identification with the firm. This dimension originates from the intense
integration of the family and business subsystems in FOBs (Ding, 2008). Indeed, while common
wisdom might lead us to assume that family members take part in the family’s enterprise in order
to maximize their personal economic wellbeing, such a utilitarian approach would not explain
the variance in the degree of family involvement in the firm across family businesses (Ding,
2008). In other words, a utilitarian economic rationale does not explain why a family member
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who is potentially able to maximize his/her economic objectives decides not to do so, but still
participates with the business. Family members get involved and participate in the family
endeavor to obtain emotional satisfaction from such actions. Family members’ objectives are to
fulfill the needs for identification and belonging to the family-enterprise which is connected with
the family’s name (Berrone et al., 2012). This strong connection between the business and the
family name makes family principals particularly sensitive to the preservation of the firm’s
reputation and concerned with the image of the family’s business (Cennamo et al., 2012). In fact,
invoking a social identity perspective, scholars have argued that family members’ participation
in the business will depend upon the firm’s ability to enhance their status. The participation will
be fostered if the business is able to convey to external stakeholders a positive organizational
image; this in turn would represent a positive image and the high status of the members of the
family business (Ding, 2008). Participating in the family’s enterprise allows family members to
address questions like “who we are” and “what do we want to be.” Moreover, in order to be
associated with a high status group, family members need to protect the reputation and the image
of the firm, as well as ensure that the firm is clearly seen both inside and outside the business as
an extension of the family (Ding, 2008; McKenny, Short, Zachary, & Payne, 2011). Recent
empirical evidence posited that family-owners strongly identify with their firms, take pride from
the participation in the business, and permeate the firms up to the point that the family’s
normative identity (i.e., concern for non-economic objectives) is mirrored by the company’s
institutional narrative (e.g., letters to stakeholders, company mission statement, and company
website) (McKenny et al., 2011). Further support for the strategic consequences of a family’s
identification with the firm is provided by several empirical investigations. These studies showed
that family firms, in respect to their non-family counterparts, invest more in corporate social
responsibility (Dyer & Whetten, 2006), are more mindful of the firm’s environmental
performance (Berrone et al., 2010), care more about their stakeholders (Cennamo et al., 2012),
and tend to undertake less aggressive accounting choices (Cascino, Pugliese, Mussolino, &
Sansone, 2010). The common thread of these strategic decisions is the family’s enhanced
25

aversion to loss of SEW vis-à-vis financial loss. Thus, FOBs are willing to bear the costs of
strategic behavior tilted to maintaining a positive image and reputation inside and outside the
firms. In fact, failing to do so would inherently jeopardize the family’s social identity and would
represent a significant loss of the family’s SEW.
Binding social ties. The origin of the SEW dimension binding social ties is rooted in the
concept of altruism, which is found in family-owned businesses. The binding social ties
dimension is the result of the emotional satisfaction that family members derive from their ability
to establish and maintain social connections with their kin (Cruz, Gómez-Mejia, & Becerra,
2010; Cruz, Justo, & De Castro, 2012), and from offering a membership into a close network
(the family business) to the non-family members connected with the firms (Berrone et al., 2012).
Empirical and anecdotal evidence shows that FOBs experience long term relationships with
buyers and suppliers (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), and enjoy relationships based on a sense
of solidarity, trust, closeness, and reciprocity (Lubatkin et al., 2005; Schulze et al., 2003). Family
businesses develop, over time, loyal and stable connections with the firm’s stakeholders, and
enjoy the emotional return from being altruistic with them (Lubatkin et al., 2005). This, in turn,
enhances the reputation and the image of the family owner. The recognition resulting from being
altruistic with relevant others is supported by empirical studies reporting how FOBs, in respect to
non-family firms, are more prone to sponsor local charity events (Dyer & Whetten, 2006), and
are more sensible to environmental issues when embedded in the local community (e.g., Berrone
et al., 2010). Additionally, family business employees and managers enjoy longer tenure and are
less likely to suffer from massive layoffs (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Gomez-Mejia, LarrazaKintana, & Makri, 2003). Hence, the rationale behind the inclusion of binding social ties in the
SEW construct lies primarily in two main factors: instrumental motives and normative motives
(Cennamo et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). On the one hand, family-owners, by carefully
managing their relationship with stakeholders (internal and external, family and non-family),
enhance their image and reputation, which in turn increases the emotional endowment that the
family derives from the firm (instrumental use of binding social ties) (Berrone et al., 2012;
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Cennamo et al., 2012). On the other hand, unlike regular shareholders, family-owners are not
anonymous individuals, they are often vital parts of the firm’s connections, and their personal
ties are managed by the family members on behalf of the firm. Thus, owner-family members
derive emotional satisfaction (i.e., gain SEW) from being altruistic towards the local community
in which they are embedded. Family principals feel an obligation towards external stakeholders
(i.e., normative motives), including the local community. In addition, the fulfillment of such
obligations represents an emotional satisfaction that, in the socioemotional accounting,
compensates for the cost entailed in the actions (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Indeed, taking a
family embeddedness perspective, Cruz and colleagues (2012) demonstrated how in family
business boundaries between kin relationships and business relationships are often faint. Hence,
family owners derive satisfaction from offering job opportunities to kin (Cruz et al., 2012). Yet,
whether this perceived obligation towards stakeholders connected to the FOB and the altruism in
family firms is beneficial for or detrimental to the firm’s financial performance is an open
research question (Lubatkin et al., 2005; Schulze et al., 2003). This question requires further
investigation, so as to explain the effect of the different SEW components on the firm’s strategy
and management.
Emotional attachment. Unlike early FOB research ascribing emotion to the family rather
than to the business, current trends in the family business domain acknowledge that emotional
relationships connect the family members and their business. Early scholars made the case for a
divide between the family (emotional and irrational) and the business (economically rational) in
terms of objectives, priorities, goals, and tasks (Carlock & Ward, 2001; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996).
This approach overlooked the fact that the boundaries between the family and the business are
extremely thin (Berrone et al., 2010). Furthermore, emotions flow back and forth between the
two subsystems generating a reciprocal influence and moving towards a situation whereby they
can achieve a mutual existence (Danes, Zuiker, Kean, & Arbuthnot, 1999; Poutziouris,
Smyrnios, & Klein, 2006). Hence, emotions permeate family firms (Baron, 2008) and affect their
management, because they represent a form of social capital for the FOBs (Sharma, 2008), and
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create a set of roles, rules, and strong organizational norms. The latter is deemed able to shape
the behavior of family and non-family members within the firm (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). The
behavioral implications of emotions depend upon the content of the organizational norms
created. For instance, in family business where the “family first” organizational norm is
predominant, behaviors such as opportunism (Villalonga & Amit, 2006), minority shareholder
wealth expropriation (Anderson & Reeb, 2004), and deviation from social norms will be more
frequent. Conversely, a stewardship behavior will be more likely to appear in FOBs where the
“business first” organizational norm is predominant. In other words, emotions shape family
firms’ strategy and management, and similarly organizational events affect and impact the
emotions of family-members involved in the business. A particular set of emotions developed in
FOBs is represented by the affective feelings connected with the firm’s ownership, labeled in the
SEW context as emotional attachment.
An important, albeit overlooked, component of the family firm system is the role that
emotions play in the firm’s management and strategy. The SEW dimension that deals with this
specific matter is the emotional attachment. Family businesses are complex social units that carry
a long history, a specific set of knowledge (often tacit and embedded in the family members), a
series of shared experiences, and social capital that, in a path dependent fashion, affect the firm’s
current behavior (Kellermanns, Eddleston, & Zellweger, forthcoming; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996).
Over time, the above-mentioned elements lead the family to develop an affective feeling. In fact,
scholars relying on the affective infusion framework argued that the ownership of the firm’s
shares triggers the development of affective feeling and a stock of affective endowments
(Kellermanns et al., forthcoming). Furthermore, such affective feelings and emotional benefits
tend to increase over time (Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008); the ownership of firm’s share creates
the expectations that the same status will be maintained in the future ( Zellweger et al., 2011;
Zellweger & Dehlen, 2012). The protection of the ownership is needed to preserve the definition
of one’s self-concept (Kellermanns et al., forthcoming). Studies proposed that family firms are
particularly prone to develop strong attachment to their stake in the firm (Zellweger et al., 2011),
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and that they tend to see the firm as a family legacy, a connection with the family’s history, a
bond between the current generation and the family’s origin and tradition (Sharma & Manikutty,
2005). The consequences of the emotional attachment of families to their firms can be found in
behaviors such as the family’s resilience to sell their ownership share, or the tendency to
overprice the firm’s share, asking for a price that the family deems able to compensate for the
emotional loss (Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008; Zellweger et al., 2011; Zellweger & Dehlen,
2012). Therefore, the study of family business phenomena cannot depart from a consideration for
the role of emotions in this organizational form.
Renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession. Within the family
business domain, two different strands of research proposed conflicting perspectives on the
nature of FOBs. On the one hand, family firms are considered organizations wherein resources
are used wisely, because their managers are family-stewards. This same reason is deemed to
explain the long-term orientation of FOBs, and concern for the firm’s survival across generations
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2008; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005;
Zahra, 2005). Others consider FOBs as organizations driven by self-serving objectives.
Accordingly, the family majority-shareholders are deemed engaged in management of their
firm's resources for the fulfillment of altruistic behavior towards the family-members involved in
the firms. All of this is at the expense of non-family minority shareholders (e.g., Anderson &
Reeb, 2004; Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze et al., 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Nonetheless,
scholars from both factions acknowledge that the FOB’s desire to create a family legacy and
undertake a generation succession is one of the pivotal elements that distinguish family firms
from their non-family counterparts (Carney, 2005; Lubatkin et al., 2005).
The SEW dimension that accounts for the aforementioned objective in FOBs is the
renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession. This dimension represents the
gain in terms of emotional satisfaction that a family-owner derives from the appointment of
family members as future leaders of the firms. Indeed, this is key to perpetuating, for an
additional generation, the family-owners’ ability to derive non-financial benefits from the
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business (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Zellweger et al., 2011). The achievement of dynastic
succession fosters a sense of legacy, provides a connection between the past and the future
generation, and it allows the passage of the family’s vision across generations. All of this
wouldn’t be possible with the appointment of a non-family successor, who would be unlikely to
epitomize the family in the business (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Whether the dynastic
succession desire is beneficial for or detrimental to the firm’s financial performance, is still an
open research question. However, it is incontrovertible how the dynastic succession desire in
FOBs shapes the decision-making process as well as the strategy and managerial choices.
The generational succession objective (i.e., maintaining the business alive and in the
condition to be passed to the future generations) fosters long-sighted managerial decisions
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), triggers the use of patient capital, increases the tendency to
undertake investments with long term return (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003), and unveils a propensity for
“growing over harvesting” (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2008; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006,
p. 41). The dynastic succession desire and the long-term perspective also generate byproducts
such as the selection of new generations of firm leaders on a blood-related criterion as opposed
to actual competences (Schulze et al., 2003), an excessive involvement of kin in the business
(Cruz et al., 2012), nepotism, and a risk preference tilted towards conservative investment when
in the presence of venturing hazard2 (e.g., Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007)
The multidimensional nature of SEW may be the key to explainning why family-owners
in the pursuit of their socioemotional needs (doing what is good for the family) might as well
improve the FOB’s financial performance (doing what is good for the firms). The familyowner’s pursuit of SEW preservation and the achievement of financial objectives are not always
mutually exclusive. On the contrary, their relationship may depend upon which among the
FIBER dimensions the family-owners value the most. For instance, Kellerman et al.

2

Consistent with Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007), venturing risk is defined as the potential increase of the variance in the
firm’s financial performance (unexpected performance outcome) associated with the search for alternative routine
and opportunities (e.g., research and development, internationalization etc.)
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(forthcoming) contend how SEW has a dark side. In their study on proactive stakeholder
engagement (PSE), they proposed how a family-owner that ascribes higher importance to SEW
dimensions connected with the achievement of personal benefit may ignore the needs of nonfamily constituencies. This is a strategy deemed able to undermine the firm’s financial
performance (Freeman, 1984). Conversely, Cennamo et al. (2012) argue that family-principals
are particularly sensible to non-family stakeholders’ claims if the family principals ascribe high
importance to SEW dimensions such as binding social ties and identification of family members
with the firm. These results echoed Miller et al.’s (2013) empirical evidence demonstrating that
FOBs ascribing importance to their reputation and legitimacy avoid self-serving strategies and
opt instead for strategic conformity.
2.4.6 An SEW-Based Approach to Explain Strategic Decision Making in Family Firms
The socioemotional wealth perspective is progressively gaining legitimacy as a dominant
theoretical model to explain and predict the strategic behavior of FOBs. As my review of the
relevant literature on SEW suggests, scholars are striving to better define the SEW construct
(e.g., Berrone et al., 2010; Cennamo et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), looking for the
boundaries of the SEW preservation perspective (e.g., Dębicki, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010;
2011), and working to overcome some of the empirical challenges that measurement of the SEW
construct entails (e.g., Berrone et al., 2012). Despite being at its infancy in the FOB research
domain (Berrone et al., 2012), SEW-based arguments have proven their effectiveness in
explaining and predicting strategic decision-making in FOBs in multiple instances (GomezMejia et al., 2011). Thus, several reasons lead me to believe that SEW and the behavioral-agency
theory (BAM) may be the most effective theoretical lens to disentangle a complex phenomenon
such as turnaround strategic choices in FOBs.
Among the reasons to opt for an SEW-based approach, is the need to overcome the
limitations found in relevant theoretical frameworks previously employed in FOB literature. In
fact, a common thread of most of the paradigms alien to the FOB field of research, and yet
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employed to explain the strategic behavior of family firms, is their assumption of economic
instrumentality (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Agency theory, among others,
has contributed a great deal to the research on FOBs (Sharma, Chrisman, & Gersick, 2012).
However, it fails to properly account for some of the FOB specificities; this resulted in turn in
inconsistent findings (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Indeed, agency theory has a very rigid
assumption whereby the agent and principals pursue conflicting interests and have therefore
idiosyncratic and unchanging risk preferences (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). As suggested
by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010) and many others, this is an excessively rigid assumption for FOBs.
Lastly, agency theory does not account for potentially collaborative behavior and overlooks the
role of emotions (Baron, 2008), salient elements in FOBs.
The foundational assumptions of stewardship are also problematic. The willingness of
firm’s managers, or firm’s stewards, to sacrifice their personal interest to pursue the interest of
the organization they work for appears to be plausible in an FOB context. In fact, firm’s
managers may be members of the owner-family. However, it might be naïve to assume that this
would always hold true; this position is supported by empirical evidence in the FOB literature
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Schulze et al., 2001). Therefore, I considered stewardship theory to be
unsuitable for the purposes of this study.
The RBV and the familiness of the family firms has been a dominant theory in the field
as well. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence available shows mixed results. Familiness was at
times found to have a positive effect on an FOB’s performance and at times a negative effect
(Rutherford et al., 2008). In addition, the combined RBV and familiness original model focuses
primarily on explaining and predicting wealth creation in FOBs (Habbershon & Williams, 1999).
Subsequent advances in the theory have extended its boundaries. Familiness was in fact
employed for the prediction and explanation of value creation in FOBs. That is, competitive
advantage generation was considered to be a mediator between familiness and value creation
(Chrisman et al., 2003, p. 203; Habbershon et al., 2003; Sharma, 2008). However, the ultimate
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outcome that the theory aims to predict and explain is wealth and value creation (Habbershon et
al., 2003). This is inconsistent with the objective of this study.
Unlike the abovementioned dominant paradigms in FOB, the SEW perspective instead
centrally addresses how an FOB frames its strategic decisions in terms of expected gain/losses of
accumulated SEW. In addition, evidence has shown that in situations of threat to SEW, decisions
in FOBs are not driven by pure economic rationality (Berrone et al., 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al.,
2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). On the other hand, scholars have shown how the preservation
of SEW is a key goal in FOBs, and as such it is the primary frame of reference for the decisionmaking process (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Therefore, I believe that the
FOB attitude towards turnaround strategies may be based on its inherent gain and losses in terms
of SEW. In other words, the SEW perspective is the theoretical background that is best suited for
the purpose of this study, which is to understand the family-owner decision-making mechanism
behind turnaround strategic decisions.
3 PERFORMANCE DISTRESS AND CORPORATE TURNAROUND
Anecdotal and empirical evidence, although often atheoretical, suggests that a firm facing
multiple years of consistent decline in financial performance following a period of growth (i.e.,
turnaround situation) undertakes a series of strategic actions in an attempt to restore profitability.
Over time, scholars produced a broad, albeit scattered, set of studies either based on large
samples or on inductive effort of theory building (Pearce & Robbins, 1993). However,
incremental advancement of our understanding of turnaround has long been hindered by the
inconsistency in the methodology employed (Chowdhury, 2002), the lack of uniformity in their
taxonomy (Pearce & Robbins, 1993), and the significantly different views of the path leading
from decline to recovery of performance (Robbins et al., 1992). Therefore, there is a void in the
literature regarding the turnaround strategies of FOBs (Cater & Schwab, 2008). Indeed, only a
handful of studies proposed conceptual models striving to disentangle the relationship between
characteristics specific to family-firms (e.g., altruistic motives, long term orientation, strong ties
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to the firms, etc.) and turnaround strategies (Cater & Schwab, 2008). However, prior to
understanding how the interplay of financial and non-financial (SEW) objectives shape the
turnaround strategies in FOBs, it is essential to clearly present the process of turnaround
response in declining firms, as well as the definition of the terms used hereafter.
Following previous literature, the relevant knowledge regarding turnaround strategies
will be presented in three sections. The first section discusses successful turnaround, the second
section reviews the turnaround process, and the last section addresses recent advances in
turnaround processes (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Dah-Kwei & Smith, 2006; Pandey & Verma,
2005).
3.1 Strategies for a Successful Turnaround
There are sets of recurrent actions undertaken by firms able to achieve successful
turnarounds. This assumption has driven the early turnaround scholars in their research quest
towards a better understanding of the more efficient response strategy to turnaround situations.
Schendel, Patton and Riggs (1975) first attempted to discriminate among response strategies to
organizational decline and identify which actions were more likely to result in bankruptcy as
opposed to recovery in the firm’s performance. Schendel and colleagues (1975) argue how a
successful turnaround strategy comes through the identification of the core cause(s) of the
performance decline. They further recognize how changes in top management are usually
associated with the turnaround effort. Such core problems could be, in their view, either
triggered by the deterioration of the competitive position with respect to competitors (i.e.,
strategic components) or by the inefficient use of the firm’s resources (i.e., operational
components). Hence, firm’s failure is more likely to occur due to a manager’s inappropriate
response to the cause that triggered decline, such as failing to respond to changes in the situation,
or inefficient implementation of the appropriate strategies (Schendel et al., 1975; Staw,
Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). In a follow up study, Schendel and Patton (1976) compared a
sample of matched pairs of firms that experienced performance decline; one firm achieved
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successful turnaround and the other continuous decline. Their findings showed statistically
significant differences in firms continuing in decline versus those achieving turnaround. The
latter increased their market share at a greater rate (in respect to the former). This was also true
for the rate of investment (in new plant and equipment as well as inventory turnover) and cash
flow; those firms also experienced a decrease in cost to total sales, profit margin, and value
added (Schendel & Patton, 1976). Further studies made the case for the achievement of
successful turnaround through the appropriate fit between the cause of decline and the response
strategy (Hofer, 1980). Hofer (1980), in a study analyzing 12 firms suffering from performance
decline, suggested that a more comprehensive model of corporate turnaround should include: the
extent of decline, the pattern of decline, and the time frame of decline. This study suggested that
the severity of decline dictates whether the firms should pursue mere cost-cutting strategies (for
firms operating close to breakeven), or asset reduction strategies coupled with aggressive
revenue-increasing moves (for firms operating under breakeven). This case-based and anecdotal
evidence that has driven early research on corporate turnaround calls for empirical investigations
aimed at validating the established relationship between strategic action and successful
turnaround.
Hambrick and Schecter (1983) challenged previous findings through an empirical
investigation of 260 firms in mature industrial businesses. They defined the strategies leading to
a successful turnaround and operationalized them through multiple variables. Such strategies are
labeled as efficiency and entrepreneurial strategies. Efficiency strategies entail cost reduction and
asset dismissal, such as reduction in R&D, marketing expenses, inventories, decline in the
newness of equipment and plants. Efficiency strategies lead to immediate improvement in profit
without jeopardizing a firm’s market position. Conversely, entrepreneurial strategies are longterm strategies geared at fostering recovery and market re-positioning. This incudes, the selective
pruning of product market combinations through increase in relative prices, enhancement of
employee productivity, reduction of accounts receivable, and reduction of inventory costs and
direct costs (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983). Their findings suggested that efficiency and
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entrepreneurial strategies in mature businesses may turn the firm around. However, in a
following investigation O’Neill (1986) uses a set of 13 case histories to build an inductive
investigation aimed at developing a turnaround framework that describes the pattern in the
strategies adopted by firms achieving successful turnaround. Unlike previous investigations,
O’Neill (1986) identifies four strategic actions as a base for turnaround: 1) managerial strategies,
which include employee layoffs, enhancement of employee motivation and refocusing of the
business, 2) restructuring strategies (changes in the product market combination and method of
production), 3) cutbacks and, 4) growth strategies (similar to the efficiency and entrepreneurial
strategies). A successful turnaround is defined as the optimal combination of the four groups of
strategies. Such a combination should result from a careful consideration of the cause of decline,
the need for external expertise to face the decline, the current competitive position, the stage of
the organization’s development, the industry type, and the product’s life cycle (O’Neill, 1986).
The aforementioned positions were bolstered by an entire strand of research, the
turnaround content approach. Researchers that followed this approach typically relied on similar
empirical testing: a cross sectional analysis of data across multiple organizations, and comparing
the combination of strategies adopted by firms that achieved successful versus unsuccessful
turnarounds. Indeed, their aim was to make the case for the existence of the perfect content for a
turnaround response effective in any turnaround situations (Ramanujam, 1984; Thiétart, 1988).
3.2 Turnaround as a Process
An additional stream of research considers turnaround as a process. This approach
questions the notion of the existence of a specific set of strategies that could be appropriately
combined to respond to a turnaround situation (either caused internally or externally). Bibeault
(1982) first defined turnaround as a multistage process composed of two main phases 1) the
retrenchment phase, and 2) the recovery phase (Bibeault, 1982).
The retrenchment phase includes all the strategies needed to bear with the sharp and
continuous decline in a firm’s performance jeopardizing the firm’s survival (Bibeault, 1982).
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Firms in turnaround situations need to implement emergency plans able to halt the financial
bleeding and the deterioration of the firm’s resources. Subsequently, the firm should strive to
maintain a situation of stability regrouping and refocusing resources in its core business, and
narrowing down the scope of the activities (Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Robbins et al., 1992).
Consistently with Hofer’s (1980) argument, the length of this phase is a function of the severity
of the financial distress that the firm experienced. This initial stage, which has the pivotal goal of
avoiding bankruptcy, includes costs and assets reduction, product elimination, and employee and
management layoffs.
The second stage in the turnaround process is recovery and repositioning (see Figure 1.1).
The objective of this phase is the return to pre-decline profitability, an increase in market share
and repositioning of the firm with a strengthened competitive position within existing or new
product-market combinations (Bibeault, 1982). Ideally, the retrenchment stage should have refocused the business on a geographical market and a product market with higher potential for
growth and profitability. Typical strategies associated with the recovery stages are an increase in
investments in the internal development of new products or markets (increase of marketing and
R&D investment) or external development through mergers and acquisitions of new customers
and new technology (Bibeault, 1982; Castrogiovanni & Bruton, 2000; Pearce & Robbins, 1993).
Bibault (1982) further posits the importance of managerial decisions in the turnaround process.
Indeed, as firms approach the turning point, moving from performance decline to stability, the
management needs to decide between two alternative paths. The first is to pursue recovery in a
reduced business, with a narrow scale and scope, and to strive to increase market penetration.
The alternative is to pursue a return to growth that includes seeking recovery in new
combinations of products and markets. The decision between the two options should depend
upon the cause(s) of performance decline.
-----------------------------------------Insert Figure 1.1 About Here
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Similar to Bibault (1982), other studies argued for a combination of retrenchment and
recovery strategies in order to achieve successful turnaround. However, the major contribution
from the turnaround process perspective lies in the notion that retrenchment and recovery are not
contextual strategies, but are rather sequential. Furthermore, the success of a turnaround process
lies in the retrenchment phase, a necessary key phase in the process of turning the firm around.
Despite the significant contribution, the turnaround process perspective received scarce
empirical testing at first, due to the methodological challenges it entails. Subsequent empirical
investigations bolstered the turnaround process. Indeed, Grinyer and McKiernan (1990) provided
support for the existence of a multi stage process of turnaround. In their study of a sample of
firms that achieved a sharp increase in performance, they analyzed the origin of decline, the
triggers of organizational changes, and the action taken. By doing so, Grinyer and McKiernan
(1990) investigated the difference in performance obtained by firms that undertook gradual
voluntary changes in the firm’s strategy versus abrupt changes forced by circumstances. Their
findings suggested that different strategies are more suitable at different stages of the turnaround
process.
A significant improvement in the multi-stage process of turnaround is represented in the
work by Pearce, Robbins and colleagues (e.g., Robbins et al., 1992; Pearce & Robbins, 1993;
Pearce & Robbins, 1994). In their investigations regarding firms in the textile industry, they
found the extent of the performance distress (or severity of the turnaround situation) to be the
pivotal determinant of the retrenchment (type and intensity) required to put the firm back on
track (Robbins et al., 1992). Indeed, those firms undertaking retrenchment were more likely to
achieve successful turnaround. In addition, they made the case for retrenchment as a key stage in
the turnaround process. Prompt cost cutting in response to financial decline was found to be an
effective strategy to turn the firm around regardless of whether the decline was general (industrywide) or relative to a single firm in respect to its competitors (Robbins et al., 1992). Hence,
retrenchment could be considered either as a significant operative stage aimed at coping with the
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emergency situation, stabilizing the firm, and laying the foundation (and obtaining the resources)
for the recovery stage, or a ‘grand’ strategy able to spur recovery.
3.3 Advances in the Two-Stage Turnaround Process
Scholarly advances toward a better understanding of the turnaround process challenges
the extant knowledge in this area. Scholars wondered whether retrenchment always represented
an effective and necessary response to performance decline, and if it is so why? The process of
critical re-interpretation of the turnaround process started with Barker and Mone’s (1994)
commentaries to Pearce and Robbins’ (1992) work. This study re-analyzed Pearce and Robbins’
(1992) investigation, concluding that retrenchment does not necessary represents a panacea for a
firm’s performance decline (Barker & Mone, 1994). Indeed, firms suffering from a more severe
turnaround situation might be forced to undertake more severe cost-cutting and asset dismissal,
without carefully planning for the subsequent recovery process. This might be detrimental rather
than beneficial for the company. Severe retrenchment could trigger a domino effect whereby
asset dismissal, layoffs, and cuts in costs might generate low morale, decrease employee
productivity, increase employee turnover, and generate a potential loss of valuable and talented
employees that might be hired by competitors (Barker & Mone, 1994). All in all, these findings
suggest that the blind application of retrenchment in response to turnaround does not directly
lead to a successful turnaround, but could actually exacerbate a firm’s decline. Therefore, we
need to pay more attention to the conditions affecting the effectiveness of retrenchment (e.g.,
cause of decline, a firm’s cost structure and a firm’s competitive position).
Despite this critique regarding the role of retrenchment in the turnaround process, its
importance is incontrovertible. In a follow up study to their 1992 investigation, Pearce and
Robbins (1993) posit how a firm’s financial performance decline erodes a firm’s available
resources, and a wise cost retrenchment is able to protect what is still left in the firm. Preserved
resources will be subsequently deployed for the firm’s repositioning. Their integrative
turnaround process suggests that scholars should consider the turnaround process in light of the
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interplay between four phases: the turnaround situation, the retrenchment, the recovery
responses, and the performance achieved as a result of the turnaround response.
The origin of the turnaround process is considered to be the turnaround situation, a
condition whereby a firm experiences consistent decline in performance following a period of
growth and prosperity. A performance decline has two potential causes: 1) it could be internally
generated (e.g., managerial inefficiency, poor application of appropriate strategies, or appropriate
application of wrong strategies); or 2) it could be externally generated (e.g., market or industry
downturn and duress). Regardless of its origin, a performance decline is further characterized by
its level of severity. I define situation severity as the extent of the threat to the firm’s existence
ranging from low severity (gradual, slow and consistent decline in firm’s profitability
approaching the break-even point) to high severity (i.e., risk of immediate bankruptcy).
Therefore, prior to defining turnaround response strategies, close attention must be paid to the
cause of the decline (external vs. internal) and to situation severity (low vs. high).
The causes of decline, if left unaddressed, are potentially able to put the existence of the
firm in jeopardy (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Thus, the firm needs to respond through the two
stages of turnaround. First, the firm needs to seek higher operational efficiency and cost
reduction (retrenchment) (Robbins et al., 1992). This is achieved differently depending upon the
origin and severity of decline. A situation of high severity calls for harsh cost and asset
retrenchment. Besides halting the financial bleeding, the priority in this case is to eliminate the
least efficient and productive operations though divestment in asset and severe cost cutting
(Pearce & Robbins, 1993). These strategies should unleash financial resources that might be
employed in the pursuit of further efficiencies. On the other hand, a less severe situation might
be addressed through cost retrenchment (Pearce & Robbins, 1993). Moreover, the extent and
type of retrenchment is a function of the type of decline. Specifically, within each decline a
different type of retrenchment strategy will result depending upon the relative contribution of
strategic misalignment and operational inefficiencies.
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Upon achievement of the firm’s stabilization, the subsequent stage is the recovery phase.
Namely, a set of long-term strategies aimed at reversing the trend of decline. An externally
generated decline calls for a recovery based on the entrepreneurial reconfiguration of the
company. This includes the development of new products, new markets, mergers and
acquisitions, and market penetration, among others. Conversely, an internally generated
turnaround situation can be addressed without changing the firm’s strategic direction, but only by
narrowing down the organization’s focus. A focus on a limited number of activities requires a
lower commitment of the firm’s financial resources. The turnaround situation is complete when
recovery, the achievement of a performance at least equal to the pre-decline one, is obtained.
Pearce and Robbins’ (1992, 1993) contribution goes beyond the mere integration of the
literature concerning corporate turnaround in their two-stage model. Indeed, those scholars
attempted to address the lack of homogeneity in the definitions employed in turnaround research
(Dah-Kwei & Smith, 2006). However, the field remained quite heterogeneous in the definition of
what a turnaround situation is, and what a successful turnaround really means. Additionally,
many financial measures have been proposed to identify the turning point in which a firm
achieves retrenchment and undertakes recovery strategies (Solnet, Paulsen, & Cooper, 2010). A
further challenge was represented by the empirical difficulties that plagued the turnaround
research in cyclical industries. In such industries a company may have undertaken and achieved
a complete turnaround process while maintaining its leadership in the industry, in spite of the
period of industry decline. Clearly, the empirical challenge is represented by the confounding
industry effect. Thus, this suggested that a closer investigation of the interplay between the
situational and organizational determinants of a corporate turnaround was necessary
(Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Francis & Desai, 2005). This could lead to more accurate results
under two conditions: the execution of more industry-based studies, and a closer consideration of
previously overlooked variables affecting the turnaround process (e.g., Hambrick & Schecter,
1983; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Robbins et al., 1992).
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3.3.1 A Comprehensive Two-Stage Model of Corporate Turnaround
Three pivotal pitfalls affected the first two decades of studies on turnaround, namely in
the 1980s and ‘90s an excessive focus on retrenchment as a trigger of successful turnaround, the
overlooked role of the contingencies affecting the turnaround process, and an oversimplistic
assumption of a chronologically linear process of turnaround. Arogyaswamy and colleagues
(1995) contended that an integrative model of turnaround process (see Figure 1.1) should include
two stages halting/reversing the cause of decline and invigorating the firm’s competitive
position. Additionally, such a model should consider all the contextual elements critical to
achieving a successful turnaround. Hence, scholars should recognize that retrenchment in
isolation is necessary but not sufficient to achieve turnaround (Barker & Mone, 1994;
Castrogiovanni & Bruton, 2000). Thus, a combination of the two stages is necessary.
Furthermore, a successful turnaround could be achieved only if the two stages are effectively
managed and supported (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). A firm undertaking turnaround cannot
overlook the importance and the role played by stakeholders (internal and external) on its
success.
Shortcomings of the early model of turnaround process. The comprehensive model of the
turnaround process questions the research efforts that claimed the centrality and primary
importance of retrenchment (in respect to recovery) for a successful turnaround. Over time,
scholars showed that successful turnaround companies (versus unsuccessful) had higher
efficiency indexes. Thus, a lower cost of goods sold over sales (e.g., Ramanujam, 1984;
Schendel & Patton, 1976), a decrease in marketing and R&D expenditures over sales, lower
current assets over sales, and an increase in the sales per productive unit (Hambrick & Schecter,
1983; Pandit, 2000) were interpreted and claimed to be the signal of retrenchment intervention.
However, the comparison between recovering versus non-recovering firms did not account for
the alternative explanation that all recovering firms were experiencing increase in sales as well.
Since the above mentioned efficiency ratios are affected by sales, it is likely that the gain in
revenue generated by sales leads to a successful turnaround, as opposed to efficiencies in the
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firm’s operations (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Indeed, the threat resulting from an overemphasis
on retrenchment was proven in the literature. Scholars made the case for the existence of a series
of additional concerns — more stringent than inefficiencies — resulting from performance
decline (D’Aveni, 1989). A severe decline exerts a pressure undermining the firm’s internal
climate (Cameron, 1994) and triggers dysfunctional decision-making (Bozeman & Slusher,
1979), managerial and strategic rigidity (Staw et al., 1981), and lack of innovative solutions
(Cameron, Whetten, & Kim, 1987). A turnaround response based only on harsh retrenchment
might lead to attrition among stakeholders’ interests, and the subsequent loss of key stakeholder
support (Gilson, John, & Lang, 1990; Lai & Sudarsanam, 1997). This scenario seems to suggest
that retrenchment could exacerbate the severity of decline rather than represent the genesis of a
firm’s turnaround (Barker & Mone, 1994). Therefore, this opened the avenue for investigation
geared at understanding the conditions under which retrenchment facilitates a firm’s turnaround
and how such contingencies interact with the turnaround process (e.g., Mone, McKinley, &
Barker, 1998; Morrow et al., 2004).
The overemphasis that scholars have placed on retrenchment as a fundamental step in the
turnaround process has led them to overlook other salient facets of the process. Among the
overlooked factors deemed able to significantly affect the turnaround process and its results are
situational variables, non-efficiency-based strategies, and their interactions. More specifically,
examples of relevant situational variables affecting the turnaround process are industry
conditions, local rules and regulations (Francis & Desai, 2005), the nature of decline (Mone et
al., 1998) and the relationship with internal and external stakeholder (Hubbard & Kosnik, 1996).
In addition, little empirical attention has been given to the role of management during the
turnaround process (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). In fact, only a handful of studies strived to link
CEO substitution with turnaround performance (Bruton et al., 2003; Castrogiovanni, Baliga, &
Kidwell, 1992). Therefore, a more comprehensive approach is needed in order to explain how
declining companies recover.
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An additional shortcoming in the early model of the turnaround process lies in the
assumption of a linear sequencing of retrenchment and recovery. By addressing this shortcoming
we might be able to understand the contextual deployment of multiple and intertwining strategies
to respond to performance decline. In addition, managers might change and adapt their strategies
on the basis of feedback loops; hence, it is unrealistic to assume that exclusively upon
completion of retrenchment a firm will deploy recovery strategies (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995).
In order to address this and the abovementioned shortcomings, Arogyaswamy and colleagues
(1995), as well as subsequent studies, strived to develop a more inclusive model of corporate
turnaround.
The turnaround model. A firm suffering from decline in financial performance for an
extended period of time needs to undertake a two-stage process striving to halt and reverse this
trend. Unlike previous studies (e.g., Bibeault, 1982; Pearce & Robbins, 1994, 1993; Robbins et
al., 1992), Arogyaswamy et al. (1995) propose a comprehensive turnaround model in which the
two stages of turnaround are independent but not sequential. More specifically, these scholars
claim that a distressed firm undertakes ‘decline-stemming strategies’ and ‘recovery strategies’;
the two stages have different purposes and they do not necessarily take place in a sequential
order. Thus, a firm may decide to deploy recovery strategies, and according to the strategy
pursued develop more appropriate decline-stemming actions (feedback loop of recovery on
decline-stemming). Alternatively, a firm may decide to deploy both stages simultaneously.
Lastly, considering the two stages of turnaround as independent implies that both of them could
take place in isolation, however, neither one of them alone is sufficient to turn the firm around.
Consequences of organizational decline and decline-stemming strategies. There are three
major consequences triggered by the organization’s decline: a) erosion of stakeholder support, b)
deterioration of the firm’s internal climate and decision-making processes, and c) progressively
increasing inefficiency (erosion of the efficiency ratios). Decline-stemming strategies are all the
actions aimed at halting and reverting the ‘dysfunctional’ consequences of organizational
decline, either internally (achieve higher efficiency) or externally (preserve/re-gain stakeholder
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support, and maintain a good organization climate) (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Dah-Kwei &
Smith, 2006). If the consequences of decline are allowed to perpetuate unchecked and
uncontrolled, they will eventually lead to organizational failure. A firm’s ability to survive
without taking corrective actions will depend upon the severity of the turnaround situation, the
availability of slack resources, and industry contraction/growth. Hence, decline-stemming
strategies address the dysfunctional consequences of decline, while the cause(s) of decline will
need to be addressed through recovery strategies.
The explanation of the decline-stemming strategies is inextricably connected to the
understanding of the consequences of performance decline that such strategies are intended to
address. Hence, more details about each of the consequences of organizational decline are
provided below:
The first consequence of organizational decline is the potential loss of relevant
stakeholder support (see Table 1.1). Indeed, a prolonged deterioration of the financial
performance might undermine the firm’s reputation and legitimacy and lead to the stigmatization
of the firm (Sutton & Callahan, 1987). Relevant external stakeholders (banks, lenders, suppliers,
and potential long term customers) might decide to shape their relationship with the firm in order
to protect their own self-interest (D’Aveni, 1989; Gilson et al., 1990). This would translate in
decreased commitment towards the ailing firms, superficial and short-term oriented participation
in the firms, and the use of their bargain power in order to extort the better possible agreement
from the firm (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). The lack of stakeholder support and their enhanced
bargaining power in turn increases the stakeholders’ ability to curb the firm’s managerial
decisions in order to protect their interests (Lai & Sudarsanam, 1997), potentially exacerbating
the rapidity of decline. Therefore, the duration of the firm’ survival in such conditions is
contingent upon the availability of slack resources (D’Aveni & MacMillan, 1990).
As Table 1.1 shows, further dysfunctional outcomes of decline are the erosion of the
organization’s internal climate and the unpaired managerial decision-making ability. Indeed, a
firm’s decline is likely to generate conflict within the organization, as tensions are likely to arise
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both from conflicting interests and from the need to decide who should be blamed for the
situation (Sutton & D’Aunno, 1989). The deterioration of the working environment also
undermines employee trust in the organization’s leadership. In addition, employees might suffer
from a loss of confidence (Mohrman & Mohrman, 1983), a low morale and significant concerns
about their future employment situation (Bozeman & Slusher, 1979; Sutton & D’Aunno, 1989).
All in all, the outcome of the aforementioned situation is the loss of focus, drop in efficiency and
productivity, and potential loss of the more talented employees (Cameron et al., 1987). Over
time, evidence also showed how the decision making process might be affected by the
organizational decline. Indeed, information overload (Staw et al., 1981), scarce innovativeness,
drop in creativity (Mone et al., 1998), and strategic rigidity are all side effects of the threat to the
firm’s existence. Therefore, by leaving the abovementioned issues unaddressed, an organization
will suffer from increasing levels of inefficiency and the management will progressively lose the
ability and flexibility to adapt to changing conditions.
Firms suffering from performance decline experience underutilization of assets and
excessive costs. Although turnaround researchers have long argued that inefficiencies are the
cause of decline, which should be addressed through cost and asset retrenchment, Arogyaswamy
et al. (1995) show how inefficiencies are actually the consequences of a firm’s decline. Indeed,
as a firm suffers from market contraction and reduction of sales, the productivity per employee
drops. Similarly, fixed and general costs, and fixed assets will be divided by a lower number of
units sold, suggesting that they are under-utilized. This, of course, will in turn lead to poor
efficiency indexes.
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 1.1 About Here
-----------------------------------------An effective turnaround process requires the firm to implement decline-stemming
strategies able to address all consequences resulting from performance decline and the potential
interplay among them. Thus, it is evident how retrenchment is one of the possible decline
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stemming-strategies as opposed to the key strategy at the base of turnaround (Arogyaswamy et
al., 1995). The pursuit of higher levels of efficiency without the necessary implementation of
stakeholder management strategies will not prevent the company from being stigmatized (e.g.,
penalized in its ability to access specific sources of funds, suppliers or buyers). In addition,
failing to address one or more of the dysfunctional consequences of decline might actually
worsen the overlooked ones (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Evidence in the literature has suggested
how employee morale within firms undertaking severe retrenchment (including downsizing)
tends to be very low (Sutton & D’Aunno, 1989) and skilled and talented employees may leave
(Cameron et al., 1987; Cameron, 1994). Other studies have demonstrated that efficiency-based
turnaround strategies might be detrimental as opposed to restoring a firm’s performance (Barker
& Mone 1994; Castrogiovanni & Bruton 2000; O’Neill 1986). Indeed, asset divestment,
dismissal of entire business units, and cost-cutting might also lead to deterioration of the firm’s
relationships and jeopardize the firm’s recovery (Barker & Mone, 1994). However, the intensity
of the comprehensive decline-stemming strategies employed is contingent upon specific
situational variables (i.e., severity of decline and slack resources available).
The severity of decline and the availability of slack moderate the intensity of declinestemming strategies. Indeed, over time scholars showed how the severity of decline is a predictor
of the type and intensity of turnaround strategies pursued (e.g., Hofer, 1980; Robbins et al.,
1992). In this situation, the consequences of decline are extremely harsh, and the firm needs to
cope with the dysfunctional consequences of decline through extensive and intensive decline
stemming strategies (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). However, those firms that possess available
slack can temporarily avoid the dysfunctional consequences of decline, as slack resources act as
emergency funds that allow the firms to survive in the short-term (Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari, &
Turner, 2004; Latham & Braun, 2008). Conversely, a low level of slack enhances the sense of
urgency and intensity of the turnaround response (Jensen, 1987; Ofek, 1993). A low level of
slack enhances the dependency on external stakeholder support and subsequently increases their
ability to curb managerial decisions towards intense decline-stemming strategies (Sudarsanam &
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Lai, 2001). Therefore, conditions of severe decline and low slack will increase the intensity of
decline-stemming strategies, and specifically of all the cash generative strategies (e.g., dividend
omission, asset divestment, and cost cutting).
CEO substitution is often the initiation of the turnaround process. Nonetheless, the
outcome of such strategic action is controversial. Over time, scholars made the case for CEO or
top executive substitution as the first required step toward the achievement of a successful
turnaround (e.g., Grinyer & McKiernan, 1990; Hofer, 1980; Slatter, 1984). Executives might be
responsible for the firm’s maladaptation to the external environment, for a poor implementation
of appropriate strategies, or proper implementation of wrong strategies (Arogyaswamy et al.,
1995). Thus, they need to take the blame for the organizational decline. Other scholars instead
posit how the CEO’s replacement could be detrimental for the firm’s successful turnaround
under certain conditions (e.g., Castrogiovanni et al., 1992; Friedman & Saul, 1991). Therefore,
whether or not CEO substitution is an effective strategy in the turnaround process depends upon
specific contingencies (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995).
The cause of decline represents a pivotal contingency affecting the effectiveness of CEO
removal as a decline-stemming strategy (see Table 1.1 for a summary). When the cause of
decline is industry-driven, not directly under the control of top management, the removal of top
executives might be detrimental for the firm’s performance (Bruton et al., 2003). Indeed, a
tenured CEO is deemed capable of leading the company through the recession wave (mainly if
they already overcame industry downturn). Additionally, the CEO can enjoy the legitimacy and
credibility needed to deal with the firm’s stakeholders. Hence, a substitution could generate
dysfunctional interruption to the managerial continuity (e.g., Friedman & Saul, 1991).
Conversely, where the cause of decline is to be ascribed to the CEO (e.g., firm’s maladaptation),
his/her removal might be beneficial for a firm’s performance (Clapham, Schwenk, & Caldwell,
2005). Thus, the substitution of CEO might halt stakeholders from withdrawing their support. It
signals a rejuvenation in the firm’s strategies, and could boost the firm’s stock price (e.g.,
Worrell, Davidson, & Glascock, 1993). Lastly, other empirical investigations suggest no
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significant effect for top executive substitution on turnaround performance (Bruton et al., 2003;
Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). Therefore, the conditions under which a CEO should be replaced to
increase the likelihood of a successful turnaround remain an open research question.
Recovery strategy in response to the cause of decline. The recovery stage of the
turnaround process includes all of the strategies that a firm undertakes, after the stabilization of
the consequences of decline, in order to address the cause of decline. That is, a firm pursues
recovery in order to strengthen its relative competitive position in the industry, and bring back
the firm at least to a pre-decline performance level. While decline-stemming strategies (namely
stabilization of the internal environment, the achievement of higher efficiency and the restoration
of stakeholders support) are essential to set the stage for recovery strategies, their beneficial
effects will be short-lasting if the firm fails to adopt recovery strategies geared at addressing the
cause of decline (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Therefore, the recovery strategies implemented are
1) dependent upon the original cause of decline (internal versus external), and 2) a function of
the decline stemming strategies undertaken, given that these provide the firm with the financial
resources needed to implement recovery.
Organizational decline is triggered by a series of causes that can be grouped into two
main categories: firm-maladaptation and industry-based decline. Recovery strategies will differ
according to which of the two causes of decline a firm is facing. First, industry-based decline is
the result of contraction of the demand and availability of resources within an industry. Thereby,
all firms that belong to that specific industry experience a generalized decline in performance. In
turn, this leads to intense competition to defend market share and the access to scarce resources
(Cameron, Whetten, & Kim, 1987; Whetten, 1987). The origins of this type of decline vary, and
examples are declining stage in the industry life cycle, economic duress, financial crises, political
changes, and other situations of crisis.
Second, firm-based decline is underperformance related to the firm itself, not generalized
to the entire industry. Causes of firm-specific decline are changes in the structure within the
industry (creative destruction) (Schumpeter, Opie, & Elliott, 1934), and changes in the
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competitive paradigm that makes the incumbent resources unable to further provide a sustained
competitive advantage (e.g., Tripsas, 1997). Alternatively, studies provided evidence of firmbased decline triggered by the loss of skills, knowledge and abilities (KSAs), the firm’s inability
to preserve and update KSAs, and their inappropriate deployment (Grinyer & McKiernan, 1990).
Thus, firm-based decline is caused by problems limited to a firm within an industry, whereas,
generalized and widespread contraction triggers industry-based decline (Arogyaswamy et al.,
1995). Therefore, as Table 1.2 shows, the differences between the two causes of decline call for
different recovery strategies.
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 1.2 About Here
-----------------------------------------Recovery strategies lie on a continuum between two extremes: strategic reorientation and
incremental strategic change (an enactment of the effectiveness in the application of the firm’s
current strategies). Evidence suggests that industry-based decline calls for strategic reorientation,
although a distinction should be made between short-term and long-term industry contraction
(O’Neill, 1986). Short-term industry-contraction can be addressed with light strategic
reorientation. Indeed, scholars have demonstrated that severe strategic reorientation entails the
development of a new set of skills and new routines in an unfamiliar market where the
management may fall short of the knowledge and experience necessary to succeed in the shortterm (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1984). The high cost and high risk inherent with a severe
reorientation would be unlikely to be recouped within a short-term decline cycle. Conversely,
during long-term generalized industry contraction those firms that preserve a strong competitive
position (relative to competitors in the same declining industry) should deploy strategies able to
ensure the preservation of the leadership position (Harrigan, 1980). Those firms that suffer from
a weak competitive position should instead pursue a market niche during long-lasting industry
downturn (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Schendel & Patton, 1976).
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A firm-based decline needs to be addressed through recovery strategies able to create a
better fit between the firm’s knowledge, skills, ability and the competitive environment. Indeed,
researchers indicate that a firm-specific problem causing decline calls for the implementation of
significant changes in the firm’s strategic orientation, the firm’s structure and its subsequent
strategies (Hofer, 1980; O’Neill, 1986). Failing to recognize the cause of decline and its extent
might lead the management to opt for a sub-optimal strategy or respond with insufficient
intensity. The underestimation of the decline’s severity or the misinterpretation of its origin
could generate a lag between the onset of performance decline and the managerial action,
significantly reducing the likelihood of a successful turnaround (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984). A
firm’s inaction could however be the result of an attempt by significant stakeholders to curb
managerial decision-making (Tushman, Virany, & Romanelli, 1985).
4 AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ON TURNAROUND IN FAMILY FIRMS
Over thirty years of research on corporate turnaround has produced a vast number of
studies, but our knowledge on this topic remains scant and the results are largely unable to
provide crystal clear directions on how to counter performance decline. In fact, over time,
scholars have made the case for a ‘process’ approach to corporate turnaround (Arogyaswamy et
al., 1995; Bibeault, 1982; Chowdhury, 2002; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Robbins et al., 1992),
while others made the case for a ‘content’ approach (Hofer, 1980; O’Neill, 1986; Ramanujam,
1984; Schendel & Patton, 1976). On the one hand, retrenchment strategies are considered to be
the pivotal stage in turnaround (Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Robbins et al., 1992). On the other
hand, they are deemed detrimental for the firm’s performance (Barker & Mone, 1994; Pearce &
Michael, 2006). The effectiveness of CEO substitution as an initiation of turnaround has been
discussed, but not completely understood (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Castrogiovanni et al.,
1992). Surprisingly, our knowledge suffers from even more significant underdevelopment when
it comes to turnaround behavior in established family firms (Cater & Schwab, 2008), a relevant
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organizational type in the world economy, with recognized differences from their non-family
counterparts, and with a higher tendency to face organizational crises.
Family firms are significantly different from their non-family counterparts. FOB
literature identified the differences between family and non-family firms as: the overlap among
the family, the business, and the ownership (Davis & Tagiuri, 1982; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996), the
interplay between family relationships and business relationships (Chrisman et al., 2005; Chua et
al., 2003), and the SEW preservation desire (Berrone et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007;
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). The interplay between economic objectives and family-owner SEW
preservation desire gives FOBs unique risks and strategic behavior preferences. These
preferences are significantly different in situations of enhanced risk for firm survival, whereby
the family’s wealth (financial and socioemotional) is at stake (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; GomezMejia et al., 2010). Therefore, the study of how specific characteristics of family firms affect the
decline and subsequent turnaround behavior of FOBs might provide novel insights into how
these organizational forms are managed in situations of crises.
The aim of this study is to bridge the above-mentioned gaps in the literature. In order to
do so, I have first reviewed the relevant literature on the home-grown theory of family firms (i.e.,
the SEW perspective and relative constructs), and thereafter the relevant literature concerning
corporate turnaround. I believe that the SEW perspective, together with the newly-developed
measures of the five dimensions that it comprises (Berrone et al., 2012), might help us
disentangle a complex and significant issue, namely corporate turnaround in the context of
family businesses. In addition, while the SEW perspective is a promising theoretical approach
for research in family firms, more investigations are needed in order to demonstrate the validity
of such an approach (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Therefore, in the
remainder of this section I propose several areas in which SEW-based arguments can be
employed to provide meaningful insight for a theory of corporate turnaround in family firms.
Figure 1.2 provides a comprehensive turnaround model relevant to family firms and specific
variables in the context of turnaround strategic choices.
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-----------------------------------------Insert Figure 1.2 About Here
-----------------------------------------4.1 Antecedents for Turnaround Strategies in Family Firms
A firm’s response to the turnaround situation is significantly affected by firm-level and
environmental variables. The reactions to a turnaround situation (stage 1 Figure 1.2) could in fact
range from inaction to intense retrenchment and recovery strategies (Schendel & Patton, 1976),
depending upon the characteristics of decline, the firm’s conditions (perimeter A in Figure 1.2)
and the environmental conditions (perimeter C in Figure 1.2). Chakrabarti and colleagues (2011)
looked at environmental conditions affecting turnaround. In their study, they posit that, in
countries with a more developed market infrastructure, the firms are more likely to capture the
benefits from reconfiguration through asset divestiture (i.e., retrenchment) (Chakrabarti et al.,
2011). Additional studies found that the severity and suddenness of decline negatively affected
turnaround performance, while environmental munificence had a positive effect on turnaround
performance (Francis & Desai, 2005). Furthermore, Chowdhury (2002) contends that those same
characteristics of decline trigger a prompt turnaround response, deemed to be vital to turn the
business around, before the decline completely erodes all firm resources (Arogyaswamy et al.,
1995; Chowdhury, 2002). However, a turnaround response is possible only if the firm’s decision
makers recognize that the firm is in decline and recognize the decline speed, entity, and the
cause.
At the same time, evidence shows that SEW preservation desire shapes FOBs behavior.
Indeed, family firms are reluctant to undertake strategies that might reduce their power,
influence, control, and ability to achieve generational succession, as these reduce the SEW that
the family can draw from the firm (Dębicki, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et
al., 2011; 2010; Mesquita et al., 2012). Additional findings demonstrate how, under situations of
performance hazard, FOBs tend to trade SEW for the survival of the firm. Yet, while I would
expect a performance decline to represent a performance hazard sufficient enough to trigger the
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FOB reaction, this is actually contingent upon the perception of the family-firm’s decision-maker
on the severity of the threat to the firm’s survival. In other words, the desire of SEW
preservation, coupled with the misperception of the cause of decline, or the underestimation of
the severity of decline, could lead FOBs to remain passive in the face of performance decline. In
addition, FOBs are typically less leveraged than their non-family counterparts (Gomez-Mejia et
al., 2011), and their long-sighted management may provide them with a higher amount of
available slack. Those factors could instill a false sense of confidence, increasing the time that
elapses between the onset of decline and the turnaround response. Therefore, in turnaround
situations it is not clear which comes first, the family-owner or the ailing business (Brooks,
2002) ? The abovementioned argument suggests that the following research questions are worth
considering (See also Figure 1.3):
-----------------------------------------Insert Figure 1.3 About Here
-----------------------------------------Research Question 1: To what extent, if at all, does the current knowledge on decline and
turnaround adequately account for family firm dynamics (i.e., intention for SEW preservation)?
Research question 2: Does the SEW preservation desire generate a misperception
regarding the suddenness and severity of a firm’s decline in FOB decision makers?
Research question 3: Does the SEW preservation desire lead decision makers in FOBs to
misdiagnose the causes of firm decline (firm-based versus industry-based)?
Research question 4: Does the SEW preservation desire affect the turnaround response
and is this effect shaped by the other determinants of turnaround situations? How, if at all, does
SEW spur or hinder the response to a turnaround situation (i.e., increases or reduces the time
elapsed between decline and turnaround response)?
Research question 5: Are slack resources deceptive for FOBs facing a turnaround
situation?
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Figure 1.3 graphically represents the pivotal research gaps concerning turnaround in
family business. I have strived to chart a road-map that scholars who are interested in bridging
these gaps may follow.
4.2 The Turnaround Response
The current knowledge on corporate turnaround suggests the existence of an appropriate
combination of decline-stemming strategies to cope with the dysfunctional consequences of
performance decline. Arogyaswamy et al. (1995) claim that decline-stemming strategies, in order
to set the stage for a successful firm’s recovery, must address the firm’s internal inefficiencies,
lack of stakeholder support, and preservation of the firm’s internal climate (Arogyaswamy et al.,
1995; D’Aveni, 1989). In a similar vein, others argued that the stigmatization of the declining
firm might exacerbate the performance decline (Gilson et al., 1990; Sutton & Callahan, 1987).
However, (as shown in Figure 1.3) questions remain on whether family firms are affected
differently by the stigmatization with respect to their non-family counterparts, and – if so – how
should they modify their ‘decline-stemming strategic mix’ accordingly.
To date, no empirical studies have addressed the stigmatization of FOBs facing
turnaround situations. Yet, I suspect family firms to be affected differently than their non-family
counterparts. Indeed, Brooks (2000) posits that popular wisdom often considers family
businesses as organizations contaminated by dysfunctional families (Brooks, 2002), driven by
egoistic objectives, a self-serving agenda, and embedded with nepotism (Miller et al., 2012).
These stereotypes regarding FOBs might be exacerbated when the firm suffers from performance
decline. Thus, I could expect FOBs to be more severely damaged by this stigmatization than
non-family firms. Conversely, the preservation of legitimacy and the firm’s reputation are
particularly salient issues in FOBs, given the strong connection between the firm’s and the
family’s name (Berrone et al., 2012). Hence, FOBs are more likely to undertake strategic
conformity (Miller et al., 2012), and to pay careful consideration to the firm’s internal and
external stakeholders (Cennamo et al., 2012) in order to preserve their SEW. In addition, FOBs
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tend to have relatively long-term relationships with the stakeholders who belong to the family’s
close network (Bruton et al., 2003; Falkenberg et al., 2004; Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le BretonMiller, 2009). The above mentioned factors, if coupled with the overlooked role of stakeholders
in the theory of corporate turnaround (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995), suggest that the following
research questions could represent fruitful areas for future investigation:
Research question 6: To what extent, if at all, are FOBs affected differently by the
stigmatization of declining firms in respect to their non-family counterparts?
Research question 7: Does the SEW preservation desire affect the FOBs relationship with
their stakeholders under condition of performance decline? And if so, is stakeholder
consideration enhanced or reduced?
Research question 8: To what extent, if at all, does the FOBs consideration for the firm’s
stakeholders (internal and external) affect turnaround strategic decisions (strategic
combinations, turnaround severity)?
Research question 9: If there is a significant effect of SEW on the stakeholders’
relationship during turnaround, do different FIBER dimensions affect the relationship
differently?
4.2.1 CEO Substitution
The role of CEO substitution is controversial in the turnaround literature. Many
researchers make the case for executive replacement as a necessary initiating strategy in the
turnaround process (Bibeault, 1982; Hofer, 1980; Slatter, 1984). Others argue that such a
strategy might instead be unnecessary and detrimental for the firm’s recovery (e.g.,
Castrogiovanni et al., 1992). Arogyaswamy et al. (1995) posit that the effectiveness of CEO
substitution could be contingent upon the cause of decline. Given the controversies in non-FOBs,
I can already begin to see that the contested role of CEO substitution becomes even more
complicated in the context of family-owned businesses.
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CEO substitution is contingent upon whether the performance decline is internally- or
externally-caused. An externally-caused decline (i.e., industry-based) calls for the retention of
the current top management, especially if tenured and proven able to cope with situations of
crisis, based upon past actions (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Conversely, in situations of firmbased decline, the replacement of top management, or even CEO substitution, might be a strong
signal to the firm’s stakeholders as to the organization’s commitment to turning the firm around
and bringing new ideas to the company (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Clapham et al., 2005; DahKwei & Smith, 2006). The objective is to preserve stakeholder support, which is needed to
overcome the situation of decline (D’Aveni, 1989). However, the overlap of three sub-systems
(family, business, and ownership) in FOBs (Davis & Tagiuri, 1982), challenges our
understanding of the role of top management substitution during turnaround situations.
The role of top management substitution during the turnaround process in FOBs might be
non-trivial. Family firms have a relatively higher stability in their relationships with employees
(Miller et al., 2009) while, family firm CEOs have close relationships based on trust, enjoy
longer average tenure (Cruz et al., 2010; Cruz et al., 2012), and are often seen as a firm’s
stewards (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009). In addition, family-CEOs can leverage their
personal and familial acquaintances for business purposes, creating a stronger connection and
ties with stakeholders. Given this premise, CEO substitution could backfire and damage an
FOB’s attempts to turn the firm around. Indeed, the replacement of senior executives with new
management might undermine the existing close relationships with stakeholders, and thus
undermine their support. The relationship of trust and close connection encourages information
sharing among managers and ownership. Changing these relationships would compromise the
deep knowledge of the firm’s core competencies and routines (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995).
Lastly, the firm’s internal environment might suffer, as employees could fear that the family’s
values and culture that used to be embedded in the firm, might soon change (Sharma, 2004).
Potential consequences of such a change are employee concerns and anxiety which can be
compensated through the fulfillment of employee expectations of job security (Seo & Hill,
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2005). In other words, CEO replacement would exacerbate the dysfunctional consequences of
decline (less stakeholder support, worse internal working environment, and potential loss of
productivity).
Taking a different perspective, CEO substitution under conditions of decline might be a
necessary and beneficial strategy for the FOB’s turnaround process. External stakeholders might
be skeptical of the ability of the top management/CEO to cope with the organizational decline
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006). In addition, in situations of family-CEO, stakeholders might fear that
with the wealth of the family at risk, the family-CEO may direct managerial decisions toward
the preservation of the family's interests at the expense of the firm's performance (Anderson &
Reeb, 2004). In such a situation, CEO substitution could foster stakeholder support and be seen
as a strong signal.
Lastly, family firms are particularly interested in the preservation of their image,
legitimacy and reputation embedded within the family’s name (i.e., SEW) (Berrone et al., 2010;
Cennamo et al., 2012). Thus, they are more prone to implement strategic conformity, which is of
particular concern when considering the stakeholder relationship (Berrone et al., 2012, 2010;
Cennamo et al., 2012). This would suggest a higher likelihood to promote the substitution of
CEOs in FOBs. However, highly socialized, trusted, and long-tenured CEOs represent a way for
the FOBs to perpetuate their ability to exert influence, power, and control over the business,
which is a source of SEW (Astrachan et al., 2002; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). The lack of a clear
understanding regarding the role of top management substitutions in the FOB turnaround process
gives rise to the following research questions:
Research question 10: To what extent, if at all, does SEW affect the strategic decisions
concerning top management substitution in FOBs undertaking turnaround processes?
Research question 11: If SEW affects the likelihood of assisting the top
management/CEO’s substitution in FOBs during turnaround, do different FIBER dimensions
affect the relationship differently?
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4.2.2 The Controversial Role of Retrenchment
The role of retrenchment on turnaround process performance is highly contested.
Scholars suggest that retrenchment is a pivotal stage in the turnaround process (e.g., Pearce &
Robbins 1993; Robbins, Pearce, & John 1992). Others contend instead that retrenchment can be
potentially harmful for the likelihood of successfully turning the firm around (Arogyaswamy et
al., 1995; Barker & Mone, 1994; D’Aveni, 1989). Recent studies suggest instead that the
effectiveness of retrenchment on turnaround performance might be contingent on additional
variables (Morrow et al., 2004).
Indeed, Morrow et al. (2004) found that the competitive environment moderates the
relationship between retrenchment and turnaround performance. More specifically, their finding
suggested that asset retrenchment is an effective strategy for turning the firm around in growing
industries, but it negatively affects turnaround performance in declining industries. In situations
of declining industry, a cost retrenchment, sought for operational efficiencies, fosters turnaround
performance (Morrow et al., 2004). An additional empirical evidence on turnaround, considering
the effect of a recessionary wave in Asia, contends that cost retrenchment is beneficial for
turnaround performance, while asset retrenchment has no effect (Falkenberg et al., 2004).
However, a conceptual study regarding turnaround in situation of economic duress posits that
retrenchment might be beneficial for short-term performance, but could severely compromise the
firm’s ability to achieve competitive advantage in the long-term (Pearce & Michael, 2006).
Pearce and Michael (2006) suggest to managers that they should contextually deploy
retrenchment and recovery strategies. That is, invest in the acquisition (through internal
development, or external acquisition) of resources that, during the recovery stage, will provide
competitive advantage, and at the same time undertake cuts on resources (asset, or employees)
that could be replaced at low cost or acquired on the market at any time (Pearce & Michael,
2006). These steps should be taken to preserve an organization’s internal climate, efficiencies,
and stakeholder support.
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Evidence from the family firms’ research domain suggests that SEW generates social
capital, solidarity between family members involved in the firm, and relationships of trust and
closeness (Berrone et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2012). Other evidence suggests that such benefits are
also transferred to other stakeholders, such as buyers, suppliers and non-family employees
(Miller et al., 2009). This translates into long-term and stable relationships, longer employee and
executive tenure, and a lower tendency for severe employees layoffs. In addition, Miller et al.
(2012), show how family firms need to debunk — through their strategic actions — a
misconception that depicts FOBs as dysfunctional organizations driven by egoistic objectives, a
self-serving agenda, and embedded with nepotism (Miller et al., 2012). In fact, the family’s
ability to maintain strong social ties and behave altruistically towards the extended family, as
well as the enhancement of the familial legitimacy and reputation, are all sources of SEW
(Berrone et al., 2012). Therefore, the role of retrenchment in family business might constitute the
subject of future investigations addressing the following research questions:
Research question 12: To what extent, if at all, does the role of retrenchment change in
family firms versus non-family firms?
Research question 13: How does SEW influence the relationship between retrenchment
and turnaround performance?
Research question 14: If there is a significant influence of SEW on the retrenchmentperformance nexus; do different FIBER dimensions affect the relationship differently?
4.2.3 Retrenchment and Recovery Strategies
Further debates in the literature concern the balance between retrenchment and recovery
strategies in the turnaround process, and which strategy should be preferred. Scholars make the
case for the need of balancing those strategies, as both independent stages are necessary
(Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). A different scholarly position argues for the effectiveness of
retrenchment under specific contingencies (e.g., Morrow et al., 2004), while others make the
case for recovery as beneficial for turnaround performances (Barker & Mone, 1994; Pearce &
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Michael, 2006). The solution to the debate has been the need to account for the dysfunctional
consequences of decline in the definition (type and extent) of retrenchment strategies, and
consider the causes (firm-based versus industry-based) in the architecture of recovery strategies.
Nevertheless, anecdotal and empirical evidences from the entrepreneurship and the
family-business field of research offer different conclusions. Rasheed (2005), in a study on small
and medium privately-held firms, investigated the firms’ preference between retrenchment and
growth as turnaround strategies. The study suggested that firms’ owners/managers tend to prefer
growth strategies over retrenchment if their perception of the firm’s decline and of the
availability of resources is either very low or very high (on a 7-point Likert scale). In
intermediate situations, however, owner/managers prefer retrenchment (Rasheed, 2005). In
contrast, Miller Le Breton and Lester (2010), studying the acquisition behavior of publicly listed
FOBs, showed that family firms are reluctant to undertake acquisition (lower frequency and
volume) with respect to their non-family counterparts (Miller et al., 2010), and suggested that
this tendency could be opposite in a situation of performance hazard (i.e., threat to the business
survival) (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Therefore, echoing Cater and Schwab (2008), there might
be additional factors, besides the mere economic reasons, leading the turnaround strategic
preferences of FOBs.
Additional evidence could lend further support to the assertion that economic and noneconomic objectives might shape FOBs turnaround preferences. Recent studies propose the role
of emotions and affectivity in FOBs (Berrone et al., 2012; Kellermanns, et al., forthcoming;
Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008; Zellweger et al., 2011). Those studies propose the affect infusion
model (Zellweger et al., 2011) and the endowment attachment literature (Zellweger & Astrachan,
2008) to describe how family members ascribe specific value to the firm’s asset and to the
ownership of the firm’s stock, leading to an overestimation of the economic value of the firm
(Zellweger & Astrachan 2008). In other words, the total value in the eyes of the owner
corresponds to the summation of the firm’s economic value plus SEW (Zellweger et al., 2011).
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Thus, FOBs facing turnaround situations might have a biased perception of the value of the
firm’s assets, which in turn could affect their decision between cost or asset retrenchment.
A similar rational could be applied in the choice between recovery and retrenchment
strategies, and I could infer that SEW might play a role in the strategic choice. Indeed, the recent
financial crisis unfolding across European countries provides evidence of family businesses
responding to the crisis in very different ways. On the one hand, the family owned and managed
Barilla, the number one pasta maker in Italy, decided to pursue recovery strategies to defeat the
crisis. The company's CEO, Guido Barilla, decided to acquire external competencies from nonfamily executives, and undertook a 52 million US dollar investment in new resources for the
expansion of the company’s market shares in additional product-market combinations (new
geographical areas will be served with new – related – products) (“Barilla Defies Crisis with
New Italian Investment” 2012). Conversely, several family firms decided to undertake the
avenue of retrenchment in order to turn the firm around (e.g., FIAT motors, a firm with
significant family ownership led by a professional CEO, but with significant involvement of the
family-owner’s offspring in the firm’s management). These two examples epitomize firms with
different degrees of openness to external stockholders, a characteristic deemed to affect the SEW
embedded in the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Therefore, the following research questions
could represent fruitful areas of interest for future researches:
Research question 15: To what extent, if at all, does SEW affect the FOBs preferences
between retrenchment and recovery turnaround strategies?
Research question 16: Does SEW affect the FOBs preferences between costs versus asset
retrenchment?
A different strand of research posits that turnaround strategic preferences are functions of
the stakeholders’ pressure (internal and external) exerted on the firm. On the one hand, I could
expect FOBs with high ownership and influence to be relatively insensitive to external
stakeholder pressure (e.g., institutional investors, banks, and lenders) (Lai & Sudarsanam, 1997).
In addition, FOBs tend to be relatively less leveraged than their non-family counterparts (e.g.,
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Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino 2003), and are likely to borrow on short-term basis from individuals
with whom they have strong ties (Bruton et al., 2003). These two ways of getting funds allows
the family to maintain power and control over the firm, without the interference of constituencies
outside the family’s close network (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). On the other hand, evidences
suggest that FOBs value the legitimacy and the reputation of the family name, tend to have more
stable relationships with stakeholders, and seek stakeholder consensus with their strategic action
(Berrone et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2012). SEW preservation desire, in fact, spurs socially and
environmentally responsible behaviors (Berrone et al., 2010). In addition, the desire to preserve
the SEW leads FOBs to undertake stakeholder management strategies (Cennamo et al., 2012).
Hence, there might be a tension between two alternative sources of SEW. From one side there is
the enhanced sensitivity to the stakeholder interests to increase family legitimacy, improve
reputation, and strengthen the family-ties with relevant others. The other source of SEW is
represented by factors such as the desire to retain influence, power, and the control over the
business. Whether and how SEW shapes turnaround strategies type and intensity in FOBs is an
unresolved research topic. Thus, the following research questions could be addressed:
Research question 17: To what extent, if at all, does SEW affect the intensity of
turnaround in FOBs?
Research question 18: If there is a significant effect of SEW on the FOBs preferences for
specific turnaround strategies, do different FIBER dimensions affect the relationship differently?
Research question 19: Does the importance ascribed to the different FIBER dimensions
by the family-owner in FOBs affect the turnaround strategies pursued differently? How about the
intensity of turnaround? How about the strategy type (retrenchment versus recovery)?
Research question 20: To what extent does the SEW preservation desire affect the
likelihood of FOBs undergoing turnaround to downsize (employees layoffs) their organization?

63

4.3 The Outcome of Turnaround
Successful turnaround is achieved through combinations of decline-stemming strategies
and recovery strategies to revitalize and strengthen the firm's competitive position. The
repositioning and return to growth – after decline-stemming has been achieved – for firms facing
the turnaround process comes through strategic reorientation (i.e., expansion in new productmarket combination). This includes acquisitions of additional resources and capabilities, either
through internal development or through acquisitions (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Pearce &
Michael, 2006). Failing to undertake one of the two strategies might undermine the
management’s ability to turn the firm around (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). At the same time, the
pursuit of a new product-market combination entails the commitment of the firm’s resources
upfront with uncertain returns, and in FOBs this might represent a threat to the family’s SEW.
Hence the question remains: are family firms different from their non-family counterparts when
it comes to turnaround processes? (Brooks, 2002) In addition, could the presence of nonfinancial goals and family ties in FOBs escalate the emotions, constrain managerial decisionmaking and eventually undermine the achievement of successful turnaround?
There is virtually no evidence of any connection between turnaround strategies and
turnaround performance in family firms. On the one hand, evidence from studies under growth
conditions suggest that FOBs are: less prone to undertake diversification than non-family firms
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011), adverse to international expansion (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), and
prone to avoid acquisition (Miller et al., 2010). In fact, both expansion of the new productmarket combination and acquisitions might require the firm to seek external (financial and nonfinancial) resources. The inability to rely exclusively on internal resources reduces the FOB’s
ability to exert influence and power and dilute control over the business, reducing the SEW that
the family can derive from the business (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). This would suggest that
family firms are more adverse to change, and this characteristic could lead the FOBs to leave the
symptoms of decline unattended.
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On the other hand, under conditions of performance hazard (threat to the firm’s survival),
the preservation of the SEW is possible only if the family-firms survive. Thus, family-owner
willingness to trade their SEW for the firm’s survival triggers risk propensity (Gómez-Mejía et
al., 2007). This desire for the firm’s survival could translate into the family owner's willingness
to use personal wealth for firm recovery (Berrone et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). To
provide an example, Dell, the early innovator in built-to-order PCs, continues to experience
significant erosion of its profitability and decline in market share. Furthermore, given
consumers’ preferences for smaller, more cost effective and versatile devices, Dell’s
performance deterioration is exacerbated by reduced demand in its core product. Attempting to
reposition the firm with new product-market combinations (e.g., with the emerging cloudcomputing technology), the company’s founder Michael Dell reclaimed the CEO position and
has launched (since 2007) over 12 acquisitions in order to acquire additional critical resources.
To what extent Dell will succeed in turning the firm around remains to be seen.
In conclusion, the extent to which the unique set of FOB specificities (e.g., resources and
capabilities, often called familiness) affect the relationship between turnaround strategies and
performance still remains an open research question. Therefore, future investigations could make
significant contributions by addressing the following questions:
Research question 21: To what extent, if at all, does familiness affect the likelihood of
FOBs to successfully achieve turnaround?
Research question 22: To what extent, if at all, does SEW considerations affect
turnaround performance in FOBs?
Research question 23: If SEW affects the firm’s turnaround response to organizational
decline, what are the implications for financial and non-financial post-turnaround performance
of the strategies being pursued?
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5 CONCLUSION
Over 25 years of family business research has produced several theoretical arguments to
explain the behavior of FOBs (Sharma et al., 2012). Over time scholars borrowed theories from
other fields and attempted to adapt them to address the uniqueness of family business (e.g.,
Chrisman et al., 2004; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Sharma, 2004). Although several attempts have
been made, none of the theories alien to the family business realm seem to have gained the status
of dominant paradigms in the field (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). However, recent advances in
family business have proposed a ‘homegrown’ theoretical background, or the socio-emotional
wealth preservation perspective, which appears to have the requisites to become the prevailing
framework in the field (Berrone et al., 2012). In this paper, I provided support for the argument
whereby SEW has the potential to be a dominant theory for family business research. SEW was
derived from family business studies, and thus directly accounts for the simultaneous presence of
financial and non-financial goals in FOBs (Berrone et al., 2012). Additionally, behavioral agency
theory, which is the foundation of the SEW perspective, lends itself particularly well to the
explanation of FOBs’ strategic behavior in situations wherein the owning-family is threatened by
a potential loss of their wealth, both financial and socioemotional (Berrone et al., 2010; Dębicki,
2012). Therefore, in this study I have proposed how SEW might be particularly useful in
explaining a highly overlooked topic, namely turnaround in FOBs. In doing so, I also
acknowledge the many challenges that the investigation of such a topic entails. Indeed, on the
one hand, turnaround literature is scant and its investigation imposes on scholars several
methodological constraints. These constraints include: the need to follow firms longitudinally,
the need for additional rigor so as to ensure the creation of a sample of firms that are actually
suffering from a turnaround situation and the threat of spurious effects (Pandit, 2000), just to
name a few. On the other hand, the infancy of the theoretical background I have decided to call
upon poses additional challenges. Among them are the measurement of the various dimensions
of SEW and the lack of clear boundary conditions for the theory (Berrone et al., 2012).
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Nevertheless, I believe that the SEW perspective may allow us to better comprehend the
conditions under which the owning-family’s involvement may positively benefit the firm.
In this respect, I have performed an in depth-review of the extant literature on family
firms and turnaround. I have looked at the interface of these two literatures and spotted multiple
research gaps worth investigating. Specifically, my literature review points out that merely a
handful of studies directly address turnaround in family firms. I believe that the effort to detect
potential antecedent, moderators and outcomes of turnaround strategies (see Figure 1.3) may
serve well scholars who intend to engage in this research stream. To further contribute to the
field, I have also presented 23 research questions (graphically represented in Figure 1.3) that will
enhance our understanding of the tension between financial and non-financial objectives in
family firms facing sharp erosion of their financial performances. I am convinced that addressing
these questions might shed light on the conflicting arguments on whether or not family firms are
a superior form of business when the conditions put the existence of the firm in jeopardy.
My intent, with the present study, is to chart a road map that may lead future research. At
the same time, my extensive literature review should set the stage and provide some of the
elements that scholars may need in order to explain and predict a salient phenomenon such as
FOBs’ strategic turnaround behaviors. While the challenges resulting from the SEW perspective
may deter scholars from using it, I hope that the present study provides potential solutions to
some of them. In this study, I made the case for the fundamental importance of the SEW
preservation perspective and its core construct for the field of family firms. Indeed, the very
existence of FOB as a field of study lies in scholars’ ability to investigate family firms-specific
phenomena (Yu et al., 2011). This can be achieved primarily by measuring the impact that
family-firms’ idiosyncratic variables have on the outcome of interest (Salvato & Aldrich, 2012;
Yu et al., 2011). SEW may serve the purpose and may enable scholars to teat family firms as a
heterogonous group.
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Essay 2: First Response to Organization Decline in Family Firms.
1 INTRODUCTION
Turnaround strategies, or reactions to sharp erosion in a firm’s performance, are
extremely relevant and critical to ensuring a firm’s survival. The significance of the turnaround
phenomenon is understandable, considering that at any given time three out of ten firms are in
need of turnaround (Boyle & Desai, 1991); that is, they must address sharp and prolonged
decline in financial performance following years of growth (Bibeault, 1982; Robbins, Pearce, &
John, 1992). In order to do so, a firm needs to undertake a multi-stage process aimed at: 1)
shrinking the firm and gaining efficiencies, in order to gather resources (i.e., retrenchment)
(Pearce & Robbins, 1993), and 2) re-deploying those resources in order to return to growth (i.e.,
recovery) (Arogyaswamy, Barker, & Yasai-Ardekani, 1995; Pearce & Robbins, 1993). Despite
the fact that the first studies in this area of research appeared three decades ago, our knowledge
and understanding of the corporate turnaround process remains limited.
The knowledge gap is even wider when it comes to family-owned businesses (FOBs),
and this is puzzling for multiple reasons. First, empirical evidence demonstrates how
organizational crises are frequent in FOBs. Moreover, FOBs suffer from a high rate of failure
(e.g., Cater & Schwab, 2008; Shanker & Astrachan, 1996). Second, FOBs represent a
predominant organizational form in the world (Colli, Pérez, & Rose, 2003; Gersick, Lansberg,
Desjardins, & Dunn, 1999; Van Den Heuvel, Van Gils, & Voordeckers, 2006). Recent estimates
indicate that there are 5.5 million family-businesses in the USA (FEUSA, 2011), which make up
over fifty percent of the national gross domestic product (GDP), nearly $8.3 trillion, and employ
about 63% of the national workforce (FEUSA, 2011). The relevance of FOBs is also evident in
the domain of publicly traded family firms, where 35% of the firms included in the S&P 500
index are family-run (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Third, overwhelming evidence in the literature
demonstrates the existence of financial and non-financial goals in family firms (e.g., Chua,
Chrisman, & Steier, 2003; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & Castro, 2011; Sharma, 2004;
Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist, & Brush, 2011). FOBs behave differently from their non-family
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counterparts. Thus current knowledge developed outside the FOB domain might not apply.
Lastly, to date relatively little is known about the strategic preferences of FOBs under conditions
of high risk and uncertainty (Cater & Schwab, 2008), when the family wealth connected to the
firm is at stake. This situation might exacerbate the attrition between firm’s and family’s
objectives within family-firms and change the preferred strategy in turn.
The reason why I expect a different turnaround behavior from family than non-family
firms is contingent upon the actual nature of this organization form. Specifically, FOBs are
organizations where “a family owner exercises much influence over the firm’s affairs. This may
well be the case even when other nonfamily owners are present (as in publicly traded firms)
and/or the firm is managed by professional (nonfamily) executives” (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011,
p. 658). In other words, the family-owner: 1) represents a dominant constituency (i.e., the family
holds significant shares), 2) runs the business (i.e., at least a family member is involved in the
firm’s management) and, 3) controls the organization with the intention to permeate the business
with the family’s culture and value across generations (i.e., the business has been in family hands
for at least 2 generations) (e.g., Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; Colli et al., 2003; Miller & Le
Breton-Miller, 2006).
Therefore, FOBs may have different preferences in terms of turnaround strategies
because: 1) the family’s wealth is highly connected to the organization and this could shape the
family-owner’s risk bearing (Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Schulze, Lubatkin, &
Dino, 2002); and 2) the family-owner may harbor a desire to exert control and power over the
business, create a family legacy, feel an emotional attachment and loyalty towards the business,
and engender a sense of identification with the organization. Hence, non-economic
considerations may shape the family-firm’s decision with regards to turnaround strategies.
In order to understand the interplay between economic and non-economic factors shaping
turnaround strategies in family firms, we need to turn our attention to recent theoretical
developments in this area of inquiry. Indeed, Gomez-Mejia et al., (2007; 2010; 2011), building
on the behavioral agency theory (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), make the case that family
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firms are loss averse when it comes to socio-emotional wealth (SEW), which is an umbrella term
used to capture all the non-financial benefits that the family derives from the firm. SEW
encompasses the family’s ability to exert discretionary power and control over the business,
identify with the business, foster reputation and status through legitimacy, be altruistic towards
family and non-family members, develop an emotional attachment to the firm, and perpetuate the
family’s dynasty (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011, 2010;
Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). Therefore, FOBs
shape their decision making in such a way as to preserve the family SEW, although this often
comes at the expense of a firm’s performance (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-Kintana,
2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). That is, family-managers are willing to trade their financial
well-being for the preservation of the family’s SEW.
Interestingly, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010) also posit that conditions of high systematic and
unsystematic risk trigger ‘fear factors,’ leading the family to prioritize financial-considerations in
the firm’s management. This is in order to avoid the firm’s failure and the complete loss of the
inextricably linked SEW. Previous investigations suggest that family firms frame their decisions
in terms of loss and gain of SEW (Berrone et al., 2012). However, it is still unclear how much of
a threat will prove necessary to alter the FOB's strategic preferences.
A family firm’s decision makers might be particularly committed to the preservation of
the family’s SEW. As such, FOBs may refrain from undertaking severe turnaround strategies
which may require the divestment of firm’s assets and potentially undermine the firm’s
reputation, legitimacy, and social ties with the firm’s stakeholders. On the other hand,
performance decline conditions could trigger the fear factor for the firm’s survival and for the
family’s ability to derive SEW from the firm in the long run. Given these considerations, the
salient research question is as follows: to what extent, if at all, does the SEW consideration affect
a family firm’s turnaround strategies?
The present study also addresses contingencies, which shape the SEW considerationturnaround strategy relationship. Specifically, I consider the role of urgency of the organizational
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decline and organizational slack. Drawing from the cognitive school of thought (Kiesler &
Sproull, 1982), a more urgent decline (sudden and intense) should spur a more intense
turnaround response (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996; Robbins et al., 1992). Hence, urgency of
decline should indicate that resources are deteriorating quickly because they were poorly
allocated and failure to respond to the decline could trigger a firm’s demise (Francis & Desai,
2005). Therefore, the urgency of organizational decline appears to be a contingency, which
shapes the family’s consideration of non-economic objectives in their turnaround strategic
decision. Furthermore, organizational slack ‒ unused financial resources ‒ may provide a
significant premium to family firms facing a performance decline. It could help the
implementation of multiple strategies in the attempt to foster the firm’s recovery (Arogyaswamy
et al., 1995). Nonetheless, the availability of slack may also instill a false sense of confidence in
the family-owner, who may use them to fulfill the family’s personal agenda. Therefore, the
original research question can be extended to reflect these contingencies: to what extent do
urgency of decline and slack resources moderate the relationship between SEW consideration
and turnaround strategies?
This study contributes to the existing literature in multiple ways. First, this is the first
empirical investigation that focuses on the relationship between SEW considerations and
turnaround strategies in family-owned businesses. Second, by connecting the turnaround process
literature and the behavioral agency model, I contend that family firms may not be willing to
bear with performance risk in order to preserve their SEW. In fact, an imminent and significant
threat to the firm’s survival may also represent for the family the prospect of a complete loss of
the SEW embedded in the firm. Unlike existing studies (e.g., Dębicki, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2010), the present paper proposes that family firms balance economic and non-economic motives
as a function of the urgency in a firm’s decline (suddenness of decline x severity of decline).
Third, the study sheds further light on the role of slack resources in family firms under
conditions of financial distress. To date, it is still unclear whether those represent a cushion to
buffer the initial impact of the performance decline on the family firms, or an opportunity for
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self-serving family constituencies to fund personal agendas at the expense of non-family
stakeholders. Fourth, this study heeds the call for additional consideration of the heterogeneity of
family firms in the investigation of family firm phenomena (Litz, Pearson, & Litchfield, 2011;
Yu, Lumpkin, Sorenson, & Brigham, 2011). Lastly, this study focuses on the initial turnaround
response to performance distress because the study of family firms under conditions of
performance distress might provide novel insights not provided by studies, which study firms
under growth conditions. Indeed, little is known how family firms navigate through tough times
(Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989; Pearce & Michael, 2006). Family firms “in times of economic
hardship…will be particularly vulnerable to clashes between business and family goals”
Rosenblatt (1991, p. 46). As such, the present paper sets the stage for addressing a managerial
conundrum: when family firms face turnaround situations “which came first? The troubled
business? The dysfunctional family'” (Brooks, 2002, p. 33).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews the relevant
literature concerning the turnaround process and provides an overview of the theoretical
framework adopted in this study. Section three presents a set of hypotheses concerning the effect
of SEW on a firm’s turnaround strategies, followed by hypotheses on the influence of urgency of
decline and slack resources on the focal relationship. The method, details on sample selection
and presentation of results, are discussed in section four. The last section discusses the
implications, conclusion, and avenues for future research.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Organizational decline is a drop in financial performance for an extended period of time
(typically two years) that follows a period of growing financial performance (as shown in Figure
2.1) (Bibeault, 1982; Pearce & Robbins, 1993). It represents a deterioration of a firm’s resources
which could potentially jeopardize its survival and thus requires a response (Cameron, Whetten,
& Kim, 1987). The decline can be due to external or internal factors. External factors are
typically defined as industry-based. Internal factors include managerial inefficiencies or strategic
maladaptation, so they are firm-based. Regardless of the triggering factors, decline remains a
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threat for the firm’s existence (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Nevertheless, some firms decide to
remain passive in the face of decline (Boyle & Desai, 1991). This managerial inaction might be
ascribed to the decision makers’ instinct to blame external, i.e. out of their control, causes for the
firm’s decline, although very seldom the firm’s decline is limited to industry-based factors (Cater
& Schwab, 2008). In addition, even when the decline is industry-based, failing to adapt, or
adapting to changing conditions but to an insufficient extent (i.e., maladaptation) generates a
series of dysfunctional consequences (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; D’Aveni, 1989; Hambrick &
D’Aveni, 1988). These include the decline of stakeholder support, the increase of inefficiencies,
and the deterioration of employee morale and working environment within the firm (D’Aveni,
1989). Therefore, firms intending to halt the performance decline need to address the
abovementioned internal issues.
-----------------------------------------Insert Figure 2.1About Here
-----------------------------------------The response to performance decline might be an even more salient issue in familyowned businesses (FOBs). In fact, the unique blend of three subsystems – the family, the
business, and the ownership – generates the contextual presence of potentially conflicting
pressures on the firm’s strategic choices (Gersick et al., 1999; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). On the
one hand, the family’s wealth is strictly connected to the firm because of its significant
ownership of a block of the firm’s shares (i.e., blockholding). Additionally, the family-owner
derives significant non-financial returns from the firm’s ownership and management (GomezMejia et al., 2011). On the other hand, a firm’s minority shareholders, and other non-family
significant stakeholders strive for the maximization of their personal interests. This generates a
tension between forces exerted by the presence of separate agendas from the business and a
family perspective, respectively.
The abovementioned non-financial benefits that the family derives from the ownership
and management of specific firms (See Table 2.1) have been defined as socio-emotional wealth
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(SEW) (e.g., Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011, 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).
As Table 2.1 shows, recent studies suggest that the non-financial benefits the family-owner can
derive from the firm include: the family’s ability to exert discretional control and influence over
the business (Schulze et al., 2003), the fulfillment of the family members’ needs for
identification with the firm, the pride for the family’s name linked to the firm (Westhead,
Cowling, & Howorth, 2001), the perpetuation of the family’s culture, values, and beliefs
embedded in the firm through dynastic succession (Casson, 1999), the ability to be altruistic with
all family and non-family members considered to be part of the family’s social capital (Ding,
2008; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005), and the emotions resulting from the family’s
history connected to the firm’s ownership (Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008).
-----------------------------------------Insert Figure 2.1About Here
-----------------------------------------It is puzzling that only a handful of studies examined the turnaround responses of family
firms and, specifically, the interplay of forces that might lead FOBs to fail in responding to
performance declines (Cater & Schwab, 2008). The limited empirical evidence available
suggests that the underperformance of FOBs can be ascribed primarily to overconfidence and the
firm’s deviation from successful business strategies (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). Outside
the field of family business, authors developed a success-based argument to make the case for
managerial overconfidence as the main cause for the aversion to undertake strategies able to
trigger organizational changes (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; Levinthal & March, 1993). However,
understanding how FOB-specific characteristics affect the turnaround response and their
subsequent performance is still limited.
2.1 The Turnaround Process
Organizational decline can be reverted. Indeed, over time scholars argued how firms can
deploy a set of strategies aimed at halting the financial bleeding of firms in decline and fostering
return to growth (e.g., Chowdhury, 2002; Pearce & Robbins, 1994; Pearce & Robbins, 2008;
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Pearce & Michael, 2006). The turnaround literature has evolved and turnaround is currently
considered a process that takes place over time (Bibeault, 1982; Pearce & Robbins, 1993;
Robbins et al., 1992), rather than a combination of strategic actions implemented at one point in
time (Ramanujam, 1984; Schendel & Patton, 1976; Thiétart, 1988).
Turnaround is a multi-stage strategy aimed at reverting organizational decline (Bibeault,
1982; Chowdhury, 2002). The complete set of strategies deployed for this purpose is typically
called a turnaround response, and includes two stages: retrenchment and recovery (Pearce et al.,
2008; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Robbins et al., 1992). The first stage of a turnaround response,
retrenchment (see step 1 in Figure 2.2), includes a set of actions aimed at halting the firm’s
financial bleeding and seeking to stabilize the decline and setting the stage for the subsequent
recovery stage (Morrow, Johnson, & Busenitz, 2004; Pearce & Robbins, 1993). Retrenchment
entails restoring efficiencies in the firm’s management. Firms engaged in this process strive to
get rid of all underutilized assets and eliminate costs. The objective of such actions is to generate
cash to support the subsequent return to growth (Lin, Lee, & Gibbs, 2008). Among retrenchment
strategies, scholars identified a series of potential actions such as asset divestment, cost cutting,
capital and work efficiency increase (Francis & Desai, 2005), layoffs of employees, and
managerial headcount cuts (Bibeault, 1982; Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Wan, 2003; Cameron, 1994;
Pearce & Robbins, 1993). The role of retrenchment in turnaround strategies has been the object
of scholarly debate for a long time. On the one hand, scholars make the case for the pivotal and
essential role of retrenchment to achieve a successful turnaround (e.g., Pearce & Robbins, 1993;
Robbins et al., 1992). Others posit instead how retrenchment might be detrimental for a firm’s
performance because of its destructive effect on firm resources, capabilities, and morale (Barker
& Mone, 1994; Bruton et al., 2003; Castrogiovanni & Bruton, 2000). While several studies
developed contingency models to reconcile opposing views on the relationship between
retrenchment and turnaround performance (e.g., Falkenberg, Chong, & Prinz, 2004; Morrow et
al., 2004; Pearce & Michael, 2006), other studies on the turnaround process clarified that both
retrenchment and repositioning were independent strategies. However, in isolation they are
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insufficient strategies to achieve turnaround (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). In fact, while recovery
should address the cause of decline, retrenchment should address the dysfunctional consequences
of decline (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Nonetheless, retrenchment remains a significant strategy
to set the conditions for a successful recovery.
-----------------------------------------Insert Figure 2.2 About Here
-----------------------------------------The second stage in the turnaround response process is recovery (see step 2 in Figure
2.2). Building upon the resources that have been created by the retrenchment strategy
(Arogyaswamy et al., 1995), firms engage in a series of actions aimed at addressing the causes of
decline and restoring the firm’s competitive position (Pearce & Michael, 2006; Pearce &
Robbins, 1994; Rasheed, 2005). Whether or not recovery strategies entail the strategic
reorientation of the firm is contingent upon the causes of decline (industry-based or firm-based)
and its duration (long-term industry downturn or short-term industry contraction) (Arogyaswamy
et al., 1995). In general, turnaround recovery strategies include a series of investments and an
increase in capital expenditures aimed at either capitalize on existing resources or create them
(Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Pearce & Robbins, 1993). Firms could, therefore, reposition
themselves by increasing marketing investment to spur market share, boost R&D expenditures to
foster innovation in products or processes, or undertake mergers and acquisitions in order to
achieve those same objectives through faster external development, as opposed to internal
development (Pearce et al., 2008; Pearce & Robbins, 1994, 1993). Overall recovery strategies
should allow firms to develop new product market combinations needed for the return to growth.
Although retrenchment and recovery are independent strategies, as Figure 2.2 shows, they are
connected by a feedback loop (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Dah-Kwei & Smith, 2006). In
addition, a retrenchment-based strategy does not lead, in isolation, to a successful turnaround that
requires the engagement in recovery strategies to be completed.
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Empirical and theoretical studies led to the development of the process approach to
turnaround. Previous investigations have studied the contingencies under which specific
turnaround strategies are more or less likely to result in a return to growth and recovery in the
firm’s performance. These contingencies include: industry type (Barker & Mone, 1994), industry
life cycle (Morrow et al., 2004), environmental munificence (Falkenberg et al., 2004), level of
development in the market for the firm’s assets (Chakrabarti, Vidal, & Mitchell, 2011), firm size,
and the firm’s life cycle (Rasheed, 2005). However, researchers largely overlooked the role of
organizational form. Indeed, as Burton et al. (2003) posited, the current knowledge on
turnaround might not apply in organizational forms wherein there is a “significant role of
interconnection among business people” involved in the firm, and “the role of powerful ownermanager, are distinct in strength” (p. 520) from what exists in other organizational forms. In their
research concerning firms embedded in ethnic Chinese communities, they demonstrated how the
study of the behavior of different organizational forms facing performance decline may provide
additional and novel insights not provided by previous studies regarding different types of
organizations (Bruton et al., 2003). This position is consistent with Arogyaswamy et al.’s (1995)
report that discussed how scholars’ excessive focus on retrenchment strategies has led them to
overlook the antecedents of such strategies, and specifically among them the influence that
powerful stakeholders (e.g., family-blockholders, minority shareholders in FOBs) could play in
curbing the strategic response to performance decline. This issue is particularly salient in family
firms, given the complexity of relationships in this organizational form (Cater & Schwab, 2008).
Indeed, echoing these positions, Cater and Schwab (2008) posited how “the hybrid nature of
family firms may create some unique challenges and opportunities for the implementation of
turnaround strategies not found in other organizational forms” (p. 33).
In consideration of the aforementioned issue, it is expected that turnaround strategic
choices in FOBs might be significantly affected by the family-owner’s priorities with respect to
financial and non-financial objectives. While the family-owner’s wealth is largely connected to
the firm (Fernández & Nieto, 2005; Voordeckers, Gils, & Heuvel, 2007) and in jeopardy given
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the performance decline, FOBs are socially embedded entities and expected to fulfill the family’s
obligations (Ding, 2008; Zellweger, et al., 2011). Which one among those conflicting objectives
will prevail under conditions of performance decline and threat to the firm’s survival and how
this friction will shape an FOB’s turnaround choice is one of the focuses of the present study. To
disentangle the issue, I will rely on the behavioral agency theory (Pepper & Gore, 2012;
Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) coupled with socioemotional wealth (SEW) considerations
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011, 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007) to explain the framework of
reference employed by family firms while making managerial choices. Hence, the following
section illustrates this theoretical background leading to the development of the hypotheses.
2.2 The Behavioral Agency Theory and Socioemotional Wealth Perspective
Family firms are significantly different from other organizational forms. Over time,
scholars have made the case for family firms as organizational forms free from agency problems
(Fama & Jensen, 1983), where their socially embedded nature granted them higher levels of trust
(Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008), strong ties among stakeholders, long-term
orientation (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), altruism (Schulze et al., 2002; Schulze, Lubatkin,
& Dino, 2003), and holding managers that are organizational stewards. That is, family-firm
managers are guided by higher order needs, and are willing to engage in self-sacrifice to achieve
the best possible outcome for the firms (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Le BretonMiller & Miller, 2009). After all, the family’s ability to engage in generational succession is
contingent upon the firm’s prosperity (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). In addition, the
family’s reputation is strictly connected to the firm (Berrone et al., 2010). In this context, family
firms are risk takers willing to forgo their self-interest in order to achieve higher financial
performance (Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjöberg, & Wiklund, 2007; Zahra, 2005). Others make the case
for family firms as organizations wherein the social embeddedness triggers dysfunctional
behavior (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Altruism, an individual’s utility connected to a second
individual’s welfare (Lubatkin et al., 2005), as lateral opportunism is considered the source of a
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different dysfunctional behavior in family firms (agency type II) (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, &
Buchholtz, 2001). According to this perspective, FOBs are embedded with nepotism, engage in
appointments for managers and employees on blood-related criteria as opposed to actual
competencies (Lubatkin et al., 2005), and are prone to impede managerial decisions to maximize
their self-interest at the expense of minority shareholders (i.e., “tunneling”) (Johnson, Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000). Consistent with this view, family firms are highly riskaverse (Munari, Oriani, & Sobrero, 2010), preferring the status quo, and refraining from any
change, which could potentially undermine their ability to fulfill the family-owner’s agenda
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).
Recent advances in the family firm field of research reconciled these opposing views by
proposing a new theoretical prism, the behavioral agency theory. This model is the result of
merging components from the behavioral theory of the firms (Bromiley, 1991; Cyert & March,
1963) and components of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), with the aim of
relaxing the agency theory assumption that decision makers have a constant risk preference
(Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The behavioral agency model (BAM) contends that the
decision maker’s risk preferences are contingent upon the context being faced and could,
therefore, swing from risk aversion to risk propensity (Gomez-Mejia, Welbourne, & Wiseman,
2000; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The decision maker’s risk preference changes upon the
framing of the problem; problems can be negatively or positively framed based on the decision
maker’s comparison between the reference point (point of indifference) and the predicted
outcome from the potential options available (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Wiseman & GomezMejia, 1998). The literature defines domain of gain as the situation in which a decision maker
foresees the prospective outcome to exceed the point of indifference. The opposite situation,
instead is defined as the domain of loss (Bromiley, 2010). According to the prospect theory,
which shares its basic mechanism with the behavioral agency model, positively framed problems
(domain of gain) spur the decision maker’s risk aversion. Instead, negatively framed problems
(domain of loss) foster a decision maker’s risk propensity (Bromiley, 1991). This is because
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individuals are loss averse. That is, they are willing to make decisions entailing a higher degree
of risk (i.e., higher variance in the potential outcome from the decision) rather than accepting a
sure loss. Therefore, as Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) explained, “loss aversion explains a
preference of riskier actions to avoid an anticipated loss altogether . . . risk preferences of lossaverse decision makers will vary with the framing of problems in order to prevent losses to
accumulated endowment” (p. 135). In their paper, accumulated endowment was defined as
something that: 1) the decision makers deem significant for their personal welfare, 2) has already
been accumulated over time, and 3) it is currently at the disposal of the decision maker. The loss
of accumulated endowment for family firms is represented by socio-emotional wealth (SEW).
3 HYPOTHESES
The applicability of the behavioral agency theory to the field of family business is based
upon evidence demonstrating that family firms are neither more nor less risk averse than their
non-family counterparts. They simply use a different problem framing, which relies on the
prospect of SEW gains or losses. In a study of family-owned Spanish olives mills, Gomez-Mejia
et al. (2007) demonstrated how FOBs were willing to bear significant performance risk
(accepting financial performance potentially below target) in order to avoid losses of SEW. In a
subsequent study, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010) demonstrated how the family-owner’s loss framing
can shift priorities. In this particular study, high systematic and unsystematic risk, as well as
performance decline, triggered a ‘fear factor’ in family owners, altering the delicate balance
between SEW preservation and business risk. Therefore, the behavioral agency model, coupled
with the consideration that the accumulated endowment used for decision making in family firms
was socio-emotional wealth, appeared to be a theoretical perspective particularly effective in
predicting most of the family firms’ managerial choices. Therefore, this study employs this
theoretical prism to predict turnaround decisions.
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3.1 Retrenchment Strategies in Family Firms: The Role of Socioemotional Wealth
According to a behavioral agency model argument, family firms should display a higher
willingness to accept a financial risk (performance hazard) if this is needed in order to avoid
jeopardizing a firm’s non-economic utility (i.e., SEW). For example, evidence demonstrated that
family firms were more willing to undertake costly and voluntary environmentally-friendly
policies (Berrone et al., 2010), stakeholder involvement practices (Cennamo et al., 2012), and
were less prone to diversify (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). These choices were hard to defend from
a financial standpoint, as these were potentially able to generate financial risk for the business.
So, from a financial standpoint, a self-serving family principal should push for a high level of
diversification to reduce business risk, not the opposite. Similarly, a self-serving family principal
should spend less (and not more) in voluntary environmentally-friendly policies and stakeholder
involvement, because such strategies represent a financial outflow upfront that may lead to
uncertainty and risky outcomes (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Conversely, those same choices
make perfect sense under the assumption that family firms often rely on non-economic reference
points to make decisions concerning the business (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Gómez-Mejía et
al., 2007), leading to potentially riskier decisions in order to preserve the SEW. In other words,
family firms are willing to accept high variability in the firm’s financial performance in order to
maintain their SEW, but they are reluctant to accept a lower variability in the firm’s financial
performance at the expense of SEW (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). However, this tendency seems
to be reversed under conditions of threat to the firm’s survival.
Conditions of threat to the existence of family firms seem to spur a stewardship behavior
in the decision makers. Evidence shows that under conditions of high threat to the firm’s
survival, FOBs are willing to undertake strategic action that may relinquish the family’s SEW in
order to mitigate the complete loss of SEW (Dębicki, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).
However, it is still unclear where the reference point separating a negatively framed from a
positively framed problem stands. At what level of financial performance does a family decision
maker start considering the firm in jeopardy? Accordingly, at what level of underperformance
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does the family-owner undermine its financial well-being in order to prevent the complete loss of
SEW resulting from a firm’s failure?
While the behavioral agency model is clear in its prediction when it comes to a family
firm’s venture risk and performance risk bearing under growth conditions, there is a void
regarding our understanding of the role that SEW preservation plays under conditions of
performance decline. Nonetheless, predicting the family firm’s response to performance decline
is a relatively complex task (Braun & Latham, 2009). For this reason, this study focuses on the
first step in the turnaround response process: retrenchment strategies. Specifically, I investigate
retrenchment intensity (percentage of reduction in assets). The rationale behind this choice lies in
the criticality of effective retrenchment strategies in setting the stage for a subsequent turnaround
response and, in turn, a successful turnaround (Pearce & Robbins, 1994b). In addition,
retrenchment strategies serve well in addressing the dysfunctional cause(s) of decline, including
stakeholder support (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Evidence in the literature suggests how family
firms are particularly sensitive to issues such as recognition, legitimacy, and stakeholder support
(Mitchell, Agle, Chrisman, & Spence, 2011; Sharma & Sharma, 2011). Therefore, retrenchment
strategies are particularly salient for family firms striving to manage financial-performance and
SEW concerns. Furthermore, evidence suggests how an extremely severe retrenchment could be
detrimental to the firm’s ability to achieve competitive advantage in the long-run (Pearce &
Michael 2006). That is, indiscriminate and harsh cost cutting, asset dismissal, and layoffs could
lead the company to lose valuable resources (e.g., technologies, talented employees) that cannot
be easily replaced (Morrow et al., 2004). This means that although firms may succeed in
achieving efficiencies and developing the financial means needed for a recovery strategy, actual
recovery will not take place since the firms will be unable to “ride” the return to growth
(Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Lastly, practitioner and scholarly-oriented literature has underlined
how the introduction of turnaround strategies in family firms entails unique challenges (Boyle &
Desai, 1991; Brooks, 2002; Cater & Schwab, 2008).
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Following a behavioral agency model approach, a performance decline might represent a
condition under which the family decision maker realizes that the existence of the firm and the
associated SEW are in jeopardy (Bruton et al., 2003; Francis & Desai, 2005). In this particular
case, action is needed to prevent the complete loss of SEW. In turn, this suggests that FOBs
should be more willing to bargain short-term SEW preservation in exchange for firm survival.
The latter offers the family the opportunity to derive SEW from the firm in the long run.
Nevertheless, this holds true unless the family’s decision maker is in denial about the actual
conditions in the firm (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). That is, the need to preserve SEW in the
FOBs might exacerbate the tendency to believe that the current performance decline is
controllable. A family executive in this situation would be driven by a false sense of security and
confidence that the situation is manageable by following the current strategic direction (Francis
& Desai, 2005; Pandey & Verma, 2005). Such a significant influence of the family-owner on the
firm’s strategic decisions holds true also in publicly-traded family firms. Although in a familycontrolled publicly-traded firm the family-owner has opened the ownership of the firm to nonfamily shareholders, the family still represents a dominant constituency in the business. Hence,
SEW considerations can freely permeate the firm’s decisions. In fact, evidence in the literature
suggests that family-controlled publicly-traded firms behave differently with respect to their nonfamily counterparts (c.f., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Morck & Yeung,
2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The majority of these differences can be ascribed to the desire
to preserve SEW.
In summary, family controlled firms are expected to be more prone to maintaining
strategic inertia and more willing to accept below target performance in order to preserve SEW.
Severe retrenchment strategies may entail changes that could potentially undermine the SEW
embedded in the firm. Shrinking the firm’s size, divesting of firm’s assets, and severe cost
cutting might signal that the firm is in hardship, which will lead to the stigmatization of the firm
as declining (Sutton & Callahan, 1987). This condition will undoubtedly represent a significant
loss in terms of reputation, legitimacy, and family prestige, which are all components of the
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family’s SEW (Berrone et al., 2012, 2010). Furthermore, evidence based on the affect infusion
perspective suggests that family-owners tend to develop an attachment to the ownership of a
firm’s shares and assets (Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2011), which makes them
reluctant to relinquish them. A firm’s shares and asset ownership are part of family memories,
legacy, and past achievement (Zellweger, et al. 2011). Lastly, significant layoffs and head count
cuts as part of the retrenchment process may exacerbate the deterioration of the organizational
climate (Cameron, 1994; D’Aveni & MacMillan, 1990) by undermining trust and loyalty within
the company and could further lead to the stigmatization of the family firm. Given the negative
impact that severe retrenchment strategies might play with regards to SEW, SEW loss-averse
family firms would be more willing to accept the business risk (further deterioration of firm’s
performance) embedded in the firm’s strategic inertia. However, this will hold true unless FOB
decision-makers recognize the organization’s decline as a threat to the firm.
Thus, while SEW perceptions will have a significant influence on retrenchment
strategies, the directionality of the relationship will be contingent upon the severity of decline
faced by the firm. In other words, family firms wherein the family-owners represents a dominant
group ‒ i.e., hold significant voting power, control and influence over the business ‒ are
expected to allow SEW considerations to influence retrenchment strategies.
Hypothesis 1: SEW considerations significantly affect the intensity of retrenchment
strategies.
3.2 Urgency of Decline and Retrenchment Strategies
Whether they are firm-based or industry-based, characteristics of the erosion in a firm’s
financial performance (or organizational decline) affect the firm’s strategic choices. This is due
to two main reasons. First, decline characteristics act as a signal to a firm’s decision makers that
the current strategic behavior and deployment of resources are not effective, and might create a
pressure for changes, in order to eliminate the inefficiencies and avoid the complete erosion of
the firm’s resources (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996). Second, from a BAM perspective, a firm’s
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decision makers frame their problems in terms of expected prospects with respect to a reference
point (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). As this study argues, the point of indifference used as a
means of comparison to establish whether a problem is negatively-framed (loss; expected
outcome for potential alternatives is below the reference point) or positively-framed (gain) is
path dependent (Bromiley, 2010). That is, as Bromiley (2010) proffered, the reference point
tends to have upward and downward shifts as a function of past performance. For example, a
firm’s manager experiencing continuous deterioration of performance (e.g., constantly negative
returns) will gradually move the indifference point for time t+1 from an expectation of positive
return to an expectation of a return margin that is not as negative as the one achieved in time t.
Conversely, a manager experiencing a constant and significantly growing margin will move the
point of indifference upward and expect for time t+1 a growth in performance at least as equal to
the one experienced in time t. This is relevant because, according to prospect theory, the
reference point affects the definition of domain of gain and loss and, in turn, the decision
maker’s risk preference and potential strategic behavior or actions. Therefore, a decline context
has the potential to affect a firm’s strategic response to performance decline.
Past research, building on Robbins and Pearce’s (1992) turnaround model as a guiding
theory, suggests that two main characteristics of decline affect a firm’s response: the severity and
the suddenness of decline. I define severity as the magnitude of the decline (Altman, Haldeman,
& Narayanan, 1977; Francis & Desai, 2005) or the extent to which the performance has declined
in time T2 in respect to time T1 (Figure 2.3).
Decline severity = |

|
-----------------------------------------Insert Figure 2.3 About Here
------------------------------------------

Looking at Figure 2.3, the severity of decline is represented by the extent of drop in
performance, as depicted by the gap between the starting point of decline in performance
(maximum performance point on the curve) and minimum performance (Francis & Desai, 2005).
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I define suddenness of decline (arrow 1 in Figure 2.3) as how rapidly the performance
deterioration takes place. The larger the gap between T1 and T2, in Figure 2.3, the less is the
decline’s suddenness. To combine the two measures of decline, scholars have used an index
called urgency of decline, defined as suddenness of decline multiplied by the severity of decline.
Urgency of decline = |

|* (T2-T1)

Where:
|

|: is the extent of performance decline in

absolute value
(T2-T1): is the number of years between the onset of performance decline and the
moment of worst decline.
In this paper, I replicate the previously tested (Robbins & Pearce, 1992) relationship
between performance decline and retrenchment intensity. My aim is to further validate Robbins
and Pearce’s (1992) turnaround model using my sample of FOBs. Such replication is useful
since I extend the literature on family firms in turnaround situations by bringing together a
comprehensive turnaround model and the BAM. Thus, using the turnaround model (Pearce &
Robbins, 1993; Robbins et al., 1992) as a driving theory, I expect urgency of decline to spur a
more severe turnaround response. Scholars have used a cognitive approach to make the case for a
more intense reaction undertaken by firms suffering higher urgency of decline (Chowdhury &
Lang, 1996; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). Researchers have further argued that while a less severe
decline might call for a simple cost-based retrenchment, a more severe decline might require
both significant asset-based and cost-based retrenchment (Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Robbins et
al., 1992). Firms in a less severe situation of decline might employ simultaneously multiple
strategies with the purpose of growing market share and boosting sales. Unfortunately, this is not
an option for firm’s facing a bankruptcy situation (Pearce & Robbins, 1993).
The previously mentioned prediction is expected to hold true in a family firm context. In
fact, from a BAM perspective, a more urgent decline might impede the manager’s deliberate
adaptation to the changing situation and the inaction given by the constant shifting of the
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indifference point. A significant threat to the firm’s SEW would spur the family’s decision
makers risk attitude. The significant and sudden underperformance should be alarming with
potentially negative outcome that should motivate decision makers to take higher risks as they
seek more intense and immediate turnaround response. Thus, I propose:
Hypothesis 2: Urgency of decline is positively related to the intensity of retrenchment
strategies.
3.3 Factors That Moderates the Tension between Socioemotional Wealth Preservation and
Retrenchment
3.3.1 Urgency of Decline
As the paper discussed previously, the urgency of decline affects the decision maker’s
problem-framing, and in turn the severity of retrenchment response (Figure 2.4). However,
urgency appears to affect problem-framing in the context of the behavioral agency theory within
family firms (Dębicki, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Family firm managers under conditions
of threat to the firm’s survival might take the firm under their stewardship. That is, they are
willing to sacrifice their financial well-being for the firm’s survival in order to do what is needed
to avert the complete loss of SEW (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Hence, while on the one hand the
family’s desire to preserve the family’s reputation, name, and legacy (important sources of SEW)
would prevent FOBs from taking more severe retrenchment strategies, the urgency of decline
may steer them in that direction.
There are multiple reasons to expect family firms in situations of urgent decline to engage
in a severe turnaround response. As noted earlier, from a BAM perspective, family firms are loss
adverse when it comes to SEW. A high urgency of decline might exacerbate the concern for the
firm’s survival and threaten the family owners with the prospect of a potential and complete loss
of SEW. As per the BAM, family firms may be willing to trade a lower short-term SEW in
exchange for a reduction of business risk, because the expected alternative would likely be the
firm’s bankruptcy. In other words, as business risk tends to (and approaches) an impending firm
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failure, the family’s utility connected with a reduction of such risk via significant retrenchment
increases accordingly. In turn, SEW maximization is sacrificed in the short-term, so as to ensure
the family’s ability to derive SEW from the business in the long-term.
Furthermore, in a situation of high urgency of decline, non-family stakeholders might
exert pressure on family firms for a prompt reaction in order to avoid bankruptcy (Lai &
Sudarsanam, 1997). Family decision makers might then take significant actions (i.e., severe
retrenchment) to maintain their legitimacy, an additional source of SEW. From a BAM
perspective, significant cost cutting and asset divestment denote the willingness of a familyblockholder to go beyond its financial self-interests. Indeed, such actions (including other cash
generative strategies) go against the blockholder’s interest since asset divestment extinguishes
the option value that is connected to the asset sold (Lai & Sudarsanam, 1997). That is, the firm
loses the ability to dispose of the asset in the future, relinquishes the opportunity of using the
asset sold as a collateral when raising debt capital, and loses the opportunity of selling the asset
in the future at a higher price. In other words, wealth is transferred from the shareholders when a
firm copes with expenses and pays off debts via the sale of assets (Lai & Sudarsanam, 1997).
Further theoretical arguments propose that a situation of crisis spurs the FOB owner’s long-term
orientation and feeling of obligation, commitment and responsibility towards the family firm
(Cater & Schwab, 2008; Gersick, 1997; Schulze et al., 2003). This, in turn, facilitates the
implementation of turnaround strategies.
Lastly, while from a BAM perspective the urgency of decline contributes to the creation
of a negatively-framed problem (domain of loss) which results in severe turnaround response, the
perpetuation of a crisis situation might also trigger organizational inertia (Staw, Sandelands, &
Dutton, 1981). Consistent with the threat rigidity hypothesis (Staw et al., 1981), the consistent
performance decline might translate into a manager’s perpetuation of intense retrenchment
strategy. Such strategic behavior, as per the threat rigidity hypothesis, is due to the crisis
situation which undermines managers’ ability to find creative solutions, leading them to look for
refuge in well-known or currently adopted strategies (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984; Staw et al.,
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1981; Sutton, Eisenhardt, & Jucker, 1986). In the context of this study, a severe and long lasting
performance decline could cause a manager in a family firm to react with severe turnaround
response (initially) and subsequently to escalate the commitment in his/her initial turnaround
response. Hence, I expect the urgency of performance decline to moderate the relationship
between SEW consideration and intensity of retrenchment strategies (see Figure 2.4). Thus, I
propose:
Hypothesis 3a: Urgency of decline moderates the relationship between SEW
consideration and retrenchment intensity, in such a way that the relationship between SEW
consideration and retrenchment is negative under conditions of low urgency.
Hypothesis 3b: Urgency of decline moderates the relationship between SEW
consideration and retrenchment intensity, in such a way that the relationship between SEW
consideration and retrenchment is positive under conditions of high decline urgency.
-----------------------------------------Insert Figure 2.4 About Here
-----------------------------------------3.3.2 Slack Resources
Slack is defined in the literature as the difference between the need for resources and the
resources currently available in the firm (Cyert & March, 1963; Mishina, Pollock, & Porac,
2004). Over time, scholars categorized slack by employing two dimensions, namely the
flexibility with which it can be deployed and its degree of accessibility (e.g., Bourgeois & Singh,
1983; Bromiley, 1991). This originated from multiple dichotomous categorizations such as
absorbed slack versus unabsorbed slack (Singh, 1986) and immediately available slack versus
slack with deferred availability (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). A more comprehensive
categorization divides slack into three groups ranging between two extremes: potential and
available slack (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983). Available slack, often labeled financial slack, is the
most flexible and accessible form of resources. This category of slack is highly liquid, and
typically consists of cash or easy-to-market securities. Recoverable slack is a form of absorbed
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slack, which implies that it has a lower level of accessibility; the firm needs time and should
implement changes in order to unlock such type of slack (Cheng & Kesner, 1997). Lastly,
potential slack is the opposite extreme (in respect to financial slack) of the slack continuum. It is
a form of slack that managers can employ in the future. In other words, potential slack does not
represent actual resources available, but it rather refers to a firm’s unused borrowing capacity, or
a firm’s ability to raise debt or equity capital.
The literature provides opposing views concerning the use of slack resources in firms. On
the one hand, scholars make the case for “slack as resources” (Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari, &
Turner, 2004) that can be employed to fund management’s strategic initiatives such as R&D,
development of new product markets, and diversification (Penrose, 1959). In addition, slack is
seen as a cushion protecting the firm from strategic mistakes (Hambrick & Snow, 1977). That is,
slack is deemed able to spur risk-taking initiatives in the pursuit of a firm’s competitive
advantage (Cyert & March, 1963). Others make the case for slack as inefficiency. The presence
of slack is deemed to be a reflection of managerial ineptitude, incapacity to put the firm’s
resources to good use, and managerial self-interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986;
Phan & Hill, 1995). Additional studies posit how slack resources might be detrimental for a
firm’s performance as they allow managers to avoid control, and allow managerial mistakes to
get unnoticed for longer. Studies based on agency theory suggest that managers might dispose of
slack resources for self-serving objectives, such as empire building (Jensen & Meckling, 1976),
excessive diversification (Merino & Rodríguez, 1997) and improvement of job security
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Lastly, the availability of slack might create misalignment between the firm’s
internal strategic configuration and the external environment, as it provides a sort of insulation
from the environmental pressure for adaptation (Child, 1972; Litschert & Bonham, 1978; YasaiArdekani, 1986). However, an attempt to reconcile these conflicting views comes with the
acknowledgment that each one of the views is supported under different circumstances.
Recent empirical investigations proposed different contingencies under which either one
of the two perspectives of slack is supported (Daniel et al., 2004). Tan and Peng (2003)
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investigated the role of slack in emerging economies. In their study of a sample of Chinese stateowned enterprises, they reconciled the opposing views on slack, providing the conditions under
which each one was likely to be supported. Studying a multi-industry sample of 900 privatelyheld companies, George (2005) suggested how the role of slack in shaping managerial riskbearing and strategic preference had different implications for private versus publicly-traded
firms. Mousa and Reed (2013) studied the role of slack in the transition from private to publiclytraded firms. Their study showed how slack resources positively affected the firm’s ability to
raise capital during initial public offerings (IPOs), but depending on the type of slack used, it
could significantly lower or raise the value of the newly formed public firm. Lastly, in a study of
a sample of firms in the software industry under conditions of an economic recession, Latham
and Braun (2008) suggested that slack allows firms to absorb, at least initially, the impact of the
recession wave. Therefore, when considering the impact of slack on the firm’s managerial
choices, we cannot ignore the specific conditions under which these decisions take place.
Slack resources might be conceived differently in the context of family firms facing
decline. Following the BAM, family-owners might consider slack resources as a possible way to
avert external stakeholder interference in the firm’s management (Lai & Sudarsanam, 1997), thus
gaining an opportunity to maximize the family’s SEW. In fact, under conditions of decline, slack
allows firms to withstand the initial performance decline, without the need to take corrective
actions. Thus, the family can perpetuate the preservation of SEW and put the family’s interests
before those of other stakeholders (Johnson et al., 2000), disregarding the performance risk.
Evidence shows that slack resources enable a firm to absorb the initial downturn or variability in
firm performance (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert & March, 1963). This
cushion effect might, however, instill in the family-owner a biased perception of the urgency of
decline. This self-deception might exacerbate the sense of security and encourage family owners
to continue the pursuit of socio-emotional wealth maximization (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). In
addition, slack could temporarily compensate for the deterioration of stakeholder support that
family firms might suffer as a consequence of decline (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). The family’s
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inability to perceive an imminent risk to the firm’s survival, due to the availability of slack
resources, shapes the firm’s strategic preference. That is, from a BAM’s perspective, a family
principal would use slack resources to withstand the initial shock of performance decline. In fact,
this behavior enables the family to retain power and control over the firm and allows it to avert
the intrusion of external stakeholders in the family firm’s affairs, all important sources of SEW.
Simply put, slack reduces a family principal’s perception of a firm’s risk. Thus, as slack
increases, the return to SEW maximization has a higher value for the family than the return to
retrenchment strategies in terms of reduction of the firm’s risk.
A different approach sees slack resources as valuable resources that, during performance
decline, enable the firm to afford multiple turnaround strategies simultaneously (Barker &
Duhaime, 1997). Slack resources could thus be deployed for remedial measures (Barker &
Mone, 1994), such as an increase in capital expenditures in an attempt to acquire market share
(Francis & Desai, 2005). Moreover, a declining firm with available slack is less likely to suffer
from credit ratings deterioration and can succeed in raising capital through debt or equity
(Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). This translates into a relatively strong ability to avoid bankruptcy as
slack can be employed to cope with urgent financial outflows. Lastly, slack enables firms to
avoid the dysfunctional consequences of performance decline temporarily (D’Aveni, 1989). All
in all, slack resources offer the managers of declining firms a higher independency from external
pressure, a “cushion” from the downturn shock, and increase their ability to undertake
investment to foster recovery. Conversely, firms with low levels of slack have lower managerial
latitude, suffer from external stakeholder pressure and their vulnerability requires more severe
retrenchment strategies to generate financial resources otherwise unavailable (Hambrick &
D’Aveni, 1988). Thus I anticipate:
Hypothesis 4a: Slack resources moderate the relationship between SEW consideration
and retrenchment intensity, in such a way that the relationship between SEW consideration and
retrenchment intensity is negative under conditions of high slack.
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Hypothesis 4b: Slack resources moderate the relationship between SEW consideration
and retrenchment intensity, in such a way that the relationship between SEW consideration and
retrenchment intensity is positive under conditions of low slack.
4 METHOD
4.1 Sample and Data Source
This study employs data for family-controlled firms traded publicly on the main U.S.
stock exchanges (NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX).

Following previous approaches in the

literature, I did not utilize data from banks, financial institutions, and investment vehicles (e.g.,
closed-end funds, real estate investment companies, etc.), as the nature of capital and investment
in these industries, and, thus, their accounting measures, cannot be compared with those of
nonfinancial firms (Volpin, 2002). Accounting data for the firms in the sample were retrieved
from COMPUSTAT for a time window that spans from 2000 to 2012. This 12-year span
encompasses both a period of economic downturn as well as period of growth (Morrow et al.,
2004), which is an important contextual variable in this study. It is also expected that by doing
this, the generalizability of findings will be enhanced.
4.1.1 Turnaround Situation
To build my sample of declining family firms, I first screened each firm’s accounting
data in order to detect those suffering from performance decline and are involved in turnaround
situations. Consistent with the operational definition of a turnaround situation (see Figure 2.1)
discussed previously (See also: Bruton et al., 2003; Francis & Desai, 2005; Morrow et al., 2004),
I retained firms that match two important criteria. First, the firm had two consecutive years of
return of investment (ROI) above the risk-free rate of return (RFRR). The risk free rate of return
is considered the average annual rate for the three-month U.S. Treasury notes at auction3 (Francis
& Desai, 2005; Barker & Duhaime, 1997). This prevented the inclusion in the sample of those
3

The raw data for Treasury bond and bill returns is obtained from the Federal Reserve database in St. Louis –
FRED.
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firms that are consistently poor performers. Second, the firm had at least three years of ROI
below the risk free rate of return during the period of decline. The RFRR is considered to be the
threshold below which a firm is failing in economic terms, because it does not provide return for
its shareholders. In addition, using a time frame of three years of consecutive decline increases
the likelihood that the firm was actually in decline as opposed to suffering from a temporary
downturn (Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994; Bruton et al., 2003). The use of ROI has been
suggested in previous studies as suitable for the investigations concerning financial decline
(Bruton et al., 1994; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Ramanujam, 1984; Robbins et al., 1992).
4.1.2 Family Firms
In order to ensure that the firms in the sample are actually family firms, consistent with
the definition of family firms provided in the present manuscript, I identified those companies
concurrently owned and managed by families, following strict criteria (e.g., Braun & Latham,
2009; Colli et al., 2003; Miller, Steier, & Le Breton-Miller, 2003): 1) the family holds significant
ownership in the firm (the average family ownership for my sample was 42.7 %), 2) the family is
active in top management, and 3) the family has been involved for at least two generations, or
seemed likely to be. That is, two subsequent generations are simultaneously present in the firms
(e.g., a father and the son(s) are both involved in the firm). Data concerning firm age,
generational involvement, corporate governance details and ownership structure were obtained
with a triangulated approach. Capital IQ provided information for a preliminary screening
concerning the ownership structure and the firm’s age. Additional information concerning
generational involvement and current family involvement in the firm’s management and firm’s
history were drawn from the company’s in-depth record from Hoover’s a D&B company. Lastly,
I completed the data collection through a manual extraction of the necessary information from
each company’s proxy statement. To ensure the reliability and uniformity of the data, I retained
only those companies that are represented by proxy statements deposited at the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission for the years in decline.
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4.1.3 Turnaround Process Data Gathering
Drawing from the literature discussing the turnaround response to performance decline as
a process (e.g., Barker & Mone, 1994; Robbins et al., 1992), I examined firms in the sample
longitudinally, considering the multiple points in time (see Figure 2.3) of the turnaround cycle
steps. Time 1 represents the year of peak performance between the two years in which the firm
had above RFRR performance preceding the decline (see point 1 in the turnaround situation
section). Time 2 represents the year of sharpest decline. That is, Time 2 is the year during which
the net change in ROI in respect to Time 1 was the highest. Some scholars argue that
retrenchment takes place after Time 2, and it takes about two years for it to result in changes in
firm performance (Barker & Mone, 1994; Robbins et al., 1992). In my study I accounted for the
notion that a time lag exists between performance decline and turnaround response, as well as for
the fact that corporate turnaround can take multiple years (Morrow et al., 2004). Accordingly, I
have gathered data concerning retrenchment (dependent variables) for every year from the onset
of decline until the end of the third year of performance decline. Data concerning the
independent and control variables were gathered so as to achieve a one-year time lag with the
end of the retrenchment process. The potential four-year time period should account for the
evolution of the turnaround process, increasing the accuracy with respect to a cross-sectional
study of retrenchment strategies.
4.2 Measures
4.2.1 Dependent Variables
I have followed previous studies (Bruton et al., 2003; Lasfer, Sudarsanam, & Taffler,
1996) and measured retrenchment intensity as the change in assets level. The variable was
calculated as follows:
Retrenchment intensity. Consistent with previous operationalization, the asset base was
calculated as the summation of cash and equivalent, account receivables, inventory, and plant
and equipment (Bruton et al., 2003; Robbins et al., 1992). The variable was computed as:
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Retrenchment Intensity = [(Asset base time 1) – (Asset base time t)] / (Asset base time
1)]
Therefore, a positive value suggests asset retrenchment while a negative value suggests
an increase in the firm’s assets. The variable, retrenchment intensity represents the slope of the
decline in firm’s asset from the onset of decline to the end of the third year of decline. The
specification of the dependent variable follows:
Retrenchment intensity ij where i = time (year 1-4), and j = firm
4.2.2 Independent Variables and Moderators
Extensive evidence in the literature makes the case for significant differences in the
strategic behavior of family firms with respect to their non-family counterparts, even in the case
of publicly-traded firms (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Faccio & Lang,
2002; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Previous studies suggest that although the family-owner
already lost part of its control over the business by opening the business to non-family
shareholders, significant differences in strategic preferences can still be ascribed to the family
SEW in those firms where the family still plays a major role (Faccio & Lang, 2002; Miller, Le
Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2012). In other words, SEW
is present in those publicly-traded firms where the family still represents a dominant coalition;
that is, where the firm’s strategic decisions are largely influenced by the preferences,
experiences, and desire of the family-owner dominant coalition (Schulze et al., 2002). Therefore,
I draw from the abovementioned evidence and a recent study by Miller et al. (2012), which
utilized specific characteristics of family firms to predict the impact of SEW. In other words, I
use a set of variables as instruments to predict the relationship between SEW and the dependent
variable of interest. All the independent and control variables were captured longitudinally for
four consecutive years, starting from the onset of financial decline. The independent variables
are as follows:
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Socio-emotional wealth. This latent variable was measured through a series of
instrumental variables representing family ownership and family involvement. Family ownership
was measured as the percentage of voting shares owned by the family members. Consistent with
the rationale for the use of this proxy to capture SEW, the minimum value allowed for family
ownership was 10 percent, in order to ensure that the family still retains a significant block of
voting stock (Astrachan & Kolenko, 1994; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999). This threshold should be considered particularly conservative with
respect to the generally accepted 5 percent voting stock (Allen & Panian, 1982). I measured
family involvement consistently with previous investigations (Le Breton-Miller, Miller, &
Lester, 2011; Miller et al., 2012), relying on two indicators: 1) The number of family members,
and 2) The number of family members seated on the board of directors.
Urgency of decline4. Urgency of decline was calculated as severity of decline times
suddenness of decline (Francis & Desai, 2005), where the urgency of decline was measured as
the firm’s Altman Z score at Time 2 (Altman et al., 1977), while the suddenness of decline was
measured as the number of years between Time 1 and Time 2 (see Lasfer et al., 1996 for a
review on Z score). This approach is widely recognized as reliable for predicting a firm’s risk of
default (Francis & Desai, 2005; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; Robbins et al., 1992;
Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). Appendix I describes the basics for the Altman Z score computation.
Slack resources. This variable was measured as the reverse of leverage ratio (i.e.,
equity/debt). It reflects the firm’s unused borrowing capacity or potential slack (Daniel et al.,
2004; Singh, 1986). Higher values for this variable represent unused borrowing capacity, while
lower values represent low levels of slack. The rationale behind the use of potential slack lies in
the consideration that, under conditions of decline, borrowers and firm’s shareholders will grant
financial resources to the poorly performing firm if the firm has a good credit rating (high
potential slack) (Francis & Desai, 2005).
4

Given the nature of the Altman Z, the variable urgency of decline was ultimately reversely coded in such a way
that a higher value of urgency of decline actually indicates more urgent decline conditions.

97

4.2.3 Controls
The data analysis controlled for variables that previous studies suggested to be influential
on my dependent variable. It was important to control for industry membership, firm size, firm
age, internally-generated decline, and financial slack because those variables were found to have
a significant impact on firms’ turnaround strategies (e.g., Bruton et al., 2003; Francis & Desai,
2005; Pandit, 2000; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). Thus, the model
controlled for a firm’s SIC dummy-coded at the second digit level (9 categories), the natural
logarithm of sales (Tushman, Virany, & Romanelli, 1985), a firm’s age, a dummy variable coded
1 if firm performance was above the industry average (Robbins et al., 1992), and the current ratio
(Daniel et al., 2004). Diversification and international diversification have been proven to be
related with an FOB’s perception of systematic and unsystematic risk (Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2010). Hence, the regression controlled for entropy (see Appendix for more details), and the
volume of foreign sales expressed as a percentage of the total sales (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010;
Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997). Studies have shown how a family’s ability to impose their
unconstrained will over the firm might be mitigated by specific conditions (Le Breton-Miller et
al., 2011). Thus, the model controls for institutional shareholding (Lai & Sudarsanam, 1997),
replacement value (Miller et al., 2012) measured as the Tobin’s Q, and for dummies coded
reflecting the family firm type as proposed by Villalonga and Amit (2006). Conversely, other
studies have found how specific FOB characteristics may alter a family firm owner’s perception
of their business. Thus, I included in my analysis a dummy variable coded 1 if a firm’s founder is
still involved in the business and 0 otherwise (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011), a dummy variable
coded 1 if the firm has the family owner’s name, and a dummy variable coded 1 if a member of
the family owner serves as the firm’s CEO (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011, 2010; Le Breton-Miller et
al., 2011; Miller et al., 2012). Lastly, given the longitudinal nature of my data, I extracted the
time effect from the error terms by controlling for a series of year-dummies (12 categories for the
years 2000 to 2012).
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4.3 Data Analysis
The hypotheses were tested on a panel of family-controlled publicly-traded firm-years
(N= 416, 104 firms). The use of a balanced panel, or a panel with an equal number of time
periods for every cross section observations, provided multiple benefits. First, the study of firms
for multiple consecutive years enables to more precisely analyze turnaround, which is a multistage phenomenon that takes place over time (Pandit, 2000). Additionally, repeated observations
over time increase the sample size and, in turn, improve the accuracy of estimates. Lastly, unlike
a cross sectional study or time series, panel data allows modeling the impact of both
environmental-level and firm-level variables on my outcome variable and at the same time
control for the time effect. However, the use of panel data is not free from methodological
challenges.
To overcome some of the methodological challenges that the use of panel data entails, I
relied on the Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) approach (Wooldridge, 2012). Indeed,
FGLS allow to account for autocorrelation, a threat frequently present in panel data, and to
account for heteroscedasticity (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). To further confirm the suitability of
my methodology I have performed multiple tests. First, I run the Hausman’s specification test
(Hausman, 1978), which compares a consistent Fixed-Effect estimators’ coefficient with the
efficient Random-Effect estimators’ coefficient. The null hypothesis for the Hausman’s
specification test, purporting that the firm-level effects are adequately described by a RandomEffect model, was rejected (χ2 = 40.03, p< 0.001). Thus, I concluded that the Random-Effect
model is not correct and a Fixed-Effect model specification would be more appropriate
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; Hausman, 1978). However, the relatively stationary nature of the
corporate governance variables (used in my model specification as indicators for SEW) makes a
Fixed-Effect model approach unsuitable (Miller et al., 2012). In fact, Fixed-Effect only estimates
the effect of variables that vary significantly over time and excludes the time-invariant variables.
By extension, this method will not work in all situations, such as mine, wherein within-cluster
variation is minimal or variables change slowly over time (Torres-Reyna, 2010). In order to
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overcome this limitation, the FGLS approach (Wooldridge, 2012) can be employed. The
suitability of my methodology was further supported by additional tests. The Woolridge test for
autocorrelation in the residuals (F = 50.082, p < 0.000) suggested the presence of autocorrelation
in my data, the likelihood ratio test on the iterated generalized least square (χ2=1312.20, p <
0.000) suggested the errors’ heteroscedasticity5, and the joint effect of the time and industry
dummies was significant (see Table 2.4). All in all, these tests confirmed that FGLS is the more
efficient and appropriate method given the specificities of my sample (Patel & Chrisman, 2013;
Wooldridge, 2012).
The FGLS model was specified so as to correct for panel heteroscedasticity and panel
common serial correlation. The effectiveness of my model specification was supported by the
post-estimation tests for the serial correlation of the FGLS residuals. In fact, the Durbin-Watson
statistic and the Baltagi-Wu LBI-statistics (modified Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.397, BaltagiWu LBI-statistics = 2.265) suggested that after fitting my FGLS model, the errors terms are
uncorrelated6 (Bhargava, Franzini, & Narendranathan, 1982). Detailed estimation of my model,
results and check for the robustness of my results are reported in the following section.
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 2.2 About Here
-----------------------------------------4.3.1 Model Estimation and Results
Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics and means comparison t-tests between the
group of retrenching and non-retrenching family-firms in my sample. The two subgroups do not
significantly differ in terms of relevant variables such as: urgency of decline, family CEO, family
name, founder-centered family firm, family firm type, institutional ownership, firm age,
5

The Breusch-Pagan test reject the null hypothesis of constant variance, therefore my model was specified so as to
account for heteroscedasticity.
6 Durbin-Watson statistic and the Baltagi-Wu LBI-statistics take values from 0 to 4. As a rule of thumbs Bhargava et
al. (1982) suggest that values below 1 indicate that successive errors are positively correlated. Values around 2 are
deemed to reflect that successive errors are uncorrelated. Excessively high values for those statistics are symptoms
of negative correlation between successive errors. This could result in a reduced efficiency of the standard errors
that is an underestimation of the level of significance.
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replacement value and international diversification. The two subsamples differ in terms of:
retrenchment intensity, family ownership, and number of family directors, family involvement,
potential slack, internally-generated decline, firm size, financial slack, and overall
diversification. Table 2.3 shows the correlation between the variable along with the Variance
Inflation Factor scores (VIF). The average VIF value was 2.881, which is well below the
threshold of 10. This suggested the absence of multicollinearity in the sample (Chatterjee &
Hadi, 2013).
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 2.3 About Here
-----------------------------------------To analyze the impact of SEW on retrenchment intensity in FOBs, multiple FGLS
models were estimated. I began by running a null model (Table 2.4) which includes control
variables against retrenchment intensity. Thereafter, I have entered, one at the time, the proxies
for SEW. Model 1a shows a negative (β FI = - 4.511) and statistically significant (Z= -2.71; p <
0.01) effect of family involvement on retrenchment intensity. In a similar vein, Model1b shows a
negative (β FD = - 7.670) and statistically significant effect of family director (Z = -4.14;
p<0.001) on retrenchment intensity. Lastly, as shown in Model 1c Table 2.4, family ownership
also had a negative (β FO = - 0.221) and significant (Z= -2.76; p < 0.01) effect on my focal
dependent variable. The Wald-Chi square for all the three models (1a, 1b, 1c) was significant
suggesting that at least one of the parameter estimates in the model is not equal to zero. All in all,
my results provide support for hypothesis 1, suggesting a statistically significant effect of SEW
consideration on the retrenchment intensity in FOBs.
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 2.4 About Here
-----------------------------------------My second hypothesis replicated the foundational argument behind the comprehensive
turnaround model developed by previous studies (e.g., Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Hofer, 1980;
Robbins et al., 1992). I found support for a direct positive effect of urgency of financial decline
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(β urgency = 2.452) on retrenchment intensity. The parameter estimate (Model 2 Table 2.5) for
the variable urgency of decline was positive and statistically significant (Z = 2.27; p< 0.05) while
controlling for potential slack. Furthermore, as shown in Table 2.5, the overall model was
significant (Wald-χ2=233.35, p < 0.000). In studying the effect of urgency of decline, I have
decided to simultaneously enter the variable potential slack (1 year lag) in order to control for its
potential confounding effect on the focal relationship. Indeed, I am sensitive to the literature
arguing that slack resources might allow a declining firm to withstand the initial impact of
financial decline (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Braun & Latham, 2009). Following this line of
thought, the cushion effect provided by available resources may instill in a firm’s management a
false sense of security (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007) leading them to overlook the impeding firm
failure that an urgent decline may entail. In other words, a firm’s decision-maker may not act
upon the extent of the urgency of decline when organizational slack is available.
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 2.5 About Here
-----------------------------------------Table 2.6 reports the results for the models that I have employed to test my third
hypothesis. I hypothesized that the SEW‒retrenchment intensity relationship may be moderated
by the urgency of decline. Specifically, I expected the relationship to be negative under the
condition of low urgency (H. 3a) and positive under conditions of high urgency of decline (H.
3b).
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 2.6 About Here
-----------------------------------------To analyze such relationships I have created interaction terms between urgency of decline
and each one of the proxies for SEW. Subsequently, I entered them, one at the time, in my
regression models (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991). Model 3a (Table 2.6) shows that the
moderating effect of urgency on the relationship between family influence and retrenchment
intensity was significant. The coefficient for the interaction term (β FI*urgency = -2.513) was
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negative and statistically significant (Z = 3.09; p< 0.001). Additionally, the model was overall
significant (Wald χ2 = 275.04; p< 0.001). Similarly, as Model 3b in Table 2.6 shows, urgency
moderates the family director ‒ retrenchment intensity relationship. The coefficient for the
interaction term was negative (β FD*urgency = -2.272) and statistically significant (Z = -2.59;
p< 0.01) and Model 3b was overall significant (Wald χ2 = 260.11; p< 0.001). Also the
interaction family ownership* urgency of decline was significant (Z = -6.09; p< 0.001) but
positive (β FO*urgency = 0.158). The overall significance of the mode was supported (Wald χ2
= 403.70; p< 0.001).
-----------------------------------------Insert Figure 2.5a; 2.5b, 2.5c About Here
-----------------------------------------Although the moderating effect of urgency of decline on my focal relationships was
statistically significant, the effect of the moderator was unexpected. As Figure 2.5a shows,
increasing level of family involvement under conditions of less urgent performance decline is
associated with a more intense retrenchment strategy. Surprisingly, under conditions of urgent
decline, an increasing involvement of the members of the family-owner in the firm’s
management is negatively associated with retrenchment intensity. Similar findings were
obtained, as Figure 2.5b shows, using the number of family director as proxy for SEW. Indeed,
under conditions of high urgency, an increase in the number of the family members seated on the
board of directors was negatively associated with retrenchment intensity. All in all, my findings
suggest that SEW is negatively associated with retrenchment intensity even under conditions of
urgent decline in financial performance.
At first glance, this contradicts the ‘fear factor’ hypothesis (Dębicki, 2012; Gomez-Mejia
et al., 2010). Indeed, it may appear that FOBs even under conditions of a potential threat to their
survival may perpetuate SEW maximization objectives with a relative disregard for their
financial performance. Nevertheless, it is important here to recall that the variable retrenchment
intensity is coded as such that higher values correspond to a more intense reduction of firm’s
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assets. Conversely, negative values of the retrenchment intensity variable correspond to an
increase, in percentage terms, of the firm’s assets. The negative association between SEW and
retrenchment intensity under conditions of high urgency may represent the willingness of family
principals to do ‘whatever it takes’ to avoid the firm’s failure. This may as well include
sacrificing their financial benefits, and the use of the firm’s resources to engage in extra
investment in the hope to save it. Put differently, my findings show that, under conditions of
significant threat to the firm’s survival, family principals may be willing to take the business
under their stewardship. Additional explanations for my unexpected findings are presented in
more detail in the discussion section.
The moderating effect of the urgency of decline on the relationship between family
ownership and retrenchment intensity was unlike the one found for the other proxies of SEW. In
fact, as shown in Figure 2.5c, under conditions of more urgent decline increase in family
ownership led to more intense retrenchment. The opposite was true under conditions of low
urgency of decline. All in all, given the significance of the moderating effect of urgency of
financial decline on the focal relationships, and the unexpected directionality of the relationship,
there appears to be partial support for hypotheses 3a and 3b.
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 2.7 About Here
-----------------------------------------Lastly, to test the fourth (H. 4a and 4b) hypothesis I analyzed the moderating effect of
potential slack on the SEW-retrenchment intensity nexus. In order to do so, I entered in the
regressions the interaction terms between the variable being used to measure SEW and potential
slack (see Table 2.7). As shown by Model 4a in Table 2.7, the interaction term family
involvement * potential slack was negative (β FI*Slack = -2.741) and statistically significant (Z=
-2.73; p<0.05). Furthermore, Model 4b (see Table 2.7) was overall significant (Wald χ2 =
310.420; p< 0.001). Similarly, the interaction term family directors* potential slack was negative
(β FI*Slack = -3.137) and significant (Z= -3.01; p<0.05). The overall significance of Model 4b
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was supported (Wald χ2 = 290.68; p< 0.001). The interaction term between family ownership
and potential slack was negative (β FO*Slack = -0.053). However, unlike the interaction terms
described above, the parameter estimated was not significant (Z= -1.47; p = 0.143). Model 4c
(Table 2.7) was overall significant (Wald χ2 = 244.390; p< 0.001).
-----------------------------------------Insert Figure 2.6a; 2.6b About Here
-----------------------------------------Figure 2.6a shows the moderating effect of potential slack on the relationship between
family involvement and retrenchment intensity. As hypothesized, when more resources are
available more family members involved in the firm’s management are associated with a less
intense retrenchment. The opposite is true when slack resources are scarce. Similarly, Figure
2.6b allows us to analyze how potential slack affects the nexus between the number of owningfamily’s members serving as directors and retrenchment intensity. Consistent with hypothesis 4a,
when an FOB has low slack resources available, a higher family representation on the board is
associated with more intense retrenchment. Conversely, under conditions of high slack
availability (H. 4b), a more significant family representation on the board of directors is
associated with less intense retrenchment strategy. In light of the results (see Table 2.7) and
given the relationships illustrated in Figures 2.6a and 2.6b, hypotheses 4a and 4b were supported.
The discussion section provides additional comments on the effect of potential slack in FOBs
facing a turnaround situation.
4.3.2 Robustness Checks
Selection bias and Reverse causality. Following previous studies (e.g., Block, 2010), I
checked for possible biases that the selection of my sample may have generated. Indeed, in order
to build my sample I have included firms in need of turnaround, regardless of whether or not the
firms engaged in any form of turnaround strategy. As a result, the sample includes both
retrenching firms (retrenchment intensity > 0) and non-retrenching firms (retrenchment intensity
< 0). Thus, it is impossible for me to analyze the effects that my independent variables have on
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asset reduction (retrenchment intensity > 0) or increase (retrenchment intensity < 0). A potential
solution to this issue could be running my models separately on a subsample of firms that
engaged in retrenchment and compare the results obtained by fitting the same models on the
subsample of non-retrenching firms. However, such a solution would introduce further bias in
the data analysis. The use of a two-step Heckman model is the ideal solution to the sample
selection bias (Heckman, 1979).
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 2.8 and 2.9 About Here
-----------------------------------------I have estimated a two-step selection model (Block, 2010; Heckman, 1979) with
retrenchment intensity as the dependent variable and a selection equation that was run against a
dummy variable that took a value 1 if the firm engaged in retrenchment and 0 otherwise. The
selection equation included the following independent variables: number of family directors,
family involvement, family directors to independents, potential slack, presence of family CEO,
family CEO duality, industry effect (9 categories), time effect (12 categories), internally
generated decline, founder center family firm, Tobin’s Q, international diversification, overall
diversification, firm’s size and firm’s age. The selection equation differed from the estimation
model by at least one variable as recommended in the literature (Heckman, 1979). Tables 2.8
and 2.9 show the results for the variables needed to test my hypotheses (1, 2, 3, and 4) and the
inverse Mills ratio used to control for sample selection (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; Shaver,
1998). The Heckman model confirmed the directionality of the relationships, albeit at a lower
level of significance. Additionally, the inverse Mills ratio was not statistically significant across
all my models. The presence of lagged indicators for financial slack, potential slack, and Tobin’s
Q allowed me to control for the potential presence of reverse causality (Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2010; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Overall, my results suggest that the analysis was not
significantly threatened, neither by sample selection nor by reverse causality bias.
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The importance of corporate turnaround for the survival of firms suffering from
performance decline is a widely accepted managerial principle (Bibeault, 1982; Chowdhury &
Lang, 1996; Robbins et al., 1992). Yet, our understanding of the process suffers from significant
gaps. This is especially true when it comes to family-owned businesses (Cater & Schwab, 2008).
This study brings together two relevant strands of research in the area of turnaround and family
firms. The aim of the study was to bridge a significant gap in our understanding of how the
interplay between economic and non-economic objectives in family firms shape the strategic
behavior of FOBs suffering from performance decline (Bammens, Voordeckers, & Gils, 2011).
The study of the behavior of firms under conditions that put the family’s wealth in jeopardy
might provide new insights that have not been previously uncovered in studies which examined
similar issues under conditions of growth. Therefore, this study makes a significant contribution
to the field by providing a more thorough and realistic investigation of the salient relationships.
5.1 Findings and Discussion
The findings suggest that SEW is negatively associated with retrenchment intensity, and
that both urgency of performance decline and availability of potential slack significantly
moderate such relationship. The indicators of SEW were all negatively associated with
retrenchment. While slack was confirmed to be potentially self-deceptive for FOB owners, the
results for the moderating effect of urgency of decline were unexpected.
SEW and retrenchment intensity. As I hypothesized, SEW has a significant impact on the
intensity of retrenchment strategy. The results show this relationship to be negative. Thus, FOBs
with a higher degree of power and influence over the business, an important component of SEW,
are less prone to engage in significant asset retrenchment. Overall, my findings appear to be
consistent with the SEW preservation perspective. FOBs appear to perpetuate SEW
maximization with relative disregard for the financial risk (Berrone et al., 2010; Gómez-Mejía et
al., 2007) connected with a less severe retrenchment strategy. That is, the priority for FOBs
appears to be a) to protect their attachment to the firm’s assets and ownership (Zellweger,
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Kellermanns, et al., 2011), b) the desire to avoid being stigmatized and addressed as a ‘firm in
hardship’ (Sutton & Callahan, 1987), and c) the desire to avert relinquishing power and control
over the firms because of non-family stakeholder pressure (D’Aveni, 1989).
Urgency of decline and retrenchment intensity. The replication of the foundational
hypothesis of the comprehensive turnaround model (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Hofer, 1980;
Robbins et al., 1992) was also confirmed in the context of financially distressed FOBs 7. Indeed,
from a BAM perspective, urgency of decline was expected to signal the FOB owner that the firm
is in hardship and that the decline must be stopped. Consistent with my expectation, FOBs
suffering from a more urgent decline were found to undertake more intense retrenchment.
However, my findings for the moderation of urgency of decline on the SEW-retrenchment
intensity nexus were unexpected.
FOBs that scored higher on the indicators of SEW had a negative association with
retrenchment intensity under conditions of high urgency of decline, and positive otherwise.
These findings were opposite to what hypotheses 3a and 3b predicted. Yet, they may provide an
interesting insight. Indeed, it is important to recall that negative values for the variable
retrenchment intensity indicate an increase in a firm’s assets. Thus, my data analysis appears to
suggest that, under conditions of significant threat to a firm’s survival, an FOB’s principal is
willing to sacrifice its financial well-being and take the firm under his stewardship doing what is
necessary to save the company. FOBs with high concern for SEW, in situations of urgent
financial decline, not only engaged in less severe retrenchment, but invested the firm’s resources
in assets so as to spur recovery.
This finding may add to the recently proposed family embeddedness perspective (Le
Breton-Miller et al., 2011). Le Breton Miller and colleagues (2011) argue that a behavioral
agency perspective will explain an FOB strategic behavior better when the firm and its

7The

analysis was performed on a sample of firms in need of turnaround. As such, the average Altman Z-score
(Altman, 2000) was Z = 1.081 (S.D. = 0.9363), denoting firms suffering from high risk of bankruptcy in a 3 years
horizon (Altman, 1983). See Appendix 1 for additional details on the Altman Z.
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executives are highly embedded with the family owner. That is, the more family members are
involved in a firm’s management (e.g., more family directors, more family executives, and
higher family ownership) the stronger the firm will identify with the family priorities (Le BretonMiller et al., 2011). Le Breton’s study of FOBs under conditions of growth suggests that,
following a behavioral agency perspective, firms with high family embeddedness should display
tendencies to: invest less for the long-run, divert slack resources in order to fulfill a family’s
agenda, avoid any risk to the firm’s financial performance, and to use the business
opportunistically so as to address the family’s needs. However, I call upon the behavioral
agency-based literature arguing that a threat to an FOB’s survival may alter the firm’s strategic
preference (Dębicki, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). In such circumstances, BAM-driven
actions do not automatically correspond to a preference for self-serving strategies so as to
maximize the family principal’s SEW. In fact, FOBs are willing to trade their financial benefits
in exchange for the survival of the firms and the inextricably connected SEW (Gomez-Mejia et
al., 2011). Hence, under conditions of high urgency of decline, a higher involvement of the
family into the firm leads to actions readily explained by the behavioral agency model. In my
study, such actions are geared at preserving the long-term ability of the family to derive SEW
from the firm, even if this comes at the expense of the FOB principal’s well-being. The findings
suggest that in the context of high urgency of decline, a highly embedded family firm uses the
FOB’s financial resources for investment in assets in an attempt to spur the firm’s recovery.
Therefore, by bringing together the family embeddedness perspective (Le Breton-Miller et al.,
2011) and the ‘fear factor’ hypothesis which is part of the SEW preservation perspective
(Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), I provided an interesting insight suggesting that
the family embeddedness may apply differently under conditions of highly urgent financial
decline.
One of the indicators used to measure SEW showed inconsistent results. The relationship
between family ownership and retrenchment intensity was positive under conditions of high
urgency and negative under conditions of low urgency. I believe this can be ascribed to the
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specificity of family ownership. A recent study provided empirical support for a curvilinear (Ushaped) relationship between family ownership and stewardship behavior in FOBs (Le BretonMiller et al., 2011). Thus, results based on family ownership might be contingent upon the
average level of family ownership for the firms in my sample. Additionally, the use of family
ownership as a sole measure of SEW might be problematic (Berrone et al., 2012). Higher levels
of family ownership do not automatically imply a higher value ascribed to SEW; an FOB owner
may hold the majority stake in a firm and still consider it merely one of the investments in his
portfolio. I partially overcame this limitation by employing multiple proxies for SEW in this
study.
Slack resources and retrenchment intensity. I argued that slack might be self-deceptive
for an FOB principal. Slack may instill a false sense of security (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), may
insulate a firm from the external environment (Litschert & Bonham, 1978), and to the extent that
an FOB can rely on slack to withstand the initial performance decline, slack may allow the firm
to avert stakeholder pressures (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Bourgeois, 1981). All in all, the
availability of slack resources was expected to lead to less intense retrenchment strategies. The
findings provided support for this position whereby in the context of declining FOBs, slack
resources offer the family principals an opportunity to pursue a relatively undisturbed SEW
maximization strategy. At the same time, in light of my results, I can infer that slack is not
necessarily ‘toxic’ for financially distressed FOBs. Indeed, the availability of slack leads to a less
extreme reaction to performance decline. Because of this, FOBs might be better off over the long
run. By not rushing into severe cuts in assets and costs, FOBs can avoid dismissing assets that
might be instrumental in the firm’s competitive stance in the marketplace (Pearce & Michael,
2006). This is especially true when the financial distress is externally generated (e.g., economic
downturn). Under these circumstances, preserving strategic assets might be essential in order to
win back market share from competitors during the recovery stage (Pearce & Michael, 2006).
All in all, my study suggests that SEW does not necessarily lead a family firm to accept a
business hazard in order to avoid a loss in accumulated emotional endowment (Berrone et al.,
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2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). In fact, under conditions of deep distress and low level of slack
resources, the family-owner realizes that overlooking the decline may lead to the firm’s
bankruptcy and complete loss of SEW. This translates into the willingness of family principals to
take the firm under their stewardship in order to achieve long-term survival. Conversely, the
desire to preserve SEW will succumb financial concerns when the decline is perceived less
urgent and available slack allows the firm to weather the impact of decline on a temporary basis
(Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Therefore, as a firm’s risk increases, the long-term return to SEW
maximization has higher value, for the family, than the return to reduction of firm’s risk via
intense retrenchment. In fact, the owning-family undertakes investment with the objective of
saving the firm, which inherently preserves the family’s ability to derive SEW from the firm in
the long-term.
5.2 Contributions for Theory and Practice
The present study theorizes on the relationship between SEW and turnaround strategies in
FOBs and examines the effect of specific contingencies (i.e., decline urgency and slack
resources), which provide boundary conditions to the behavioral agency theory (Gomez-Mejia et
al., 2000; Pepper & Gore, 2012). By so doing, my efforts contribute to the existing family firm
literature in multiple ways. First, this study is the first empirical investigation that addresses the
SEW-turnaround strategies relationship in a holistic manner. Second, insights from the
turnaround process literature and the behavioral agency theory provide a better understanding of
how non-financial concerns affect the strategic choices of family firms. Third, the present
investigation sheds additional light on the role of slack resources in family firms under
conditions of financial distress, a relatively understudied topic in family business. Available
slack might be deceptive for the family firms’ decision-makers and induce a false sense of
confidence and low perception of urgency. Fourth, this study provides a better understanding of
within family firm differences. Therefore, I heed the call for additional consideration of family
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firm heterogeneity in the investigation of family-firm-specific phenomena (Litz et al., 2011; Yu
et al., 2011).
The present investigation provides important practical implications. First, little is known
about how family firms navigate challenging times (Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989; Pearce &
Michael, 2006). Family firms “in times of economic hardship…will be particularly vulnerable to
clashes between business and family goals” Rosenblatt (1991, p. 46). Thus, this paper provides
useful insights to non-family shareholders and potential investors on how non-financial
considerations may spill from the family’s unique perspective over the strategic behavior of the
business itself. Furthermore, non-family stakeholders should be aware of how the presence of a
family-owner in the business, as a dominant constituency, may curb the strategic behavior of the
firms at the expense of non-family members. In addition, FOB consultants may advise their
client-firms to preserve slack in order to prevent FOB over-reaction to organizational decline.
Lastly, my model uses predictors that can be retrieved from the firm’s annual standardized
profile; this may allow investors and lenders to use the model presented here for normative
purposes.
5.3 Avenue for Future Research
The limitations of the study notwithstanding, I conclude that the role of SEW in family
firms to predict firm’s behavior in situations of performance decline provides an interesting
avenue for future research. In light of the unfolding global financial crisis, an increasing number
of firms suffer from performance decline and they are, thus, in need of turning their businesses
around (Pearce & Michael, 2006). A family business exhibits a unique blend of financial and
non-financial objectives that shape the firm’s managerial choices. Therefore, future research
efforts may significantly enhance our understanding in the following ways. First, the present
study used corporate governance variables to approximate a firm’s SEW. Although this is a
widely accepted approach, it may capture only partially the complexity of the SEW construct.
Future studies must employ survey-based direct measurement of SEW to validate the present
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findings. This may also help us to understand whether the extent of SEW and value ascribed to
SEW have differential effect on the strategic preferences of FOBs. Second, while I advanced the
theory on the impact of SEW on turnaround strategies, additional studies are necessary to
investigate how this affects the firm’s ability to achieve a successful turnaround. Lastly, I placed
focus on the first stage of the turnaround response process (i.e., retrenchment). Future research
should investigate the tendency of family firms to undertake a recovery strategy approach as
opposed to retrenchment.
5.4 Conclusion
This study integrates multiple streams of research and expands our understanding of
SEW in family firms. Specifically, it proposes specific boundary conditions within which the
behavioral agency theory is expected to effectively predict the family firms’ strategic behavior,
when integrated with insights from the turnaround literature. As such, this paper is one of the
first research efforts that attempt to explain the turnaround response of family firms to
performance decline. Moreover, the theoretical arguments and the hypotheses advanced in this
study make the case for a different turnaround behavior between family and non-family firms.
As discussed previously, the family’s wealth is inextricably connected to the family business and
this alone could shape the family-owner’s risk bearing (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Schulze et al.,
2002). Additionally, the family-owner may nurture a desire to exert control and power over the
business, to create a family legacy, feel an emotional attachment and loyalty towards the
business, and a sense of identification with the organization. Hence, non-economic
considerations shape FOB decisions in the turnaround process.
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Essay 3: Turnaround Response to Performance Decline in Family Firms:
Impact of Socioemotional Wealth Considerations
1 INTRODUCTION
The erosion of stakeholder support is a significant consequence of a firm’s performance
decline. Research on strategic response to performance decline (i.e., turnaround) suggests that
the lack of stakeholder support could significantly exacerbate the firm’s decline (Arogyaswamy,
Barker, & Yasai-Ardekani, 1995). In fact, stakeholders are “groups of constituents who have a
legitimate claim on the firm” (Freeman, 1984; Hill & Jones, 1992, p. 133). The legitimate claim
results from an exchange whereby stakeholders supply the firm with a critical resource and, in
return, expect the fulfillment of their own interests (Hill & Jones, 1992). The critical nature of
stakeholder support is clear, considering that during performance decline a firm might find it
difficult to access resources critical for the firm’s survival when the firm needs them the most
(Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; D’Aveni, 1989). At the same time, during hardship, the firm has a
limited means to cope with all stakeholders’ needs, and should therefore attend to the interests of
those stakeholders that guarantee access to critical resources (Donaldson & Preston, 1995;
Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978). Hence, firms facing decline need to
tailor their response strategies in order to avoid the spiral of performance decline, withdrawal of
stakeholder support, and further performance decline (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Clarkson,
1995). Interestingly, the role of stakeholders in the turnaround process has been largely
overlooked in the literature.
The study of how stakeholders affect a firm’s turnaround strategies, under conditions of
performance decline, might be particularly meaningful in the context of family firms for several
reasons. First, family-owned businesses (FOBs) are a predominant organizational form in the
world (Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999) and they represent a significant
percentage of private as well as publicly traded firms (e.g., Astrachan & Shanker, 2003;
Zellweger & Nason, 2008).
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Second, following Chua et al. (1999, p.25) an FOB is “a business governed and/or
managed with the intention to shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant
coalition controlled by members of the same family or a small number of families in a manner
that is potentially sustainable across generations of the family or families.” As such, FOBs
pursue financial and non-financial outcomes as part of their strategic behavior (e.g., Chrisman,
Chua, & Litz, 2004; Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007).
Hence, the fulfillment of a particular stakeholder’s interests might be aimed at receiving a nonfinancial resource in exchange (e.g., legitimacy, recognition for the family’s name, etc.)
(Mitchell, Agle, Chrisman, & Spence, 2011). Moreover, FOBs have an additional and complex
stakeholder in respect to their non-family counterparts, the family itself. That is, a group of
stakeholders (shareholders and non-shareholders that could be involved in the firm’s
management) with unique non-economic goals (i.e., socio-emotional wealth) (Dyer & Whetten,
2006; Zellweger & Nason, 2008). Additionally, family and non-family members within family
firms are strongly connected to one another (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). On the basis of social identity
theory (Dyer & Whetten, 2006), scholars demonstrated that this made the family firm’s decision
maker more sensible toward the needs of the stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 2011; Sharma &
Sharma, 2011; Zellweger & Nason, 2008).
Third, the aforementioned arguments seem to suggest that family firms attempt to fulfill
the interests of multiple stakeholders (Zellweger & Nason, 2008). In addition to this, FOBs have
a different set of constituencies with respect to non-family firms (Mitchell et al., 2011).
Therefore, the differences between these two organizational forms may imply that stakeholderrelated knowledge developed outside the context of family firms might not hold true.
To understand how stakeholder influence shapes the turnaround strategies in family
firms, I turn my attention to the recently developed socioemotional wealth preservation
perspective, which employs behavioral agency theory (Gomez-Mejia, Welbourne, & Wiseman,
2000; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) in the context of the family firm (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz,
Berrone, & Castro, 2011; Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).
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Following this theoretical prism, the turnaround response to performance decline in FOBs will be
a function of those who exert control over the organization and the extent to which this dominant
constituency values the achievement of non-financial objectives such as legitimacy and
recognition or reputation (Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Sharma & Sharma,
2011). In fact, the overarching assumption of the socio-emotional wealth perspective is that
family principals carry financial and non-financial objectives (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, &
Larraza-Kintana, 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Socio-emotional wealth (SEW), a construct
that encompasses non-economic benefits the family owner derives from the business, is the main
frame of reference in decisions made by FOBs (Berrone et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011).
Interestingly, FOBs are willing to accept risk in terms of financial performance if it is necessary
to preserve SEW (Dębicki, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Recent studies show how SEW is a
complex and multi-dimensional construct as captured by the FIBER model, It includes “…
Family control and influence, Identification of family members with the firm, Binding social ties,
Emotional attachment of family members, and Renewal of family bonds to the firm through
dynastic succession” (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012, p. 2). Therefore, taking a holistic
approach without considering separately the multiple dimensions of SEW might lead to
imprecise predictions.
In order to bridge this gap, I draw from the stakeholder theory literature to better
understand the role of stakeholders in FOBs strategic decision making. Recent investigations
propose how family firms attend to stakeholders’ needs for instrumental (do ‘x’ to obtain ‘y’ in
exchange) and normative reasons (do something because I believe it is right to do so) (Cennamo
et al., 2012; Mitchell et al., 2011). Depending on which FIBER dimension of SEW the familyprincipal employs as a frame of reference, a different set of stakeholders might be relevant in
decision-making. Specifically, an FOB will fulfill the needs of those stakeholders that the
family-principals either believe it is right to consider, or have the ability to provide the familyprincipal with the desired non-financial return. For this reason, I expect family firms to pursue
those turnaround strategies that best fulfill the needs of salient stakeholders. In other words,
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stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) will help me elucidate and predict the turnaround decisions
of family firms as a function of the following important components: 1) stakeholder influence
(Rowley, 1997), 2) non-financial benefits that the specific stakeholder can provide to the family
firms (Berrone et al., 2012), and 3) non-financial returns that the family principal deems more
salient (Cennamo et al., 2012; Mitchell et al., 2011). At the same time, I will call upon a
component of behavioral agency theory whereby family firms responding to stakeholder
pressure/needs will often let SEW preservation concerns take precedence over economic wellbeing (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Whether this holds true when the
firm’s survival is in jeopardy is an open question. Therefore, this study addresses the following
research question: to what extent, if at all, do socio-emotional wealth dimensions affect
turnaround response to performance decline in family firms?
In order to address the above research question, this study relies on behavioral agency
theory (also known as behavioral agency model - BAM), with insights from stakeholder theory,
to advance our knowledge on the non-financial benefits derived by FOBs. By drawing upon
these theoretical bases, this study extends the existing literature in multiple ways. First, this study
integrates the BAM with contributions from stakeholder theory literature to account for the
multidimensional nature of SEW. By doing this, I will be able to investigate the potential
convergence of the instrumental and normative views of stakeholder theory in the context of
FOBs. This is the first study that connects individual SEW dimensions to the strategic
preferences of family firms. Second, the investigation of the role of stakeholder pressure on
decline-stemming strategic choices heeds the call for empirical investigations aimed at bridging a
significant gap in turnaround-related knowledge (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Moreover, by
studying how SEW affects turnaround response to performance decline adds an additional
antecedent able to explain and predict this phenomenon. Third, insights resulting from the two
abovementioned theoretical lenses allow to shed further light on a family firm’s strategic
response to performance decline, a largely overlooked topic (Cater & Schwab, 2008).
Furthermore, components of the BAM bolster the claim that family firm decision makers will
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attend to stakeholder needs for reasons other than the economic resources needed for the firm’s
survival. Family firms will choose their strategies to seek stakeholder support needed to weather
organizational decline (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001) and to preserve the family’s SEW
(Mitchell et al., 2011). I argue that the importance that a family decision maker places on each
dimension of the FIBER model will have an impact on which of the above two strategic
directions the FOB may actually follow. Fourth, this is one of the first studies to employ direct
measures of the SEW construct and its dimensions to make predictions concerning the strategic
preferences of family firms. Fifth, by studying how family firms manage economic and noneconomic goals under conditions of threat to the firm’s survival might provide interesting and
novel insights not provided by studies conducted under conditions of growth. Lastly, by
investigating the different dimensions of SEW to predict turnaround strategies, I heed an
important call made in the family firm literature regarding the need to better understand how
family firm specific variables affect the strategic preferences of this organizational form (Salvato
& Aldrich, 2012; Sharma, Chrisman, & Gersick, 2012; Sharma, 2004; Yu, Lumpkin, Sorenson,
& Brigham, 2011). My investigation does not merely compare family versus non-family firms.
Such a comparison would essentially imply that family firms behave homogeneously. My study
accounts for within-family-firm differences.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the relevant
literature on turnaround strategies and provides additional information about stakeholder theory.
Section three discusses recent advancements in SEW research and develops the focal hypotheses.
Section four offers information about the method, measures, and data analysis. The last section
offers a thorough discussion of the findings and a conclusion along with the implications for
theory and practice. Lastly, the essay discusses avenues for future research.
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Turnaround is the achievement of a firm’s recovery from performance decline. Firms are
said to be in need of turnaround when they experience a prolonged period of performance
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decline following a period of growth (Robbins, Pearce, & John, 1992; Schendel, Patton, &
Riggs, 1975). Hence, in order to halt the performance decline and return to growth, firms
undergo a multi-stage process (Bibeault, 1982; Pearce & Robbins, 1994), known as turnaround
process (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996). Firms engage in strategies geared at generating higher
efficiencies and re-focus the business (i.e., retrenchment stage) so as to gather the resources
needed in order to invest in the repositioning of the firms and recovery of financial performance
(i.e., recovery stage) (Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Robbins et al., 1992). Turnaround response to
performance-induced crises attracted scholarly attention, although to date the focus has been
mainly on the investigation of the successful versus unsuccessful turnaround process, and on the
controversial role of retrenchment in the achievement of a successful return to growth
(Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Therefore, the variables affecting turnaround strategic choices
remain relatively untouched, and only a handful of studies strived to shed light on such a topic in
the context of family firms.
This section presents the relevant literature concerning the turnaround process, introduces
stakeholder theory, and the family business related notions needed for the subsequent
formulation of hypotheses.
2.1 Turnaround Process
Retrenchment strategies cover a significant role in the turnaround process, but their
impact on turnaround performance is controversial. Retrenchment includes strategic moves such
as divestment of the less productive assets, refocusing of the firm on core activities, significant
cost cuts, downsizing, and head count cuts (Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Pearce & Robbins, 1994;
Robbins et al., 1992). Scholars make the case for retrenchment as the genesis of turnaround
(Pearce & Robbins, 1994), because of its ability to eliminate inefficiencies, re-focus the business,
and gather the resources needed to perpetuate the turnaround process (Hofer, 1980; Pearce &
Robbins, 1993; Robbins et al., 1992). Others make the case for retrenchment as detrimental to
the firm’s ability to return to pre-decline performance levels (Barker & Mone, 1994; Bruton et
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al., 2003; Castrogiovanni & Bruton, 2000), because firms might get rid of critical assets,
employees, and competencies critical to achieving recovery (Pearce & Michael, 2006). An
additional strand of inquiry suggests how retrenchment and recovery are equally important and
are both needed in order to achieve successful turnaround (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). In fact,
those two strategies address different issues. Recovery copes with the cause of decline, while
retrenchment (also called decline stemming strategies) bears with the consequences of decline
(Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Thus, retrenchment per se might address potential inefficiencies in
the firms suffering from performance decline, but could exacerbate dysfunctional consequences
of performance decline (D’Aveni, 1989). Among them, scholars identified the deterioration of
the firm’s internal climate, the generation of dysfunctional decision making, and most
importantly the erosion of stakeholder support.
The pivotal role played by stakeholder support is evident in light of a few key
considerations. A firm suffering from performance decline fails when the dysfunctional
consequences of decline go unaddressed (Barker & Mone, 1994; Gilson, John, & Lang, 1990;
Sutton & Callahan, 1987). That is, stakeholders within the firm or outside the firm withdraw
their support (Sutton & Callahan, 1987). On the one hand, withdrawal of internal stakeholder
support could lead to more dysfunctional decision making process (Bozeman & Slusher, 1979;
Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981), a significant erosion of internal climate with the resulting
decrease in employee productivity (Cameron, Whetten, & Kim, 1987; Cameron, 1994; Sutton &
D’Aunno, 1989). On the other hand, withdrawal of external stakeholder (e.g., suppliers, buyers,
or creditors) support leads the firm to remain without the resources needed to survive (Pfeffer &
Salanick, 1978). The denial of credit to the ailing firm can lead to an inability to cope with
financial commitments and, in turn, to bankruptcy (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). In fact, scholars
posit how the withdrawal of stakeholder support represents a potentially vicious circle
(Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988) whereby: 1) the performance decline triggers

stakeholders’

concerns (D’Aveni, 1989), 2) stakeholders might decide to become less supportive toward the
firm, inherently generating further pressure on the declining firm that may be unable to access
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the critical resources needed to survive, and 3) the lack of support might exacerbate the firm’s
decline, leading to further erosion of support from the circle of stakeholders (Hambrick &
D’Aveni, 1988). Firms intending to achieve recovery of financial performance need to deploy
significant decline-stemming strategies sensitive to the potential erosion of stakeholder support
(Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). In addition, studies show how firms suffering decline are also
subject to stigmatization (e.g., Sutton & Callahan, 1987). This implies that external stakeholders
become overly protective for their stake in the declining firms, and might in turn use their
influence to curb the managerial decisions towards the preservation of their own self-interests
(Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; D’Aveni, 1989). The deterioration of the firm’s relationship with its
external stakeholders generates a domino effect wherein: 1) the firms suffer from a loss of
productivity, 2) increased pressure from stakeholders requiring unreasonable guarantees to
protect their stake in the firm lead to a reduction in managerial latitude (Jawahar & McLaughlin,
2001), 3) stakeholders might reduce the firm’s ability to access financial and non-financial
resources (Gilson et al., 1990; Sutton & Callahan, 1987), and 4) the firm, in order to survive,
needs to rely on alternative providers and must bear with higher cost to access resources. All in
all, the domino effect undermines the ability of the firm to regroup and return to growth. This
evidence suggests that firms need to undertake decline-stemming strategies that preserve
stakeholder support, so as to be able to build solid bases to develop recovery strategies. The
focus of this study is, therefore, on this first and critical step in responding to performance
decline.
Decline-stemming strategies include a set of substantive strategies to address turnaround
situations (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). These address conditions whereby the firm’s profitability
indexes fall below a risk free rate of return (Bruton et al., 2003). Among these strategies, the
literature identifies: 1) aggressive cost cutting, 2) severe asset cuts, and 3) intense focus on
improvement in sales either through reduction in price and/or through investment in marketing
funded via cuts in all other functions of the organization. Intuitively, each of the aforementioned
strategies preserves the interest of a specific category of stakeholders. Thus, the firm’s decision
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of which strategy should be prioritized depends on both the pressure exerted by a specific
stakeholder category (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997; Rowley,
1997), and the relevance that the firm ascribes to those stakeholders (Jawahar & McLaughlin,
2001). These considerations are particularly intriguing when it comes to family firms for three
reasons. First, family firms have an additional and significant constituency (stakeholder), the
family-owner (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Zellweger & Nason,
2008). Second, the family principals have both financial and non-financial objectives; that is, the
family-owner considers non-economic benefits (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011, 2010; Gómez-Mejía
et al., 2007) (i.e., SEW) such as legitimacy, recognition, pride and reputation (Berrone et al.,
2010) as critical. Third, non-economic goals in family firms make this organizational type
particularly sensitive to stakeholder interests (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2011;
Sharma & Sharma, 2011). Therefore, stakeholder theory will play a significant role in explaining
and predicting the turnaround strategic preferences once contextualized in the realm of family
firms.
2.2 The Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder theory maintains that the functioning of an organization is shaped by its
relationships with stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). In other words, an organization’s objectives,
strategies, and achievements are driven by the stakeholder influence (Mitchell et al., 1997;
Rowley, 1997). This view should thus enable management to define how to strategically manage
their stakeholders (Frooman, 1999). As such, a firm should account for its stakeholders’ claims
in their decision making process and strategic planning (Freeman, 1984). However, firms have a
limited amount of resources available and are, therefore, unable to attend to the claims of all
stakeholders (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). Therefore, to shed light on this interesting
dynamic, scholars provide multiple reasons along three main perspectives: instrumental,
normative, and stakeholder saliency (Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008). Following a normative
perspective, the strategic behavior of firms addresses stakeholder needs because ‘it is the right
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thing to do’(Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999). Stakeholders have an intrinsic value and it
is the firm’s moral responsibility to fulfill their needs (Berman et al., 1999; Freeman, Wicks, &
Parmar, 2004; Ogden & Watson, 1999). Conversely, scholars supporting an instrumental
perspective propose that attending to stakeholder claims is a good business practice (Jones,
1995). That is, the fulfillment of stakeholders’ interests might bring specific benefits to the firm
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Hill & Jones, 1992). Therefore, a firm addresses the claim of a
specific stakeholder group in order to receive access to a specific benefit (e.g., a critical resource
controlled by the stakeholders) (Hill & Jones, 1992).
Other scholars contend that a firm should attend to the claims of stakeholders on the basis
of their attributes. According to this view, the importance of a specific stakeholder (also called
salience of a stakeholder) is a function of three attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency (e.g.,
Mitchell et al., 1997). Power is defined as the ability of a social actor (A), to get another social
actor (B) to behave in a way that B would not have done otherwise (Mitchell et al., 2011, 1997).
In a resource dependency approach (Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978), scholars discuss how power, in
the context of stakeholder theory, results from a stakeholder’s ability to provide or withdraw
resources deemed important to the firm (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). Clearly, who, among
the stakeholders, will be attended is also a function of their power. Legitimacy is another
stakeholder attribute and it is the firm’s understanding of who among the stakeholders really
counts (Mitchell et al., 1997). This decision can be rooted either in the normative or in the
instrumental stakeholder perspective (Suchman, 1995). Lastly, urgency refers to the time
sensitivity of a specific claim (Mitchell et al., 1997). The stakeholder’s urgency is contingent
upon the situational context (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). For instance, under situations of
decline in performance and erosion of the firm’s credit line, and shrinkage of the firm’s financial
resources, creditors’ claims are probably highly urgent. In other words, urgency tells whether the
fulfillment of a stakeholder claim can be delayed or not (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999). It
is important to note that the consequences of delay in the fulfillment of a stakeholder’s claim
might erode the relationship with that specific stakeholder or group of stakeholders. Therefore,
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according to this perspective, overall stakeholder saliency should be the driver that informs
managers which among the stakeholders’ needs they should account for in the development of
the firm’s strategy (Agle et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997). Intuitively, a stakeholder’s saliency
changes over time and is contingent upon the firm’s life cycle stage; when the firm suffers from
an increased dependency on resources, stakeholder saliency is very likely to be based on the
resources that a stakeholder controls (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001).
In the context of family firms, the definition of stakeholder saliency might be more
complex (Mitchell et al., 2011; Zellweger & Nason, 2008) given the interplay of economic and
non-economic resources that the family-owner pursues. Yet, to date stakeholder theorists have
failed to include the role of the family owner in their predictions. As Cennamo et al (2012, p. 10)
suggest, the stakeholder consideration in the strategic choices of family firms is “ultimately a
function of who controls the organization and the extent to which this controlling party values
the (non-monetary) benefits derived” from the strategy pursued. This is quite clear if we study
the issue from an SEW preservation standpoint. That is, the pursuit of a specific strategy in
family firms results from SEW considerations. The most valuable strategy for family firms is
thus the one that helps the family fulfill its non-economic objectives, even though this might
come at the expense of economic considerations (Berrone et al., 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007;
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010)
3 HYPOTHESES
According to Freeman (1984), stakeholders are defined as “any group or individual who
can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of a corporation’s purpose” (Freeman, 1984, p. 6).
Different groups of stakeholders carry different goals and objectives and, therefore, have
different claims on the organization. This is particularly true in family firms where the familyowner represents a significant group that carries both financial and non-financial objectives
(Sharma & Sharma, 2011; Zellweger & Nason, 2008). In order to respond to stakeholder
demands, the firm should undertake strategies that fit the needs of the various stakeholders.
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Nevertheless, family firms need to account for the significant pressure of the family as a
stakeholder group, who desires to advance relevant claims for the preservation of their
socioemotional endowment (Mitchell et al., 2011; Sharma & Sharma, 2011). The phenomenon
cannot be explained with the sole use of stakeholder theory. In fact, stakeholder theory overlooks
the role of owners as a firm’s stakeholders group (Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 2003) and ignores
that in an FOB the firm’s ownership and the firm’s decision makers may partially overlap
(Mitchell et al., 2011; Zellweger & Nason, 2008). This paper addresses the abovementioned
limitations by drawing from both stakeholder theory and behavioral agency theory (the
socioemotional wealth preservation perspective).
3.1 Socioemotional Wealth and Stakeholders Relationship
Central to the application of the BAM in family firms is the definition of socioemotional
wealth (SEW). SEW is an umbrella term used to define all the non-financial benefits that the
family derives from the family ownership and management (Berrone et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia
et al., 2011, 2010). According to Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007, p. 108), SEW includes the "needs
for belonging, affect, and intimacy; continuation of family values through the firm; perpetuation
of the family dynasty; social status; preservation of family firm social capital; discharge of
family obligations based on blood ties; and ability to act altruistically toward family members
using firm resources."
The behavioral agency theory results from the combination of the behavioral theory of
the firms and prospect theory (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2000; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The
main notion resulting from the behavioral agency theory is that decisions in organizations are
contingent upon the decision makers’ definition of a reference point (or point of indifference)
(Pepper & Gore, 2012; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). A further central concept is that those
decision makers are loss averse when it comes to their accumulated endowment in the firm
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2000; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). By accumulated endowment,
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) refer to something that has the following characteristics: 1) it
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is deemed valuable by the decision makers for their well-being, 2) it is something that the
decision maker accumulated over time, and 3) it is something currently at the decision maker’s
disposal. To further contextualize the behavioral agency theory with regard to family firms,
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) building on overwhelming evidence in the family firm literature,
indicate that for family firm key decision makers non-financial benefits (i.e., SEW) represent the
accumulated endowment (Berrone et al., 2012, 2010; Cruz, Justo, & De Castro, 2012; GomezMejia et al., 2011, 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Mesquita, Hashimoto, Hom, & GomezMejia, 2012).
As per the behavioral agency theory, a key decision maker in family firms, while facing
strategic decisions will strive to preserve the family’s SEW, even though this might generate a
potential performance hazard for the firm (Berrone et al., 2010). Evidence supporting this claim
shows, for example, how family-owned olive mills are less likely to join cooperatives – a choice
that might relinquish the family’s ability to exert control over the firm even though this implies
a potential threat to firm performance (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Other studies suggest that
family firms are less likely to undertake corporate diversification (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010),
acquisitions (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010), and internationalization (Dębicki, 2012),
all choices that while potentially able to provide gain in terms of financial performance, are also
deemed able to reduce the family’s SEW. In more recent studies, scholars noticed that under
conditions of enhanced threat to the firm’s survival, the fear factor might push the family
principals to take the firm under their stewardship in order to avoid a firm’s failure and the
complete loss of SEW (Dębicki, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). All in all, these findings
suggest some important considerations. First, that family firms are neither more nor less rational
than their non-family counterparts; they simply use a different frame of reference for their
decision making process (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). That is, family firms frame their strategic
choices in terms of expected gain and loss in terms of SEW. Second, family firms are risk
adverse and risk seeking at the same time (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). They are risk averse as
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they are particularly sensitive to the potential loss of SEW, and risk seeking as they are willing to
bear with business risk in order pursue their non-financial objectives (avoid any threat to SEW).
Since its introduction in the family firm setting, the behavioral agency theory received
empirical support. Studies demonstrate how family firms are more likely to follow strategic
conformity to avoid stigmatization ( Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2012). Some studies
found that family businesses are particularly sensitive to their environment as they desire to
preserve the family’s reputation and legitimacy (Berrone et al., 2010). Lastly, recent
investigations demonstrate that family firms engage in philanthropic activities, care about the
well-being of their employees, strive to offer stable jobs, and offer more protective contracts in
spite of economic performance considerations (Cruz, Gómez-Mejia, & Becerra, 2010; Cruz et
al., 2012). All in all, this evidence suggests that family firms are particularly concerned with
their relationships with their stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 2011; Sharma & Sharma, 2011;
Zellweger & Nason, 2008).
Building on these arguments, I anticipate that family firms that use SEW as a frame of
reference for their decision-making will account for stakeholder claims as they develop their
strategies. More specifically, given the context of this study (i.e., firms suffering performance
decline), I expect family firms to choose who the more salient stakeholders are (Jawahar &
McLaughlin, 2001). This implies that under conditions of decline and scarce availability of
resources, the family firm needs to concentrate available resources in developing turnaround
responses that perpetuate relevant stakeholder support, as this may guarantee access to critical
resources (Frooman, 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997). However, unlike their non-family counterparts,
family firms pursue both financial and non-financial resources (e.g., legitimacy, recognition, and
pride in being considered good corporate citizen). Thus, the perception of stakeholder saliency
shaping the firm’s strategies might be handled differently in family firms.
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3.2 SEW Dimensions
Recent studies found that family firms attend stakeholders needs for both instrumental
and normative motives (Cennamo et al., 2012; Mitchell et al., 2011). So, from the one hand
family firms engage in socially responsible actions towards stakeholders because of the family’s
culture and values (Berrone et al., 2010). Conversely, from an instrumental view family
principals attend to stakeholder needs in order to increase the family’s legitimacy (Cennamo,
Berrone, & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Jones, 1995) and reputation, to strengthen the family’s social
capital, and to enable the family-owner to exert control and influence over the firm in the long
run (Carney, 2005). Nonetheless, generally talking about socio-emotional considerations shaping
the firm’s strategic response might be over simplistic as different family firms might ascribe
different emphasis to SEW considerations (Berrone et al., 2012). Furthermore, the components
of SEW that the family-owner deems more important, and uses as a frame of reference for
decision-making, might shape the perception of stakeholder saliency differently.
Therefore, I build on recent advancements in the SEW literature, to inform the
relationship between the consideration of SEW and the development of turnaround response
strategies. Specifically, in a recent study, Berrone et al. (2012) posit that the construct of SEW is
defined vaguely and measured poorly. They propose the FIBER model, an acronym resulting
from the initial of each one of the five dimensions that comprise the SEW construct. According
to the authors, SEW includes five dimensions. The first dimension is Family control and
influence, which refers to the non-financial benefits that the family-owners derive from the
ability to exert control over their business, and impose their decisions in spite of whether those
are driven by self-serving desire or economic rationale (Berrone et al., 2012; Jones, Makri, &
Gomez-Mejia, 2008). This is the ability to impose an unorthodox decision over the business
(e.g., being altruistic towards family members by offering blood-related career advancement)
(e.g., Lubatkin et al., 2005). The next dimension, family Identification with the firm, refers to the
emotional benefit that family members derive from being associated with the firm (Ding, 2008).
This is particularly true when the family’s name is strongly tied to the firm (Dyer & Whetten,
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2006). Some of those benefits include the sense of pride resulting from being considered a good
corporate citizen, the recognition of the family image, its reputation, and the firm’s legitimacy
(Berrone et al., 2010; Carrigan & Buckley, 2008; Micelotta & Raynard, 2011). Another
dimension is the Binding social ties. This refers to the emotional endowment that the family
derives from the ability of maintaining long-lasting relationships with non-family stakeholders
(e.g., employees) and behaving altruistically towards them over time (Berrone et al., 2012).
Furthermore, family principals derive additional emotional satisfaction when such long-term and
stable social ties are a means to achieve recognition and family’s reputation improvement (Cruz
et al., 2012). The fourth dimension is Emotional attachment, which accounts for the role of
emotions in family firms. It represents the emotional component of SEW (Berrone et al., 2012).
Emotions flow back and forth from the business to the firm because of the kinship relationship
between individuals involved in the firm’s management (Gersick et al. 1997; Tagiuri and Davis
1996). The benefits resulting from the emotional attachment are therefore the ability to let the
family’s emotions permeate the decision making (Baron, 2008). The firm is not a mere
investment ( Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008; Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2011),
but it carries with it the family values, heritage, relationship of trust, loyalty, altruism, and
harmony. Lastly, Renewal of family bond through dynastic secession refers to the familyowner’s intention to pass the firms to the offspring (Casson, 1999; Tagiuri & Davis, 1992). The
intention of dynastic succession has significant implications on decision making as it changes the
managerial risk-bearing as well as the time horizon associated with the development of the firm’s
strategic investment (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).
The multi-dimensional nature of SEW construct provides a more precise understanding
of the effect of non-financial objectives on turnaround response in FOBs. In fact, a familyprincipal does not strive to preserve SEW in general, but rather desires to maximize a specific
SEW dimension. That is, I contend that in the behavioral agency model in FOBs, the
accumulated endowment should be a specific SEW dimension and not the whole SEW construct.
The SEW includes multiple non-financial objectives that are represented by its five (FIBER)
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dimensions. Thus, family-principals may deem one of them more valuable and, in turn, use such
dimension as a driver for the firm’s decision making. Inherently, I acknowledge that not all the
non-financial objectives are alike for FOBs.
3.3 Stakeholders Saliency and Turnaround Strategies
The definition of turnaround strategies in family firms may be significantly shaped by the
claims of stakeholders. Given the difficult access to critical resources under conditions of
performance decline, stakeholder theorists suggest “that organizations will pay more attention to
and be more concerned with issues of stakeholder groups who control resources critical to the
survival of an organization” (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001, p. 402). By extension, different
degrees of attention for different stakeholder claims will be manifested in different strategies
used to attend to those stakeholders.
Scholars classify these strategies as proactive, accommodation, and defensive, or reaction
(e.g., Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). Proactive strategies consist of anticipating stakeholder
needs in order to foster stakeholder support ex-ante; given that the firms in this study are
declining firms, a proactive strategy is not contemplated here. Firms are suffering from
performance distress and are thus in need of a turnaround response. As such, the strategy that
appears to be more suitable in this context is accommodation; that is, family firms are more
likely to recognize stakeholder needs, and engage in strategies to satisfy those needs (Jawahar &
McLaughlin, 2001). These strategies could also be viewed as risk adverse because they are
geared at satisfying the stakeholders and preserving their support (Frooman, 1999; Pfeffer &
Salanick, 1978). Hence, from a behavioral agency model perspective, these strategies will be
used with stakeholders who are considered critical for the preservation of SEW linked to the
family firm. Riskier managerial strategies include defensive and reaction strategies (Jawahar &
McLaughlin, 2001). These involve defending against stakeholder claims and neglecting the
responsibility towards a specific stakeholder group, respectively (Frooman, 1999; Mitchell et al.,
1997). Defensive and reaction strategies are considered riskier as they fail to satisfy the
130

stakeholders, and could potentially undermine the relationship with specific stakeholder groups,
or result in withdrawal of their support (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). I expect that family
firms will refrain from using such strategies with stakeholders that are critical to SEW
preservation.
In the context of this study, accommodation strategies are represented by the turnaround
response strategy that best fits salient stakeholder needs. Table 3.1 presents the main non-family
stakeholders and their respective strategic response preferences for performance distress. The
family principal’s decision to undertake a turnaround strategy that disappoints a specific
stakeholder category implies that the decision to use a defensive/reaction strategy with that
specific stakeholder category. However, as mentioned, stakeholder theory does not account for
the firm’s ownership (Laplume et al., 2008; Phillips et al., 2003), yet the family owner is a
relevant stakeholder group in family firms (Sharma & Sharma, 2011; Zellweger & Nason, 2008).
The definition of stakeholder saliency in family firms facing decline is therefore a function of the
following: 1) the importance ascribed by the family principals to non-financial objectives; 2) the
SEW dimension used as a primary frame of reference; and 3) normative and instrumental
considerations that are relevant to non-family stakeholders. As Mitchell et al. (2011, p. 246)
posit: “the urgency of preserving and increasing socioemotional wealth influences the
perceptions of the power and legitimacy of family stakeholders and the ability of those
stakeholders to influence the behaviors of the firm.” Therefore, in the next sub-sections I will
discuss how the emphasis on a specific non-economic objective in family firms influences the
definition of the salient stakeholders and the consequent turnaround strategy undertaken (Table
3.2 presents the hypothesized relationships and their directionality).
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 3.1 About Here
------------------------------------------
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3.3.1 Family Control and Influence
A family-principal who ascribes particular importance to the preservation of family
control and influence over the firm will consider family members as the dominant stakeholders
group. In fact, family members with or without firm shares are allowed to significantly shape the
business management. However, under conditions of performance decline, firms may suffer from
stigmatization and from limited access to financial resources; this makes stakeholders such as
investors and lenders particularly salient groups.
Following the stakeholder theory and as discussed previously, a firm should attend to the
needs of the most salient stakeholder at any given time (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). In the
context of family firms and by employing the BAM, I expect the family to be willing to sacrifice
their financial well-being to preserve their SEW endowment or the control and influence over the
firm (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Hence, the family instinct to
preserve the ability to control managerial decisions in the firm should direct decisions toward
turnaround strategies that attend to the needs of the salient stakeholders. These stakeholders are
the ones who are able to provide access to resources critical to the firm’s survival (Cennamo et
al., 2009; Mitchell et al., 2011). Lenders and investors, through their support, may allow the
family firm to keep a relatively unconstrained ability to impose their will over the firm
(Cennamo et al., 2012). For purely instrumental reasons, the family principals will undertake
strategies such as an attempt to increase sales revenue, and severe asset/cost cuts, although by so
doing they undermine their self-interest (Lang, Poulsen, & Stulz, 1995). In fact, an asset sale
eliminates the option value connected to the asset(s) sold. Which is the ability to use the asset in
the future to support growth, the possibility to use the asset as collateral for debt financing, or the
opportunity to sell the asset in the future for a higher price (Lai & Sudarsanam, 1997).
This implies that family principals will deploy the firm’s resources on accommodating
strategies towards the salient stakeholders’ needs so as to preserve the valued SEW dimension or
the control and influence over the firms. As a result, defensive strategies (e.g., justification) will
be used with unattended stakeholders, because they are deemed non-instrumental for the
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preservation of SEW. In so doing, the family principal accepts the risk associated with
disregarding specific stakeholder groups in order to avoid loss of SEW. Thus, I propose:
Hypothesis 1: Family control and influence over the firm will be positively related to [a]
asset and [b] cost retrenchment, and to [c] focus on improvement in sales.
3.3.2 Family Members Identification with the Firms
Previous studies regarding family firms based on social identity theory showed how
family members get involved in the business as they can derive status by belonging to a selected
group (Ding, 2008). In fact, family members derive SEW by being associated with a specific
group, namely the family firm owners (Berrone et al., 2012; Dyer & Whetten, 2006; GómezMejía et al., 2007). According to this view, members of the family are committed with
maintaining the reputation, status, and legitimacy of their group (Berrone et al., 2010; Ding,
2008). Since there is a strong connection between the family’s name and the company (GomezMejia et al., 2011), the group’s status can be enhanced through the firm’s reputation and
prosperity. Any action potentially detrimental to the firm’s reputation is a direct threat to the
family’s SEW, given that it might ruin the family’s image (Berrone et al., 2010; Micelotta &
Raynard, 2011). Empirical evidence shows that family firms are willing to accept performance
risk if this is needed to avoid being considered as irresponsible citizens, or socially careless
(e.g., environmental preservation) (Berrone et al., 2010; Craig & Dibrell, 2006; Dyer & Whetten,
2006). This may lead family firms to be involved in the sponsorship of local events and other
socially responsible behaviors that might improve the firm’s reputation. In short, family firm
owners that derive SEW from their identification with the firm will deem salient those
stakeholders groups able to impact the family’s reputation.
Evidence from the literature also suggests that, under conditions of performance decline,
the declining firm runs the risk of suffering from severe stigmatization from stakeholders
(Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988; Sutton & Callahan, 1987). As such, stakeholders might be
reluctant to provide the firm with access to critical resources (e.g., lenders may reduce their
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credit lines or sellers may require shorter payment terms) (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). The
firm’s stigmatization may be overemphasized in family business, wherein stakeholders might
wonder whether turnaround strategic choices result from the family pursuing a personal agenda
or a business agenda (Brooks, 2002). In this situation, according to the instrumental stakeholder
theory’s perspective, the family needs to accommodate the claims of external and internal
stakeholders that could more significantly impact the family’s reputation (Carrigan & Buckley,
2008; Micelotta & Raynard, 2011). In fact, they are instrumental for the preservation of the
family’s SEW. Following a normative stakeholder theory logic (Donaldson & Preston, 1995), the
family-principal will attend to stakeholders needs out of moral obligation. That is, the familyowner’s conviction that it is morally right to protect the interests of internal and external
stakeholders groups will lead them to avert massive layoffs, to maintain stable relationships with
buyers and suppliers, and to accommodate claims by non-family shareholders (Berrone et al.,
2010; Westhead, Cowling, & Howorth, 2001). The family’s principal strong identification with
the firm implies that a public condemnation of the family as irresponsible and opportunistic
would be emotionally destroying for the family itself (Cennamo et al., 2012). Hence, from a
BAM perspective, the utility in terms of SEW that the family derives by pursuing turnaround
strategies that avoid the firm’s stigmatization and improve its reputation outweigh the utility (in
terms of reduction to financial performance risk) that the family could achieve via severe
turnaround responses. Thus, the family firm will avoid severe asset retrenchment and
downsizing, and will engage in efficiency measures (e.g., reduction of costs and improvement in
sales). The family-owner might also be willing to sacrifice the family’s financial well-being by
funding investment in the firm with personal wealth equity, so as to provide additional resources
to the firm in order to foster the return to growth.
Hypothesis 2: Family member identification with the firm will be negatively related to [a]
asset retrenchment strategies, and positively related to [b] cost retrenchment strategies and [c]
focus on sales improvement.
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3.3.3 Emotional Attachment
The literature on family firms is rich with evidence suggesting an important interplay
between emotions and economic rationality within FOBs (e.g., Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). The
emotional components that distinguish family firms from their non-family counterparts are
responsible for shaping the decision making process in this organizational form (e.g., GomezMejia et al., 2011). Recent investigations suggest how family principals, under conditions of
threat to the firm’s survival, might decide to take the firm under their stewardship (Dębicki,
2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). That is, they sacrifice their financial well-being and selfinterest in order to be altruistic towards an enlarged set of stakeholders. This altruistic desire is
likely to permeate the business and shape the family principal’s relationships with stakeholders
inside and outside the firm (Baron, 2008).
Additional empirical evidence shows that FOB owners develop, over time, an emotional
attachment to the firm. That is, family firm owners ascribe both economic and significant
emotional value to their ownership in the firms, to the firm’s assets and to business relationships
(Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008; Zellweger & Dehlen, 2012). Thus, any form of asset dismissal
and significant reduction in costs corresponding to an attempt to reduce the firm’s scope would
be an emotional loss for the family (Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008; Zellweger & Dehlen, 2012).
From a BAM perspective, when the family-owner ascribes high importance to their emotional
attachment toward the firm, the family’s utility (in terms of financial benefit) resulting from a
reduction of performance risk via severe retrenchment is lower than the utility (in term of SEW)
that the family derives from maintaining the firm’s current level of assets and costs. The family’s
preference for SEW over reduction of performance risk, following the stakeholder theory, will be
implemented through turnaround strategies that account for the needs of both internal and
external stakeholders. Therefore, an FOB will engage in accommodation strategies for both
categories of stakeholders. This implies that an FOB will avert asset/cost retrenchment, but it
will strive to improve sales revenues. Although beyond the scope of this study, I might also
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expect the family firm owner to inject equity in the firm funded from the family’s wealth in order
to foster return to growth.
Hypothesis 3: Family emotional attachment to the firm will be negatively related to [a]
cost retrenchment and [b] asset retrenchment strategies, but [c] positively related to focus on
sales improvement.
3.3.4 Binding Social Ties
The role of emotions within family firms also provides a justification for the empirical
evidence suggesting the relatively stable relationships that family firms maintain with the firm’s
close stakeholders (Cennamo et al., 2012). Internally, family firms experience emotional
connection among kin involved in the firm’s management. Moreover, normative motives lead the
family to perceive a sense of closeness, solidarity, and altruism towards other non-family internal
stakeholders (Cruz et al., 2010; Cruz et al., 2012). This may motivate family firms to engage in
protective contracts with hired non-family employees (care-oriented contracts) (Cruz et al.,
2010) and decrease their tendency to undertake downsizing in spite of the potential impact on the
firm’s performance (Stavrou, Kassinis, & Filotheou, 2007). Externally, the family-owner who
ascribes importance to social ties tends to be an active social actor and also engages the business
in social activities beyond the firm’s scope (Graafland, 2002). Family firms are found to be more
prone to undertake proactive stakeholder engagement (Cennamo et al., 2012), to care about the
well-being of their local communities, and to be environmentally friendly (Berrone et al., 2010).
In summary, regardless of the performance implications, family firms who view social
ties as particularly important are likely to consider internal and external stakeholders as salient.
Given that the preservation of the FOB’s internal and external social ties is an integral part of the
SEW that the family intends to preserve and enhance (Berrone et al., 2012), the family will strive
to avoid the erosion of such relationships. Thus, from a BAM perspective, the family will
undertake accommodation strategies with internal and external stakeholders, so as to preserve the
relationships with those stakeholders groups and avoid a loss of SEW. By so doing, the family136

owner is inherently willing to accept a potential risk to financial performance which is connected
with less severe turnaround strategies. More specifically, the family’s utility (in terms of SEW)
from the preservation of the firm’s internal and external social ties outweighs the family’s
economic utility (in terms of reduction of performance variability) that could be obtained via
severe retrenchment. Thus, FOBs are expected to avoid significant asset/cost retrenchment that
would compromise the social ties with certain internal and external stakeholders groups. When
the FOB considers social ties as important, it will strive to improve sales revenue.
Simultaneously, the family-owner may decide to, commit personal resources to inject equity in
the firms and foster performance recovery.
Hypothesis 4: Family binding social ties will be negatively related to [a] cost
retrenchment and [b] asset retrenchment strategies, but [c] positively related to a focus on sales
improvement.
3.3.5 Family Dynastic Succession
The desire of family owners for dynastic succession represents one of the pivotal
differences between family firms and firms with significant insider shareholding (Zellweger &
Astrachan, 2008; Zellweger, et al., 2011). In fact, family firms go beyond mere shareholding
(Brooks, 2002) to include important considerations such as the family’s legacy, a means to pass
the family’s tradition and values to the generations that follow through succession (Casson,
1999; Tagiuri & Davis, 1992). Zellweger et al. (2011) recently found how the intention of
generational succession in family firms partially mediates the relationship between family
ownership and the pursuit of non-financial goals. In a similar vein, others studies indicated that
family firms were not considering their firms as a mere investment or an asset that can be sold.
Family owners ascribed a value to their firm that exceeded the actual firm’s market-value. Such
extra value is due to the incorporation of the non-economic benefits that owning and managing a
family firm generates for the family principals (Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008; Zellweger et al.,
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2011). Therefore, the intention to pass the firm to the family-owner’s off springs significantly
affects the decision making process of family principals.
A family firm’s intention to undergo generational succession in the future may change
the perception of stakeholder saliency. In this situation, from a stakeholder theory perspective,
family members become central stakeholders for the firms (Cennamo et al., 2012). Clearly, a
family principal needs to consolidate the support of the firm’s internal stakeholders in order to
improve the heirs’ social capital and consolidate social relationships (Carney, 2005; Sharma &
Sharma, 2011). Building strong ties with internal stakeholders (especially non-family executives
and members of the board as well as non-family shareholders) is especially important under
conditions of performance decline. Indeed, in such situations internal stakeholders might
question the strategic decisions of family principals, wondering whether they prioritize family
interests over the firm’s interests (Brooks, 2002). As such, the family firm suffering from
performance decline might also suffer from significant stigmatization. Declining firms are
stigmatized and restricted from accessing financial resources because of the threat of bankruptcy
(Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Sutton & Callahan, 1987). Family firms might suffer from additional
stigmatization, as stakeholders could identify the declining firms as subject to the dysfunctional
family owner’s desires. To overcome this situation the family-principal navigating the firm
through the performance decline maze may consider as salient the firm’s internal stakeholders.
Therefore, the firm will pursue strategies that accommodate internal stakeholders’ claims.
Following the instrumental stakeholder theory logic, internal stakeholder support is
instrumental for the achievement of dynastic succession, an important source of SEW. Therefore,
according to the BAM, the family principal is willing to bear the risk to financial performance
associated with the use of reactive strategies with external stakeholders in order to preserve the
support of internal stakeholders, which is instrumental to achieve dynastic succession. In fact,
failing to achieve dynastic succession would be a devastating loss of SEW for the family.
To further expand the abovementioned argument it should be considered that severe asset
retrenchment undermines shareholders’ interest. Indeed, the sale of assets to pay back the firm’s
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debt eliminates the option value connected to the assets being sold. Hence, non-family
shareholders may read this strategic move as a family owner’s attempt to put the firm back on
track while others (i.e., non-family shareholders) are bearing the costs (and consequences) of the
strategic decision. However, to maintain the support of institutional investors and lenders, the
firm needs to give a signal of commitment towards efficiency-seeking strategies. That is, cost
retrenchment and increases in sales are instrumental for this purpose. Lastly, severe downsizing
and managerial renovation might be detrimental as it could erode the support of non-family
executives and firm employees. According to the behavioral agency model, for family principals
that ascribe high value to dynastic succession, the utility (in terms of SEW) resulting from the
fulfillment of internal stakeholders’ claims is higher than the utility (in terms of reduction of
performance risk) that could be achieved via severe cost and asset retrenchment. Thus:
Hypothesis 5: Family dynastic succession intention will be [a] negatively related to asset
retrenchment, positively related to [b] cost retrenchment and positively related to [c] focus on
sales improvement.
4 METHOD
4.1 Sample and Data Source
To test the focal hypotheses (a summary of the hypotheses and expected relationships is
provided in Table 3.2) I relied on a sample of family-controlled public firms traded on the US
main stock markets (NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX). Consistent with previous studies, I did not
include in the sample banks, financial institutions, and investment vehicles (e.g., closed-end
funds, real estate investment companies, etc.) because their accounting measures cannot be
compared with those of nonfinancial firms given the unique nature of capital and investment in
these industries (Volpin, 2002). Accounting data for the firms in the sample were retrieved from
COMPUSTAT for a time window that spans from 2000 to 2012. Previous studies (e.g, Morrow,
Johnson, & Busenitz, 2004) argued that the 12-year span should encompass both a period of
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economic downturn as well as a period of growth in order to improve the generalizability of the
results. My initial sample included 8844 firm-observations (N= 737 x T = 12).
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 3.2. About Here
-----------------------------------------4.1.1 Turnaround Situation
To build the sample of declining family firms, I first screened accounting data of the
firms in order to detect those suffering from a turnaround condition. Consistent with the
operational definition adopted in the present study as well as with previous approaches in the
literature (see also Bruton et al., 2003; Francis & Desai, 2005; Morrow et al., 2004), I retained
the firms that matched the following criteria: 1) the firm had two consecutive years of return of
investment (ROI) above the risk-free rate of return (RFRR). The risk free rate of return is
considered as the average annual rate for the three-month US Treasury notes at auction8 (Francis
& Desai, 2005; Barker & Duhaime, 1997). This prevented the inclusion of those firms that are
poor performers on a consistent basis; 2) the firm had at least three years of ROI below the risk
free rate of return during the period of decline. The RFRR is the threshold below which a firm is
failing in economic terms, as it is not providing a return for its shareholders. In addition, using a
time frame of three years of consecutive decline increases the likelihood that the firms were
actually in decline, as opposed to suffering from a temporary downturn (Bruton, Oviatt, &
White, 1994; Bruton et al., 2003). The filtering process left me with a sample of 7613 firmobservations (N = 635 x T = 12). In justifying my method, I found that the use of ROI has been
suggested in previous studies as a suitable measure for investigations concerning financial
decline (Bruton et al., 1994; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Ramanujam, 1984; Robbins et al.,
1992).

8

The raw data for Treasury bond and bill returns is obtained from the Federal Reserve database in St. Louis –
FRED.
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4.1.2 Family Firms
I adopted a restrictive criterion to select family firms, to ensure consistency with the
definition provided. Hence, family firms are as such only if they are family-owned and managed;
this requires a firm to match the following three criteria, which were also used in previous
studies (Braun & Latham, 2009; Colli, Pérez, & Rose, 2003; Miller, Steier, & Le Breton-Miller,
2003):
1)

The family holds significant ownership in the firm (at least 10% voting shares9),

2)

The family is active in top management, and

3)

The family has been involved for at least two generations, or seemed likely to be. That is,
two subsequent generations appear to have been involved in the business.
Multiple studies recognize the challenges that are inherent in dealing with FOBs, given

the relatively difficult availability of family firm specific variables. To overcome this challenge,
I used a triangulated approach. I retrieved information concerning firm age, generational
involvement, corporate governance detail, and ownership structure from multiple sources.
Capital IQ provided information for a preliminary screening concerning the ownership structure
and the firm’s age. The information concerning the generational involvement, current family
involvement in the firm’s management and firm’s history were integrated and cross-checked
relying on each company’s in depth records with the Hoover’s database. Lastly, I completed the
data collection through a manual extraction of the necessary information from company proxy
statements and web sites. I retained only those companies that are represented by proxy
statements deposited at the SEC for the years of decline, in order to ensure the reliability and
uniformity of the data. My final sample consisted of 416 firm-observations (N= 104 x T=4,).

9

The 10% voting share threshold used to discriminate between family and non-family business is considered
conservative. It exceeds the often-used 5% voting share threshold, which is deemed acceptable when studying
publicly-traded family firms (See also: Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011).
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4.1.3 Turnaround Process Data Gathering
Evidence in the literature shows that turnaround is a process used to respond to
performance decline (e.g., Barker & Mone, 1994; Robbins et al., 1992). For this reason, I
examined firms in the sample using a panel of data following individual firms, case by case,
through the process that spans from the onset of decline to the third consecutive year of decline.
The multiple points in time at which variables concerning the individual firms were gathered are
as follows: Time 1 is the year in which the firm achieved the peak in financial performance in the
two years preceding the decline. Time 2 represents the third year of performance decline.
Between Time 1 and 2 there is a time lag of at least 3 years. Therefore, the retrenchment and
sales increase variables were collected for a total of 4 points in time (i.e., Time 1, year of
performance reduction not below RFRR, 1st year of decline, 2nd year of decline, and Time 2).
The rationale behind my choice lies in previous evidence suggesting that, following the
performance reduction, it takes about two years for the firm to observe an effect on performance
resulting from the strategies implemented (Barker & Mone, 1994; Robbins et al., 1992). In
addition, corporate turnaround can take multiple years, so this time frame might not hold true
(Morrow et al., 2004). Accordingly, I gathered data concerning asset, cost retrenchment, and sale
intensity increase (dependent variables) for every year from the onset of decline until the end of
the third year of performance decline. The independent and control variables were collected for
four consecutive years, starting from the year in which the firm achieved the peak in financial
performance in the two years preceding the decline. The procedure was implemented in order to
ascertain the presence of temporal ordering between independent and dependent variables.
Furthermore, treating the dependent variables as a panel allowed me to capture the trend of
variation over time and should, in-turn, provide a superior understanding of the phenomena
which would not otherwise be provided by a cross sectional study.
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4.2 Measures
4.2.1 Dependent Variables
The dependent variables are cost retrenchment intensity, asset retrenchment intensity, and
sales change intensity. These variables are measured as the change in the variable from one
period to the next and were calculated as follows:
Cost retrenchment intensity (CRT). This variable represents the change in the firm’s cost
base from one year to the following and was calculated for every year from Time 1 to the end of
the third year of performance decline. The cost base is sales minus cost of goods sold (CGS)
minus operating income plus interest expenses (Barker & Mone, 1994; Morrow et al., 2004;
Robbins et al., 1992). I used the following formula to compute the variable:
Cost retrenchment = [(Cost base time t-1) – (Cost base time t)] / (Cost base time t-1)
Therefore, a positive value suggests cost retrenchment and a negative value suggests an
increase in the firm’s costs. The final variable, cost retrenchment intensity (CRT), represents the
slope of the decline in a firm’s costs from the onset of decline to the end of the third year of
decline; it encompasses four data points. The specification of the dependent variable is as
follows:
CRTij where i = time (year 1-4), and j = firm
Asset retrenchment intensity (ART). Following previous studies (Robbins et al., 1992) I
calculated the asset base first. This was defined as the summation of cash and equivalent,
account receivables, inventory, and plant and equipment. Similar to cost retrenchment, I
computed asset retrenchment as:
Asset retrenchment = [(Asset base time t-1) – (Asset base time t)] / (Asset base time t-1)
Therefore, a positive value suggests asset retrenchment and a negative value indicates an
increase in the firm’s assets. The variable, asset retrenchment intensity (ART) represents the
slope of the decline in firm’s assets from the onset of decline to the end of the third year of
decline; it encompasses four data points. The specification of the dependent variable is as
follows:
143

ARTij where i = time (year 1-4), and j = firm
Change in sales intensity (SCT). This variable (SCT) captures the last of the operational
strategies that a firm may implement to respond to performance decline, revenue generative
strategies (Bruton et al., 2003; Tikici, Omay, Derin, Seçkin, & Cüreoglu, 2011). As shown in
previous studies, revenue generative strategies are aimed at ameliorating the firm’s cash flow
through increases in sales; therefore, I used the change in sales from one year to the other. By so
doing, the changes in sales are in percentage terms, allowing me to avoid a confounding effects
due to firm size. Similar to previous studies (e.g., Bruton et al., 2003), the change in sales was
calculated as follows:
Change in sales = [(Sales time t) – (Sales time t-1)] / (Sales time t-1)
Thus, a positive value suggests increases in sales and a negative value shows decreases in
the firm’s sales. The final variable, change in sales intensity (SINC) represents the slope of the
increase in firm’s sales from the onset of decline to the end of the third year of financial decline;
it encompasses four data point. The specification of the dependent variable is as follows:
SINCij where i = time (year 1-4), and j = firm
4.2.2 Independent Variables
Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that there are significant differences in the
strategic behavior of family firms with respect to their non-family counterparts. This holds true
in the case of publicly-traded family firms (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Dyer & Whetten,
2006; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). In fact, although publicly-traded family
firms, by opening themselves to non-family shareholders, relaxed part of the control over the
business, the family owners in those firms still represent a dominant coalition (Faccio & Lang,
2002; Miller et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2012). The same evidence also shows that the main
difference in strategic behavior between family and non-family firms can be ascribed to SEW.
That is, in businesses where the family still represents a dominant coalition, the firm’s strategic
decisions are largely influenced by the preferences, experiences, and desire of the coalition
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represented by the family owner (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2002). However, to date, no study
measured SEW directly in publicly-traded firms. Therefore, in this study, I strive to bridge the
gap by capturing the multiple dimensions of SEW from a firm’s narrative texts through a content
analysis, as recently proposed by Berrone et al., (2012). That is, I rely on the assumption that a
firm’s narrative texts (e.g., proxy statements, press releases, and letters to shareholders) mirror
mental models, beliefs, values, and perceptions of the firm’s dominant constituency (Berrone et
al., 2012; D’Aveni & MacMillan, 1990). Thus, a content analysis of these documents should
allow me to capture constructs such as SEW, which is “anchored at a deep psychological level
among family owners” (Berrone et al., 2010, p. 87). This would be challenging to capture
otherwise (Berrone et al., 2012). The decision to use this over other possible ways of measuring
SEW (e.g., survey, experiment) is driven by multiple reasons. First, previous studies
demonstrated the reliability of the method in capturing non-financial objectives in family firms
from narrative corporate texts (e.g., letters to investors, proxy statements, and annual reports)
(McKenny, Short, Zachary, & Payne, 2011). According to McKenny et al. (2011, p. 300)
“Content analysis is a useful method to ascertain the cognitive comparators and performance
goals that managers project to numerous organizational stakeholders.” Outside the realm of
family firms, others demonstrated how content analysis can capture the mission of social
ventures and other non-financial objectives (e.g., Moss, Short, Payne, & Lumpkin, 2011; Short &
Palmer, 2008). Second, capturing SEW in publicly-traded firms would require the use of proxybased measures previously used in the literature, but as Berrone et al. (2012) discussed, such
measures actually captured merely a small portion of the multiple SEW dimensions. This would
undermine my effort to capture the effects of different SEW dimensions on my dependent
variables. Third, surveys and experiments would require administering the survey, or otherwise
involving in the experiment, executive members of the family-owner. This could potentially
jeopardize the response rate and the ability to collect reliable responses (Falconer & Hodgett,
1999). On the contrary, content analysis offers several advantages. In fact, it is a valid alternative
for capturing a construct such as SEW, that would be hard to measure reliably though primary
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data collection. In addition, text analysis allows researcher to avert most of the biases inherent
with the use of survey methodology, because it relies on available texts and it is thus nonobtrusive. As such, a text analysis-based study can be easily replicated (Berrone et al., 2012).
Last, the availability of content analysis software such as DICTION minimizes potential human
errors, which might be present in manually coded content analysis.
To extract the SEW dimensions, I relied on DICTION, an increasingly popular software
to perform this type of analysis in strategy and entrepreneurship (McKenny et al., 2011; Short &
Palmer, 2008). The advantage of DICTION over other software lies in its ability to apply
artificial intelligence to the understanding of the context of words and sentences, by relying on
31 predefined dictionaries (Short & Palmer, 2008). Additionally, on the basis of linguistic
theories, the software is able to extract variables from the text that scholars have shown to mirror
the FIBER dimensions (Berrone et al., 2012). Thus, I relied on the procedure described in
Berrone at al. (2012) to perform a content analysis on the proxy statements and the connected
letters to the shareholders deposited at the SEC at year-end from Time 1 for 4 consecutive years
until the end of my panel. The independent variables are as follows:
Family Control and Influence. This variable (F) is not automatically extracted by the
DICTION software. Therefore, following a previously adopted approach ( Miller et al., 2012), I
relied on the firm’s proxy statement to capture the following indicators: 1) Family ownership,
percentage of voting shares in the family’s hands, 2) A dummy variable with value 1 for the
presence of a family CEO, 3) A dummy variable with a value of 1 in case of family CEO duality,
that is if a family member covers the dual position of chairman of the board and chief executive
officer, 4) a count variable that reflects the number of family members serving as officers, 5) a
count variable that reflects the number of seats that the family holds on the board of directors,
and 6) a firm’s year will reflect the number of years the family has been involved in the firm.
The use of multiple family firm specific indicators allows me to capture family control and
influence. In fact, as Miller at al. (2012) posit, these indicators cover the F-PEC scale (family
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influence on power, experience and culture) (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002; Klein,
Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005), which is used to capture the first dimension of SEW.
Identification of family members with the firm. The variable (I) for this particular
dimension of SEW was operationalized by relying on the following variables extracted from a
content analysis of each firm’s proxy statement: embellishment (expression emphasizing human
actions), praise (indicates the affirmation of a person or group or abstract entity), and denial (an
element of narcissism, used in the past for CEO hubris and CEO celebrity) (Short & Palmer,
2008);
Binding social ties. The following variables, extracted through DICTION from the firm’s
proxy statement, were used as the operationalization of the binding social ties dimension of SEW
(B): human interest (this reflects the presence in the text of language involving family and
friendship relationships), collectives (reflects expression indicating social grouping), spatial
terms (reflects awareness of distance between individuals), and cooperation (reflecting
behavioral interaction among individuals terminating with a group result) (Berrone et al., 2012;
Hart, 2000; Short & Palmer, 2008).
Emotional attachment of family members. This SEW dimension (E) was operationalized
by extracting the following variables from the firm’s proxy statement: tenacity (refers to totality
and confidence), aggression, and blame (refers to expression denoting the implementation of
ideals, the intention to avoid inertia and implement changes based on ideals) (Hart, 2000)
Renewal of family bonds through dynastic succession. This last FIBER dimension (R)
was operationalized through DICTION extracting variables reflecting the concern with
chronological and temporal matters, namely: temporal terms (terms that fix a person, idea, or
event within a specific time-interval, therefore signaling a concern for concrete and practical
matters) (Hart, 2000), past concerns (refers to the presence in the text of the past-tense forms of
verbs included in the present concern dictionary) (Hart, 2000; Hunter, 2003), and present
concerns (refers to the presence of a series of present-tense verbs that points to general physical
activity, social operations, and task-performance) (Berrone et al., 2012; Hart, 2000).
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4.2.3 Controls
The data analysis controlled for variables that previous studies suggested to be influential
on my dependent variables. It was critical to control for industry membership, firm size,
internally-generated decline, and financial slack because those variables were found to have a
significant impact on the type and intensity of turnaround strategies (e.g., Bruton et al., 2003;
Francis & Desai, 2005; Pandit, 2000; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). Thus,
I included in my analyses: a firm’s SIC dummy-coded at the second digit level (9 categories), the
natural logarithm of sales (Tushman, Virany, & Romanelli, 1985), a dummy variable coded 1 if
firm performance was above the industry average (Robbins et al., 1992), and the current ratio
(Daniel et al., 2004). Evidence suggests that stakeholders are more prone to provide their support
to firms that they perceive older and historical10 (Choi & Shepherd, 2005). This preference
towards older firms may therefore affect the firm’s decision concerning who the salient
stakeholders are, and by extension the turnaround strategic preference. Thus, I included in my
model a variable that measured the difference between the year of onset of financial decline and
the firm’s foundation year (Miller et al., 2012). Diversification and international diversification
have been proven to be related with an FOB’s perception of systematic and unsystematic risk
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Hence, the regression controlled for entropy, and the volume of
foreign sales expressed as a percentage of total sales (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Hitt, Hoskisson,
& Kim, 1997). Evidence has shown that a family’s ability to impose an unconstrained will over
the firm might be mitigated by specific conditions (e.g., Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011). Thus, my
model controls for institutional shareholding (Lai & Sudarsanam, 1997), replacement value
(Miller et al., 2012) measured as the Tobin’s Q, and for dummies coded reflecting the family
firm type as proposed by Villalonga and Amit (2006). Conversely, other studies have found that
specific FOB characteristics may alter a family firm owner’s perception of their business. Thus, I
included in the analysis a dummy variable coded 1 if a firm’s founder is still involved in the

10

This is because stakeholders perceive older firms as cognitively reliable, more likeable, more accountable, and
lastly thanks to their long history they are deemed able to adapt and to be strategically flexible.
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business and 0 otherwise (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011), and a dummy variable coded 1 if the
firm has the family owner’s name (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011, 2010; Le Breton-Miller et al.,
2011; Miller et al., 2012). Lastly, the longitudinal nature of my data required me to extract the
time effect from the error terms. Thus, I controlled for a series of time-dummies (4 categories for
time 1 to 4).
4.3 Data Analysis
To determine the differential effect of the FIBER dimensions of SEW on my dependent
variables, I analyzed a panel sample of 416 firm-observations. The use of a panel with an equal
number of time periods for every cross section of observations (i.e., balanced panel), provided
several benefits. First, the study of firms for multiple consecutives years is particularly suitable
to more precisely analyzing turnaround, which is a multi-stage phenomenon that takes place over
time (Pandit, 2000). Second, repeated observations over time increase the sample size and
improve the accuracy of the estimates. Lastly, unlike cross sectional studies or time series, the
panel data approach allowed me to model the impact of both environmental-level and firm-level
variables on the outcomes and at the same time control for the time effect. However, the use of
panel data requires dealing with some methodological challenges.
To analyze my sample of family-controlled publicly-traded firms, I studied multiple
models relying on the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) approach (Wooldridge, 2012).
FGLS allows me to account for the heteroscedasticity and for the non-independence of the error
terms (i.e., autocorrelation), which are frequent issues in panel data (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).
Several tests suggested the suitability of FGLS over alternative statistical methods. I first
conducted the Hausman’s specification test (Hausman, 1978) to compare the first level estimates,
from the efficient random-effect (RE) estimator, to those of the consistent fixed-effect (FE)
estimator (Wooldridge, 2012). If the Hausman’s test rejects the null hypothesis11 the estimates
are significantly different. Thus the FE should be retained since the efficient estimators are
11

The null hypothesis for the Hausman’s test is as follows: β FE = β RE
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inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2012). As shown in Table 3.3, the Hausman’s tests on the models
explaining asset retrenchment (χ2=25.67; p<0.001) and cost retrenchment (χ2=16.39; p<0.05)
rejected the null hypothesis of indifference of the FE versus RE parameter estimates. Thus, the
use of a FE model appears to be more suitable to the situation (Hausman, 1978). Nevertheless,
the relatively stable nature of my independent variables over time makes a Fixed-effect model
approach unsuitable (Miller et al., 2012). In fact, FE only estimates the effect of variables that
vary significantly over time and excludes the time-invariant variables. As such, an FE method
will not work in all those situations, such as mine, where within-cluster variations are relatively
low or variables change slowly over time (Torres-Reyna, 2010). In order to overcome this
limitation, the FGLS approach (Wooldridge, 2012) can be employed.
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 3.3 About Here
-----------------------------------------The Hausman’s test for the sales increase model (see row 2 Table 3.3) failed to reject the
null hypothesis (χ2=7.82; p=0.50), suggesting that an RE model should be retained. To further
ascertain the appropriateness of the choice, I conducted the Breusch and Pagan (1980)
Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects (see row 1 Table 3.3). The test failed to reject the
null hypothesis (χ2=2.00; p=0.10), so I concluded that RE was not actually the appropriate
method (Torres-Reyna, 2010). Therefore, I decided to employ the FGLS method for all the
models explaining my dependent variables. As rows 3, 4 and 5 in Table 3.3 show, the fit between
the data and my statistical methods was confirmed by a series of additional tests. First, the
likelihood ratio test on the iterated generalized least squares suggested the heteroscedasticity of
the error terms in the model explaining the dependent variables (See Table 3.3 row 3). The
Woolridge test for autocorrelation in the residuals suggested the presence of autocorrelation in
the models that explain asset retrenchment (F=74.432, p<0.000) and sales increases (F=127.208,
p< 0.000), but not for the model explaining cost retrenchment (F=0.036, p=0.85). All in all, these
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tests confirmed that FGLS is the more efficient and appropriate method given the specificities of
the sample (Patel & Chrisman, 2013; Wooldridge, 2012).
The FGLS models for asset retrenchment and sales increases were specified so as to
correct for panel heteroscedasticity and panel common serial correlation, while the model for
cost retrenchment was specified to correct for heteroscedasticity only. The effectiveness of my
model specification was supported by the post-estimation tests for the serial correlation of the
FGLS residuals (see Table 3.3 Row 5). The Durbin-Watson statistic and the Baltagi-Wu LBIstatistics for all my models suggested that after fitting the FGLS models, the errors terms were
uncorrelated (Bhargava, Franzini, & Narendranathan, 1982). Details about the models
estimation, results and robustness checks are reported in the following section.
4.3.1 Model Estimation and Results
The total sample encompasses 416 observations (104 firms): 238 firm-observations
concerned firms that engaged in asset retrenchment (178 concerned firms that did not do so), 235
firms that engaged in cost retrenchment (181 concerned firms that did not do so), and 265
engaged in sales increases (151 concerned firms that did not do so). Note also that there are
significant variations in the level of assets, costs, and sales changes. The mean (M) percentage of
change in asset was about -9.99% and the standard deviation (SD) 54.66%, the M percentage
change in costs was 1.04 % with 108.00 % SD, and the M percentage of sales increases was
6.19% with 63.25% SD (See Table 3.4). Table 3.4 also shows the descriptive statistics and the
correlation coefficients for the variables in my model.
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 3.4 About Here
-----------------------------------------Following previous studies dealing with panels of publicly-traded family-firms (e.g.,
Patel & Chrisman, 2013), I analyzed the data with the FGLS method, as described in the
previous section. I began my analysis testing the effect of family control and influence over the
firms on the intensity of the retrenchment strategies (asset retrenchment, cost retrenchment, and
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sales increases). As I show in Model 1a, among the indicators, only family ownership was
significant (p<0.05) and negative (βFO = - 0.135). Family director, the second indicator, was
only marginally significant (p<0.10), but positive (βFD = 5.472). Model 1a was overall
significant (Wald χ2 = 86.070, p<0.001). However, hypothesis 1a, making the case for a positive
relationship between family control and influence and asset retrenchment intensity, was not
supported. In a similar vein, I tested H1b (see Table 3.7 Model 1b). For the model predicting cost
retrenchment, only family ownership (β=0.166, P<0.10) and family CEO duality (β=9.053,
P<0.10) were marginally significant. Although the two indicators were consistent with the
hypothesized direction, and the model was significant overall (Wald χ2 = 78.720, p<0.001),
hypothesis 1b was only marginally supported. In Table 3.9, Model 1c, I show the test for
hypothesis 1c. This particular hypothesis proposed a positive relationship between family control
and influence and sales increase intensity. Contrary to my expectations, I found that only one of
the indicators for the first FIBER dimension was significant (p<0.05) and negatively associated
with sales increase intensity. Thus, hypothesis 1b was not supported. I provide a potential
explanation for my inability to find complete support for the hypotheses in the discussion
section.
-----------------------------------------Insert Tables 3.5, 3.7 and 3.9 About Here
-----------------------------------------Hypothesis 2 (2a, 2b, and 2c) investigated the effect of the second dimension of SEW,
identification, on the focal dependent variables. Although models 2a (Wald χ2 = 55.900,
p<0.001), 2b (Wald χ2 = 92.460, p<0.001), and 2c (Wald χ2 = 128.180, p<0.001) were
significant (see Table 3.5, 3.7, and 3.9), the variable capturing the identification of family
members with the firm was not significant. Thus, I failed to find support for hypothesis 2.
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As per hypothesis 3, I tested the effect of binding social ties on asset retrenchment, cost
retrenchment, and sales increase. As reported in Table 3.6, Model 3a, there is a negative and
significant association (βB= -1.112, p< 0.001) between biding social ties and asset retrenchment.
Model 3a was overall significant (Wald χ2 = 83.490, p<0.001), suggesting that owning-families
who ascribe high value to their connections with family and non-family members involved in the
firms tend to be less prone to engage in severe asset retrenchment. Thus, hypothesis 3a was
supported. The coefficient for binding social ties for the mode predicting cost retrenchment
(Model 3b, Table 3.8) was negative but not significant (βB= -0.344, z=-0.88). Although Model
3b was significant (Wald χ2 = 98.260, p<0.001), I failed to find support for hypothesis 3b.
Lastly, in Table 3.10 Model 3c, I report the results of the test for hypothesis 3b. As I expected,
there was a positive and significant association (β B=1.450, P<0.001) between binding social ties
and sales increase. Additionally, Model 3c was significant overall (Wald χ2 = 664.710, p<0.001).
Thus, hypothesis 3c was supported.
Hypothesis 4 (4a, 4b, and 4c) involved the relationship between emotional attachment of
the owning-family to the firm and retrenchment strategies. As Table 3.6 Model 4a shows,
families emotionally attached to their firm are less prone to engage in severe asset retrenchment
in response to performance decline. In fact, the coefficient for the emotional attachment variable
was negative (βE = -0.946), albeit marginally significant (p<0.10). The Model 4a explaining
asset retrenchment was overall significant (Wald χ2 = 66.51, p<0.001). Thus, Hypothesis 4a was
partially supported. In a similar vein, I tested for the presence of a negative association between
the family’s emotional attachment to the firm and cost retrenchment (hypothesis 4b). While
Model 4b (Table 3.8) was overall significant (Wald χ2 = 104.600, p<0.001) and the coefficient
for the focal independent variable (βE = -0.798) was consistent with my expectation, it was not
significant (z= - 1.23, p>0.10). Therefore, I failed to find support for Hypothesis 4b. Lastly, I
tested for the positive relationship between emotional attachment to the firm and intensity of
sales increase strategies. Consistent with my expectations, the emotional attachment of family
members to the firm was positively (βE = 2.430) associated with sales increase strategy. The
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coefficient for the variable was significant (p<0.001) and Model 4c (Table 3.10) was overall
significant (Wald χ2 = 486.090, p<0.001). Therefore Hypothesis 4c was supported.
The desire of the owning-families to pass their business into the hands of their off-spring
is one of the major factors that sets family businesses apart from their non-family counterparts
(Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012). I, therefore, tested the effect of the value ascribed
by the owning-family to the renewal of their family bond through dynastic succession on
retrenchment strategic choices. Table 3.6 Model 5a shows that FOBs that ascribe high value to
the dynastic succession were negatively associated with asset retrenchment. That is, they
engaged in less significant asset dismissal. In fact, the coefficient for the variable renewal of
family bond through dynastic succession was negative and significant (βR= -1.991, p<0.001),
and Model 5a was overall significant (Wald χ2 = 155.640; p<0.001). Thus Hypothesis 5a was
supported. Hypothesis 5b, which made the case for a positive relationship between the
importance ascribed to the renewal of family bond through dynastic succession and intensity of
cost retrenchment strategy, was not supported. In fact, while Model 5b (see Table 3.8) was
overall significant (Wald χ2 = 94.710; p<0.001), the focal independent variable (i.e., R) was nonsignificant (z=-.99; p>0.10). Hence, I failed to find support for hypothesis 5b. Following a
similar procedure, I tested Hypothesis 5c. The estimation of the FGLS model, see Table 3.10
Model 5c, suggests a positive (βR = 2.139) and significant (p < 0.001) association between the
renewal of family bond though dynastic succession and intensity of sales increase strategy. In
addition, the test for the overall significance of model 5c was supported (Wald χ2 = 94.710;
p<0.001). Hence, I conclude that this hypothesis was supported.
4.3.2. Robustness Checks
Check for sample selection bias and reverse causality. Following the approach adopted
by previous studies (e.g., Block, 2010), I checked for the potential presence of biases that my
sampling procedure may have introduced in the data analyses. In fact, my sample comprises
firms in need of turnaround, regardless of whether or not they were engaged in a strategic
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response to such decline in performance. That is, it includes retrenching firms and nonretrenching firms, as well as firms that pursued increases in sales intensity and firms that did not
do so. It was nonetheless impossible for me to separately analyze the effects that the independent
variables had on asset and cost reduction vis-à-vis asset and cost increase. A potential solution is
to create sub-samples of retrenching and non-retrenching firms, fit the models on the subsamples and subsequently compare the parameter estimates. Although the solution is technically
viable, it would generate additional sample selection biases for the analysis (Block, 2010). In
such situations, the use of a Heckman model represents the ideal solution (Heckman, 1979).
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 3.11 & 3.12 About Here
-----------------------------------------I estimated three sets of two-step selection models (Block, 2010; Heckman, 1979). The
first set uses asset retrenchment intensity as a dependent variable (see models H1a, H2a, H3a in
Table 3.11, models H4a and H5a in Table 3.12), and a selection equation that was run against a
dummy variable that took the value of 1 if a firm engaged in the retrenchment of its asset and 0,
otherwise. The second set of two-step selection models (see models H1b, H2b, H3b in Table
3.11, models H4b and H5b in Table 3.12) had cost retrenchment intensity as a dependent
variable and a selection equation which was run against a dummy that took the value of 1 if a
firm engaged in cost retrenchment and 0, otherwise. The last set of two-step models had sales
increase intensity as a dependent variable and a selection equation that was run against a dummy
variable that had value of 1 if a firm engaged in sales increases and 0, otherwise. The selection
equations included the following variables: lagged family ownership, lagged family directors,
lagged family to independent directors ratio, lagged generational involvement, family CEO
duality dummy, family CEO dummy, family name dummy, industry effect (9 categories), time
effect (4 category), internally generated decline (dummy), lagged Tobin’s Q, diversification,
international diversification, family firm type (4 categories), lagged institutional ownership,
founder-centered family firms (dummy), firm age, firm size, and lagged financial slack. Thus, as
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recommended, the selection equations differed from the estimation models by at least one
variable (Heckman, 1979). In Tables 3.11 and 3.12 I reported the results obtained by fitting a
series of estimation modes that controlled for the sample selection bias. In order to do so, I added
to the control variables the inverse Mills ratio (λ) derived from my selection equations (Hamilton
& Nickerson, 2003; Shaver, 1998). The Heckman models supported the directionality of my
hypothesis, although the parameter estimates had a lower significance level. Additionally, the
inverse Mills ratio, used as a control, was non-significant in all the models. Lastly, the presence
of lagged indicators for family ownership, family directors, family to independent directors ratio,
generational involvement, Tobin’s Q, institutional ownership, and financial slack allowed me to
control for the potential presence of reverse causality (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Villalonga &
Amit, 2006). All in all, the results suggest that my analyses were not significantly threatened,
neither by sample selection nor reverse causality bias.
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In the present paper I contend that, under conditions of performance distress, the pressure
that the firm’s dominant coalition receives from external stakeholders shapes the family firm’s
turnaround strategic behavior. More specifically, the importance (i.e., saliency) that the dominant
coalition ascribes to a specific stakeholder is a function of: 1) the economic and non-economic
objectives of the dominant coalition, and 2) who, among the stakeholders, provides the resources
needed to achieve such objectives. Given that different stakeholders have different needs, I
anticipate that a firm suffering distress attends to the claims of the most salient stakeholders by
undertaking strategies that accommodate such claims.
5.1 Findings and Discussion
In this study, I analyzed a sample of 416 firm-observations (104 firms) concerning
family-controlled publicly-traded firms in need of turnaround. The analysis of their first response
to performance decline partially supported my claim (see Table 3.13 for a summary of the
findings). That is, FOBs appear to frame their decisions so as to preserve the support of those
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stakeholders that the owning-family considers salient to keep deriving SEW for their firm. In
addition, FOBs were found to define their decline stemming strategies neither for purely
instrumental motives nor for purely normative motives. My findings substantiated Cennamo et
al.’s (2012) findings concerning proactive stakeholder engagement strategies. I provided
empirical, albeit indirect, support to their propositions. FOB behavior appears to be driven by a
combination of instrumental and normative motives (Cennamo et al., 2012). Specifically, the
study of the saliency of stakeholders appears to be suitable in defining which set of motives
would prevail.
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 3.13 About Here
-----------------------------------------The owning-families’ emotional attachment to their firm (E) and the importance that they
ascribe to the ties (B) with family and non-family stakeholders seem to spur normative motives
in FOBs. Hence, a high saliency appears to be ascribed to the firm’s internal and external
stakeholders in those FOBs that consider E and B important SEW dimensions. By extension,
those same FOBs engage in accommodating strategies towards those salient stakeholders. This
includes a manifested reluctance to engage in severe asset retrenchment and a preference to
engage in an intense sales increase. Consistent with my expectation, I found that FOBs that
ascribe high importance to the renewal of family bonds through dynastic succession (R) are
indeed particularly concerned with the protection of the heirs’ social capital. The owning-family
in those FOBs needs to ensure that their offspring will receive the necessary support to engage in
generational succession from the internal stakeholders. As such, FOBs scoring high on R were
found to be reluctant to retrench their assets significantly, a strategy considered to be
accommodating for the salient internal stakeholders and reactive towards the external
stakeholders.
Unexpectedly, I failed to find support for the relationship between the identification of
the family members with their firms (I) and a firm’s decline stemming strategies (asset
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retrenchment intensity, cost retrenchment intensity and sales increase intensity). I ascribe this to
the specificities of the firms in my sample. Indeed, family firm owners are deemed to be
particularly sensitive to the stigmatization, erosion of their legitimacy, and reputation among
their local communities (Berrone et al., 2010; Cruz et al., 2010). The public condemnation of the
family firms by those who surround the firm has emotionally devastating consequences for the
owning-family (Berrone et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2012). In other words, family firms are more
prone to cede to external stakeholder pressure (institutional and public pressures) when they are
strongly embedded in the local community. Family firms are found to care about the effect that
their actions may have on those who are connected to the firm (Berrone et al., 2010; Block,
2010; Stavrou et al., 2007). This is supported also by Berrone et al. (2010), who found that
stronger local roots lead family firms to strive for better environmental performances. Differently
put, a high geographical concentration of a firm’s subsidiaries around the firm’s headquarters
makes the local community much more relevant for the owning-family. However, unlike the
firms in the abovementioned studies, my sample is primarily made of publicly-traded familyfirms operating on a global scale. It is therefore possible that, despite the extent to which the
members of the family-owner identify themselves with the firm, they might feel less pressure
from external stakeholders such as that from the local community. Additionally, FOBs that carry
the owning-family name might be more exposed to public condemnation in light of the obvious
association between the family and the business. I partially addressed this issue by introducing in
the models a dummy variable that took the value of 1 when the family and the firm’s names were
the same. The variable was indeed positively correlated (r =.213, p<0.001) with the identification
of family members with their firms (see Table 3.4). Nonetheless, the variable did not lead to
significantly different results when introduced as a control in my estimation models.
Following previous studies (e.g., Miller et al., 2012), I measured family power and
influence over the firms with a series of indicators. My aim was twofold. First, I aimed to mirror
the aspects of family power, control, and influence included in the F-PEC scale. Such a scale is
significantly overlapping with the first dimension of SEW (Miller et al., 2012). Second, it was
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my intention to overcome the lack of a content analysis-based measure for the first dimension of
SEW. Nevertheless, my investigation of the effect of family control and influence (F) over the
business on the decline stemming strategies led me to unclear results. First, my indicators of F
had overall lower level if not absence of statistical significance vis-à-vis the other dimensions of
SEW. Indeed, among the indicators that I chose, only family ownership was significant across
the models explaining asset retrenchment intensity and sale increase intensity. Additionally, the
directionality of the relationships between family ownership and the dependent variables were
inconsistent with my expectations. The results were not completely unexpected in light of recent
findings in the family firm research domain. For instance, Le Breton et al. (2011) make the case
for a curvilinear relationship between family ownership and stewardship-driven strategic
behaviors in FOBs. To address the possibility of a curvilinear relationship, I iterated the models
on two subsamples. The two subsamples were created by splitting the original sample in two
halves. The first subsample included firms with a level of family ownership below the sample
median (FO < 37.5%), and the other included firms with levels of family ownership above the
sample median. The analyses suggested different directionalities of the relationships between
family ownership and the focal dependent variables for the two subsamples. Nonetheless, the
confidence levels were not large enough to make solid statistical inferences (i.e., the significance
level for my coefficients were below 5%). All in all, it appears that family business scholars
should focus on the development of alternative indicators for the measurement of family power
and influence over the business.
Lastly, the relationships between the SEW dimensions and cost retrenchment intensity,
although consistent with my expectations, were not statistically significant. This might be caused
by the following reasons. It is possible that family principals might consider changes in the
firm’s level of expenses to have no significant consequences on their ability to derive SEW from
the firm in the long term. Indeed, part of my argument was drawn from studies rooted in the
possession attachment and affect infusion literature (Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008; Zellweger &
Dehlen, 2012). According to those studies, owners in family firms develop attachment to their
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ownership stake (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005) as well as to the physical possession (e.g., firm’s
assets) due to emotional motives (Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008). As such, the owning-family
may be reluctant to undertake asset divestment. The owning-family might deem assets to have
values that exceed their market prices. Assets could have developed over time a non-economic
(emotional) value, such as the symbolic value of being a reminder of interpersonal or transgenerational ties (Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008). Relinquishing part of the firm’s physical assets
might represent a loss in terms of emotional endowment for the owning-family. However,
significant cost cutting may have no emotional consequences for the owning-family. In fact, the
current level of a firm’s expenses, unlike a firm’s stake or firm’s assets, misses the
characteristics needed to be considered within the boundaries of the material possession
attachment (Kleine & Baker, 2004). That is, a firm’s costs: (1) cannot be considered a selfextension of the family owner; (2) are not physical objects that may have a deep meaning
developed over time; and (3) cannot be clearly identified and distinguished, or in other words,
are not “decommodified and singularized” (Kleine & Baker, 2004, p. 1). Hence, to the extent that
maintaining or reducing current levels of expenses has no emotional consequences for the
owning-family, the family firm’s owner will ignore them in making his strategic decisions and
formulating his SEW accounting. All in all, I was impaired in my ability to make statistical
inferences based on the results. Thus, this prevents me from drawing a precise conclusion with
respect to the effect of SEW on cost retrenchment intensity.
In summary, my empirical investigation suggests that normative motives tend to strongly
influence the strategic behaviors of FOBs. Indeed, binding social ties, emotional attachment, and
renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession were, among the FIBER
dimensions, those with a stronger ability to predict the intensity of decline-stemming strategies.
This study found that, even in the face of significant decline in performance, FOBs display the
tendency to avoid significant asset dismissal and to engage in significant sales increase. Family
business owners facing the risk of a potential demise of their firms appear willing to take the
firm under their stewardship at the expense of their financial well-being. While I surmised that
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the avoidance of extremely harsh asset retrenchment may be beneficial for the overall postturnaround performance, future research endeavors should directly address the effect of the
strategic preferences of FOBs and turnaround performance.
5.2 Theoretical Implications
The pivotal contribution of the present research stems from the effort to bring together
ideas from stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Hill & Jones, 1992; Rowley, 1997) as well as the
behavioral agency theory in the realm of FOBs (i.e., the socioemotional wealth preservation
perspective) (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia,
1998). The intersection of these theoretical strands allows counterbalancing the shortcomings
that the two theories exhibit when they are used independently, such as the relatively overlooked
role of stakeholders in the behavioral agency model, and the tendency of the traditional
stakeholder theory to overlook the role that ownership plays in the selection of firm strategies
(Laplume et al., 2008; Phillips et al., 2003).
By investigating the abovementioned relationships in the setting of family firms, I extend
the existing literature. Specifically, I expand on Jawahar and McLautghlin’s (2001) argument
that firms under conditions of decline merely look at who among the stakeholders provides
economic benefits to the firms and ignore the others. In fact, I suggest that family firms
undertake a specific turnaround strategy because of the non-economic benefits that specific
stakeholder groups can provide. This perspective is rooted in recent studies that proposed that
family firms are highly sensitive to relevant stakeholders, and more prone to undertake
management strategies related to stakeholders as a way to enhance SEW (Berrone et al., 2012;
Mitchell et al., 2011; Sharma & Sharma, 2011). In addition, I anticipate that, since SEW is a
multi-faceted construct (Berrone et al., 2012), stakeholder saliency, and in turn turnaround
strategies, are contingent on which dimensions (from the FIBER model) are used by the family
principal as a frame of reference.
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With this investigation, I provide additional contributions. First, I move away from the
traditional comparison between strategic behaviors of family versus non-family firms. Unlike
previous research endeavors, I did not limit the investigation to a comparison of the two
organizational forms, relying on the assumption that family firms carry SEW considerations and
non-family firms do not do so. I engage in a within‒family‒firms comparison, striving to capture
the heterogeneity among different family firms; this heeds the calls made in several recent
articles (Salvato & Aldrich, 2012; Sharma et al., 2012). In order to do so, I incorporate recent
advancements in the family business field of study (Berrone et al., 2012; Cennamo et al., 2012),
and I acknowledge that SEW is a multidimensional construct. Hence, drawing from the FIBER
dimensions of SEW, I developed a set of hypotheses geared toward predicting how family firm
specific variables (e.g., the various SEW dimensions) affect the FOB’s strategic behavior under
conditions of performance decline. Second, in order to test my hypotheses, I employed recently
proposed methodology that measures SEW directly as opposed to relying on proxies.
Specifically, through the use of software-based content analysis (Hart, 2000), I captured the
FIBER dimensions and investigated how they relate to turnaround performance. This study is the
first of its kind to use this method. Third, the arguments in this study suggest that in family firms
the strategic behavior is not driven exclusively by instrumental motives. Even when an
instrumental motive is the driver of strategic action, the resources that the firm is trying to obtain
in exchange for the accommodation of stakeholder claims are non-financial in nature (e.g.,
recognition, prestige, legitimacy, or the ability to impose the family’s will over the firm). In fact,
echoing recent findings in the literature (Cennamo et al., 2012; Mitchell et al., 2011) and
depending upon which non-financial objective (i.e., FIBER dimension) the family principals
prioritize, the motivation behind a strategic action will be instrumental, normative, or a
combination of both.
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5.3 Practical Implications
The study of relationships between SEW dimensions and turnaround strategies may have
several interesting practical implications. First, family-owners represent a large and significant
stakeholder group in family firms. This study may provide insight regarding how prioritizing a
specific non-financial objective could drive the firm’s strategic behavior when family wealth is
in jeopardy, such as during performance decline. Recognizing that different family principals
operating under different frames of reference could bolster a specific strategy might help them to
better understand potential within-family tensions. This, in turn, may enable family members to
reduce intra-family conflicts typical of family firms in a crisis situation (Gubitta & Gianecchini,
2002). All in all, the findings from this study may allow family owners to avoid making mistakes
that could potentially exacerbate the firm’s decline. Second, this model may be useful to nonfamily stakeholders. In fact, family principals may decide to adopt high risk, denial, or
justification strategies with those stakeholders that are deemed less salient. That is, given the
inability of a specific stakeholder group to provide the firm with the non-financial benefits that
the family decision maker desires, their claims may go unaddressed. This model could provide a
firm’s stakeholders with the ability to predict, according to the family firms’ main frame of
reference, the strategic behavior most likely to be undertaken. Third, quite similarly, the model
may provide important insights to non-family minority shareholders. In fact, they are the ones
more likely to suffer from the negative financial consequences of the family’s attempt to curb
managerial decisions for the preservation of the accumulated SEW.
5.4 Future Research
The present study is one of the first research endeavors striving to directly employ the
SEW construct and all its FIBER dimensions to predict an interesting phenomenon. This study
relied on recent advancements in the scholarly field of family firms to address an important and
yet highly overlooked topic: family firm turnaround strategies. I found that the proxies for SEW
in use to date do not cover all the nuances of SEW. Especially when the need is to capture a
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specific dimension of SEW. Hence, future research endeavors should strive to develop
alternative indicators for this specific facet of the construct. Additionally, I contend that the
prioritization of one dimension of SEW over the others may radically change the strategic
preferences of an FOB. Therefore, limitations notwithstanding, the present study has shown that
accounting for all FIBER dimensions of SEW represents a research challenge, but also an
opportunity to better understand the managerial decision-making in this organizational form.
Indeed, precise measurement of the FIBER dimensions of SEW will allow for more accurate and
precise predictions and explanations of family firm phenomena.
By proposing this exploratory study, I hope to set the stage for future research. First, this
investigation does not provide any insight on how the strategic preferences of family firms will
affect turnaround performance. In other words, while I theorized on the most likely strategy
pursued by family firms, according to the family principals’ main non-financial objectives, I did
not explain how this could increase or reduce the likelihood of a successful turnaround. Future
research may expand and provide the rationale linking strategic behavior to the firm’s postturnaround performance. Second, the present study concentrated on a specific turnaround stage,
which is the retrenchment response to performance decline. Future studies may decide to use a
wider time horizon and follow both retrenchment and recovery strategies undertaken by family
firms. Lastly, this study investigates the main effect of the FIBER dimensions on the turnaround
strategies. Future research should strive to find the boundaries conditions for this model. The
novelty of the FIBER model represents a methodological and theoretical challenge. However,
extant research may provide a starting point and a viable theoretical approach that can be
exploited by future investigations.
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Table 1.1: The consequences of decline and decline-stemming strategies
Consequence of
decline

Decline stemming strategies


Loss of stakeholder
support




Inefficiencies

Deterioration of
internal climate













Manipulative strategies (symbolic or
substantive)
Increase stakeholder perception of their
participation in the company and their
power
Clarification of benefits embedded in
their participation in the firms
Increase stakeholder perception of the
firm’s credibility and reliability
Debt restructuring
Cutting dividends
Closing plant
Discontinuing operations
Replacing executive
Decentralization
Decreasing the scope of firm’s activities
Cost-efficient policies
Corporate culture should promote:
flexibility, support, decentralization,
adaptation, and innovativeness
Communication should be made easy
Ad hoc human resources strategies
should foster the retention of talented
employees
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Table 1.2: Recovery strategies to address the cause of decline adapted from Arogyaswamy et al.,
(1995).
Strong relative competitive
position
Strategic reorientation aimed at
Firm-based
achieving a higher level of
decline
efficiency in the use of current
resources
Short term industry downturn:
Incremental changes in strategy
that enable the firm to strengthen
its competitive position relative
to competitors using current
resources and capabilities.
Industry-based Long term industry downturn:
decline
Incremental changes in strategy
and strengthening of market
position expanding the firm’s
resources capabilities.
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Weak relative competitive
position
Strategic reorientation; the need
is to create new resources and
capabilities.
Short term industry downturn:
Pursuit of a niche market; limit
the scale and scope of the
business to those product-market
combinations where the
company’s current resources and
capabilities are sufficient to
succeed.
Long term industry downturn:
Pursuit of a niche market; limit
the business to promising
product-market combinations
with new resources and
capabilities

Table 2.1: The family’s non-financial goals in the family owned businesses- A synopsis of the
emotional endowment in the firms
Non-financial goals of family firms (family
level)
Autonomy and control
Family cohesiveness, supportiveness, loyalty
Harmony, belonging, and trustful relation
Family status, legitimacy, family’s name
recognition, and goodwill in the community
Family power and control
Family social ties
Family’s emotional attachment to the firm
Family members’ identification with the firm
Family perpetuation of the dynasty

191

Reference
(Ward, 1997)
(Sorenson, 1999)
(Sharma & Manikutty, 2005)
(Berrone et al., 2010; Cennamo, et
al., 2012; Zellweger, et al., 2011)
(Berrone et al., 2012; GomezMejia et al., 2011; Gómez-Mejía
et al., 2007)

Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics and mean comparisons retrenching versus non-retrenching
family-controlled publicly traded firms.

Retrenching Firms

1
2
3
4
5
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Retrenchment intensity
Family ownership
Family directors
Family involvement
Potential slack
Urgency of decline
Family CEO
Family name
Founder-centered
family firm
Type I
Type II
Type III
Type VI
Institutional ownership
Internally-generated
decline
Firm age
Firm size
Financial slack
Tobin’s Q
International
diversification
Diversification

Mean
18.937
38.121
1.328
1.496
3.205
-3.090
.839
.145
.137

SD
16.049
23.435
.661
.768
4.367
2.719
.368
.353
.346

Non-Retrenching
Firms
Mean
SD
-39.767
96.773
44.815
25.516
1.772
.957
1.905
.975
1.839
3.030
3.558
2.990
.796
.403
.186
.389
.119
.325

.284
0.076
.565
0.076
17.853
.992

.487
.267
.498
.250
16.556
0.087

.432
0.091
.414
.063
15.539
.712

.496
.288
.493
.244
16.613
.453

.384
.086
.462
0.067
16.268
.800

.487
.281
.499
.251
16.556
.400

34.343
5.304
4.595
.995
.168

20.436
1.661
4.456
1.118
.219

38.537
5.615
2.907
1.107
.136

27.517
1.801
3.262
1.536
.234

37.216
5.517
3.439
1.072
.146

25.550
1.769
3.757
1.417
.229

.264

.379

.384

.459

.346

.439

Firms
Observations
131
† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Pooled Sample
Mean
-21.280
42.707
1.632
1.776
2.269
-3.414
.810
.173
.125

SD
85.058
25.045
.898
.934
3.558
2.913
0.932
.378
.331

104
416

t-test

***
*
***
***
**

**
**

***
†
***

*

Table 2.3: Correlation table (N= 416)

Variable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1

Retrenchment intensity

2

Family ownership

-.064

3

Family directors

.005

.288***

4

Family involvement

.035

.298***

.899***

5

Potential slack

-.045

-.203***

-.082†

-.099**

6

Potential slacka

.031

-.207***

-.104†

-.107†

.886***

7

Urgency of decline

-.010

-.014

.087†

.062

.150**

.156**

8

Family CEO

-.031

.005

-.021

-.024

.002

-.006

.225***

9

Family name
Founder-centered family
firm

.033

.214***

.223***

.205***

-.099*

-.094

-.113†

-.086*

-.035

.001

-.242***

-.283***

.144**

.151**

-.015

.035

-.096*

11

Type I

-.008

.427***

.280***

.258***

-.160***

-.184***

.083†

.219***

.213***

0

12

Type II

.029

-.050

.155**

.165***

-.062

-.067

-.223***

-.549***

.130**

-.116*

13

Type III

-.034

-.331***

-.282***

-.269***

.140**

.165**

.099*

.338***

-.219

.058

14

Type VI

.051

-.114*

-.157**

-.152**

.102*

.104†

-.109**

-.482***

-.123

.015

15

Institutional ownership
Internally-generated
decline

.035

.061

.141**

.132**

-.082†

-.073

-.019

-.007

.191

-.007

-.115*

.050

.010

.022

-.066

.063

-.048

-.042

-.026

-.012

17

Firm age

.071

.212***

.334***

.322***

-.179***

-.185**

-.098*

-.156**

.147**

-.351***

18

Firm size

.127**

.141**

.164***

.208***

-.343***

-.342***

-.236***

-.109*

.303***

-.133**

.108**

-.16**

-.143*

-.155**

.776***

.867***

.154**

-.049

-.035

.257***

-.152**

.053

-.194***

-.211***

.203***

.197***

.137*

.003

-.043

.081

-.024
-.085†
-.172*** -.166***
22 Diversification
-.054
.164***
.031
.096*
† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. a: lagged variables.

.202***

.234***

.043

.074

-.206***

.146**

-.152**

-.169***

-.083†

.003

.235***

.038

10

16

19
20
21

a

Financial slack
a

Tobin’s Q
International
diversification
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Table 2.3 Continued: Correlation table (N= 416)
Variable

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

VIFs

1

Retrenchment intensity

2

Family ownership

1.52

3

Family directors

5.91

4

Family involvement

5.82

5

Potential slack

8.07

6

Potential slacka

4.94

7

Urgency of decline

1.24

8

Family CEO

2.29

9

Family name

1.43

10

Founder-centered family firm

1.44

11

Type I

7.47

12

Type II

-.243***

13

Type III

-.732***

14

Type VI

-.212***

-.285***
-.83†

-.249***

15

Institutional ownership

.157**

.069

-.199***

.013

16

Internally-generated decline

.036

-.018

-.033

.014

.108*

17

Firm age

.271***

.126**

-.286***

-.098*

.196***

.033

18

Firm size

.247***

.135*

-.291***

.305***

-.022

.372***

-.152**

-.071

.141*

-.053
.094†

-.039

.029

-.147**

-.271**

-.088

-.060

.087

.069

-.218***

.030

-.159**

-.454***

.174**

-.058

-.074

.007

-.022

-.027

.175**

.082

-.046

-.07

.098**

.0567

.186***

-.160**

-.036

19
20
21

a

Financial slack
Tobin’s Q

a

1.98
1.82

International diversification
-.143**
-.185*** .273***
22 Diversification
.076
.01
-.056
† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. a: lagged variables.

1.95
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1.3
1.09
1.65
1.94
4.74
1.4
1.28
.012

1.22

Table 2.4: Feasible generalized least square models for the main effect of SEW on retrenchment intensity (H. 1)
DV: Retrenchment Intensity
Independent Variable
Family ownership (FO)
Family directors (FD)
Family involvement (FI)
Family CEO
Family name
Founder-centered family firm
Type I
Type II
Type III
Institutional ownership
Internally-generated decline
Firm age
Firm size
Financial slacka
Tobin’s Qa
International diversification
Diversification
Industry dummies
(9 categories; p )
Time dummies
(12 categories; p)
_cons
Number of observations (Firms)
Observation per group
Wald χ2

Null Model
Coef.

Model 1a
Z

Coef.

-0.04
-2.75
-2.00
-1.45
-4.05
-1.24
3.49
1.55
-2.04
3.84
3.18
-2.20
-2.82
-2.84

-4.511
0.768
-12.970
-19.137
-14.182
-34.785
-10.122
.353
6.764
-0.081
3.676
1.351
-5.426
-30.891
-7.240
<0.001

Model 1b
Z

Coef.
-7.670

-.216
-10.267
-15.858
-12.608
-33.013
-10.859
.3786
7.129
-.134
4.869
1.597
-4.321
-25.989
-9.796
< .001

***
*
***
***
*
***
***
*
**
**

< .001

***
*
***
***

**
**
**
***
*

-2.71
0.13
-3.36
-2.39
-1.63
-4.24
-1.15
3.24
1.45
-1.17
2.64
-2.7
-3.28
-2.02
-2.71

<0.001

1.284
312 (104)
3
269.86

**

0.07

***

† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. a: Lagged variable
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***

**
*
†
***
**

**
*
**
***
*

0.8

***

Z
-2.76

0.71
-3.09
-2.23
-1.8
-4.22
-1.36
2.78
1.62
-0.46
2.99
2.46
-2.72
-3.77
-2.38

-2.452
-12.037
-12.387
-9.287
-35.041
-10.966
0.334
5.509
-0.077
5.197
1.356
-3.105
-33.688
-9.001
<0.001

*

***
**

***
**
***
**

-0.42
-2.51
-1.58
-1.1
-4.37
-1.34
2.74
0.78
-1.12
3.95
2.83
-1.56
-3.55
-2.49

0.002

13.112
312 (104)
3
279.04

Model 1c
Coef.
-0.221 **

-4.14

0.002

14.899
312 (104)
3
276.44

4.060
-11.198
-17.286
-15.729
-34.234
-11.933
0.299
7.374
-0.030
3.907
1.262
-5.322
-34.415
-8.852
<0.001

Z

0.72

***

12.444
312 (140)
3
243.51

0.61

***

Table 2.5: Feasible generalized least square model for the main effect of urgency of financial
decline on retrenchment Intensity (H.2)
DV: Retrenchment Intensity
Independent Variable
Urgency of decline

Model 2
Coef.
2.452

Potential slacka

-1.439

Family ownership (FO)

-0.187

Family directors (FD)
Family involvement (FI)

-15.200
8.766

Z
*

2.27
-1.16

*

-2.24

***

-3.61

*

2.2

Family CEO

-3.911

-0.6

Family name

-8.888

-1.77

Founder-centered family firm

-14.180

†

-1.76

Type I

-7.149

Type II

-19.683

Type III

-6.132

-0.64

0.173

1.45

Institutional ownership
Internally-generated decline
Firm age
Firm size
a

Financial slack
Tobin’s Q

a

International diversification
Diversification
Industry dummies
(9 categories; p )
Time dummies
(12 categories; p)
_cons
Number of observations (Firms)
Observation per group

-0.77
*

-2.13

8.751

1.2

-0.060

-0.84

4.237

***

3.24

1.790

†

1.66

-3.907

†

-1.93

***

-3.38

*

-2.02

-28.910
-8.420
<0.001
0.002
18.897

0.98

312
(104)
3

Wald χ2

233.35
***
† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
a: Lagged variables.
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Table 2.6: Feasible generalized least square models for the moderating effect of urgency of
decline (H. 3)
DV: Retrenchment Intensity
Independent Variable

Model 3a
Coef.

Model 3b
Z

Coef.

Model 3c
Z

Coef.

FO*urgency

Z

0.158

FD*urgency
FI*urgency
Urgency of decline
a

**

-2.59

***

3.36

-2.518

-1.12

-1.672

-2.513

***

-3.09

6.271

***

3.81

5.728

-0.91

-1.409

-2.73

-0.212

Potential slack

-1.135

Family ownership (FO)

-0.223

Family directors (FD)

-2.272

-13.996

**
***

-3.29

-23.114

Family involvement (FI)

-1.798

-0.33

8.447

Family CEO

-8.462

-1.19

-7.356

Family name

-8.630

-1.62

-8.941

Founder-centered family firm

-16.286

†
*

-2.00

-16.542

Type I

-2.179

-0.23

-2.569

Type II

-18.177

-1.91

-20.017

Type III

-2.861

-0.29

-2.103

Institutional ownership

0.259

Internally-generated decline
Firm age
Firm size
Financial slack
Tobin’s Qa

***
*
†
*
*
†

6.09

†

-1.7
-1.3

-2.53

0.336

**

2.63

-4.51

-17.58

***

-4.1

2.12

10.972

**

2.82

-1.02

4.397

0.74

-1.67

1.787

0.31

-2.02

-12.956

-1.6

-0.26

-19.867

*

-2.2

-2.08

-31.859

***

-3.5

-0.2

-19.857

*

-2.3

1.93

0.222

†

1.83

*

2.12

2.14

0.232

7.887

1.15

8.399

1.25

12.012

-0.076

-1.02

-0.086

-1.13

-0.005

2.87

4.063

3

4.785

***

3.82

1.30

1.605

1.47

1.934

†

1.82

*

-2.09

-4.02

*

-2

3.809
a

*

*

***

**

1.403

**

-0.1

-4.024

*

-1.99

-4.278

International diversification

-26.047

**

-3.16

-27.609

***

-3.28

-32.263

***

-3.7

Diversification

-11.206

**

-2.72

-11.227

**

-2.68

-8.04

***

-2

Industry dummies (9 categories; p )

< 0.001
0.003

Time dummies (12 categories; p)
_cons
Number of observations (Firms)
Observation per group

35.856

†

1.79

312
(104)
3

Wald χ2

275.040 ***
† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
a: Lagged variables.

< 0.001

< 0.001

< 0.001

< 0.001

28.895

-1.156

312
(104)

312
(104)

3

3

260.11
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1.49

***

403.70

-0.1

***

Table 2.7: Feasible generalized least square models for the moderating effect of potential slack
(H. 4)
DV: Retrenchment Intensity
Independent Variable

Model 4a
Coef.

Model 4b
Z

Coef.

Model 4c
Z

FO*Slacka

Z

-0.053

FD*Slacka

-3.137 **

FI*Slacka
Urgency of decline
a

Potential slack

Family ownership (FO)
Family directors (FD)
Family involvement (FI)
Family CEO
Family name
Founder-centered family firm
Type I
Type II
Type III
Institutional ownership
Internally-generated decline
Firm age
Firms size
Financial slacka
Tobin’s Qa
International diversification
Diversification
Industry dummies (9 categories; p
)
Time dummies (12 categories; p)
_cons
Number of observations (Firms)
Observation per group
Wald χ2

Coef.

-2.741
2.877
4.448
-0.262
-17.966
16.592
-5.677
-8.793
-19.626
-0.061
-13.776
1.909
0.203
6.014
-0.028
4.273
0.747
-3.801
-32.999
-8.696

** -2.73
*
2.49
*
2.23
** -3.03
*** -3.65
*** 3.29
-0.89
†
-1.77
** -2.64
-0.01
-1.34
0.2
†
1.85
0.8
-0.4
***
3.3
0.72
*
-2.09
*** -4.53
*
-2.08

2.340
4.808
-0.247
-13.965
13.535
-4.785
-9.011
-20.533
2.040
-14.833
3.254
0.214
5.772
-0.050
4.344
1.092
-3.704
-30.772
-8.139

-3.01

*
2.09
*
2.35
** -2.94
*** -3.23
*** 3.23
-0.75
†
-1.85
**
-2.7
0.22
-1.47
0.34
†
1.94
0.74
-0.69
*** 3.46
1.06
*
-1.98
*** -4.11
*
-2.02

2.339
1.065
-0.037
-13.015
4.158
-0.392
-9.615
-15.177
-7.044
-16.533
-7.910
0.183
8.332
-0.060
4.581
1.486
-4.399
-35.669
-7.966

<0.000

<0.000

<0.000

<0.000
16.779

<0.000
12.094

<0.000
21.603

0.87

312
(104)
3
310.420 ***

312
(104)
3
290.680 ***

† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
a: Lagged variables.
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-1.47

0.59

*

2.32
0.73
-0.37
*** -3.21
1.05
-0.06
-1.94
†
-1.81
-0.74
†
-1.76
-0.82
1.5
1.48
-0.75
*** 3.18
1.51
*
-2.35
*** -3.67
†
-1.92

312
(104)
3
244.390 ***

1.11

Table 2.8: Heckman selection models: treatment for sample selection bias (H. 1,2)
DV: Retrenchment Intensitya
Independent Variable
Urgency of decline
Potential slackb
-0.14
(-1.89)

Family ownership (FO)
-9.72
(-2.67)

Family directors (FD)
Family involvement (FI)
λ (inverse Mills ratio)
Wald χ2
Selection model
ρ

-8.53
(-3.85)
7.42
(0.96)
61.71
0.54

†

**

***

***

10.61
(1.04)
47.93
0.70

*

-10.05
(-1.53)
45.41
-0.67

*

1.96
(3.00)
0.04
(0.10)
-0.12
(-1.74)
-3.99
(-0.75)
-7.89
(-2.56)
11.76
(0.96)
75.04

**

†

**

***

0.79

σ
13.69
15.16
15.10
14.89
† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note a: The control variables in the equations are: family CEO, family name, founder centered family firm, family
firm type (dummy 4 categories), institutional ownership, internally generated decline, firm’s age, firm’s size,
financial slack, international diversification, diversification, industry effect (dummy 9 categories), time effect (12
categories). b: denotes variables 1 year lagged. Wald Z statistics are denoted in parentheses.
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Table 2.9: Heckman selection models: treatment for sample selection bias (H. 3,4)
DV: Retrenchment
Intensity
Independent
Variablea
FO*Slackb

0.03
(1.51)

FD*Slackb

-0.07
(-1.47)

b

FI*Slack

-0.98*
(-2.37)

FO*Urgency

-0.03
(-1.33)

FD*Urgency

-2.33*
(-2.51)

FI*Urgency

-1.90**
(-2.80)

Urgency of decline

4.89***
(3.92)

5.29***
(3.55)

3.09**
(2.93)

2.15***
(3.32)

2.01**
(3.10)

2.12***
(3.24)

Potential slackb

0.18

0.05

0.09

1.49

0.94

-0.66

(0.22)

(0.06)

(0.11)

(1.49)

(0.94)

(-0.72)

-0.09

-0.07

-0.24*

-0.16*

-0.13*

-0.22*

(-1.32)

(-1.03)

(-2.08)

(-2.33)

(-1.97)

(-2.36)

-3.81

-8.95†

-4.26

-4.48

-3.12

-4.04

(-0.71)

(-1.63)

(-0.78)

(-0.87)

(-0.59)

(-0.76)

-14.31***

-9.10***

-7.99*

-4.68

-7.03*

-7.12*

(-3.64)

(-3.06)

(-2.54)

(-0.87)

(-2.28)

(-2.32)

13.64

9.73

13.20

10.68

11.16

11.34

(1.12)

(0.83)

(1.06)

(0.90)

(0.92)

(0.94)

83.49***

87.56***

75.40***

85.55***

79.37***

79.14***

ρ

0.88

0.71

0.85

0.75

0.77

0.78

σ

15.55

13.79

15.52

14.20

14.53

14.61

Family ownership (FO)
Family directors (FD)
Family involvement
(FI)
λ (inverse Mills ratio)
Wald χ

2

Selection model

† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note a: The control variables in the equations are: family CEO, family name, founder centered family firm, family
firm type (dummy 4 categories), institutional ownership, internally generated decline, firm’s age, firm’s size,
financial slack, international diversification, diversification, industry effect (dummy 9 categories), time effect (12
categories). b: denotes variables 1 year lagged. Wald Z statistics are denoted in parentheses.
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Table 3.1: Non-family stakeholders and preferred first stage of turnaround response, partially
based on Lai & Sudarsanam (1997)
Stakeholders

Non-family
associated
shareholders
Institutional
investors
Non-family
executive
Lenders
Employees
Local community

Cost retrenchment

Asset retrenchment

Focus on
improvement in
sale

Downsizing

+

-

+

+

+

-

+

+

-

+

-

-

+
=

+
+
=

+
+
+

+
-

+ Strategy more likely to be preferred; = indifference; - Strategy less likely to be preferred.
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Table 3.2: Summary of the hypothesized relationships between the SEW dimensions and
turnaround strategies
Asset

Costs

Retrenchment

retrenchment

intensity

intensity

Family control and influence (H 1)

+

+

+

Identification with the firm (H 2)

-

+

+

Binding social ties (H 3)

-

-

+

Emotional attachment (H 4)

-

-

+

-

+

+

SEW dimensions

Renewal of family bonds to the firm
through dynastic succession (H 5)
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Sales increase
intensity

Table 3.3: Tests for the appropriateness of the statistical method
Tests
1

2
3

4
5

Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian
multiplier test for random effects
Hausman test

χ

2

p
χ

2

Asset
retrenchment
1.60

Cost
retrenchment
2.05

Sales
increase
2.00

0.11

0.10

0.10

N (firms)
416(104)

25.67

16.93

7.82

p

0.00

0.04

0.5

likelihood ratio test on the
iterated GLS (test for
heteroscedasticity12)
Woolridge test for
autocorrelation

LR χ2

872.23

1110.28

780.49

p

0.000

0.000

0.000

F

74.432

0.036

127.208

P

0.000

0.8504

0.000

Post-estimation tests for the
serial correlation13

Modified
Bhargava et al.
Durbin-Watson

1.67

2.01

1.57

416(104)

Baltagi-Wu LBI

2.45

2.67

2.4

416(104)

12

416(104)
416(104)

416(104)

The test reject the null hypothesis of constant variance, therefore the FGLS model was specified so as to account
for heteroscedasticity.
13 Durbin-Watson statistic and the Baltagi-Wu LBI-statistics take values from 0 to 4. As a rule of thumb Bhargava et
al. (1982) suggest that values below 1 indicate that successive errors are positively correlated. Values around 2 are
deemed to reflect that successive errors are uncorrelated. Excessively high values for those statistics are a symptom
of negative correlation between successive errors. This could result in a reduced efficiency of the standard errors,
that is an underestimation of the level of significance.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics and correlation table (N=416)
M

S.D.

1

Variables
Asset retrenchment (ART)

-9.99

54.66

2

Cost retrenchment (CRT)

1.04

108.00

.222***

1

3

Sales increase (SCT)

6.19

63.25

-.402***

-.226***

1

4

Family ownership (FO)

42.71

25.05

-.0645

.049

.001

1

5

Family director (FD)

1.63

0.90

.068

-.0317

.001

.269***

1

6

Family involvement (FI)

1.78

0.93

.047

-.042

.004

.288***

.895***

1

7

Generational involvement (GI)

32.52

23.96

.052

-.063

.103†

.237***

.362***

.378***

1

8

Family CEO duality

0.67

0.47

-.057

.037

.033

-.036

-.123*

-.132*

-.186**

1

9

Family CEO

0.81

0.39

-.046

.010

.049

.015

-.049

-.050

-.189***

.702***

1

0.38

0.49

.031

-.096†

.120*

.428***

.278***

.249***

.314***

.070

.232***

-.054

.129*

.099

.055

.073

.039

a

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

10

Identification with the firm (I)

11

Bind social tiesa (B)

8.58

4.25

-.042

12

Emotional attachment (E)

4.86

2.42

-.043

-.069

.125*

.015

.039

.064

.014

.003
.013

.048
.018

13

Renewal of family bond (R)

5.59

2.76

-.044

-.052

.123*

.006

.002

.028

-.009

.012

.056

14

Family name

0.17

0.38

-.007

-.063

.105

.208***

.225***

.207***

.246***

-.062

.073

15

Internally generate decline

0.80

0.40

.067

.079

-.052

.051

.034

.026

-.025

.081

-.059

16

Tobin's Q

1.07

1.39

-.135*

.027

-.056

.065

-.201***

-.207***

-.168**

.103†

.031

17

International diversification

0.15

0.23

-.034

-.072

-.016

-.072

-.179**

-.144*

-.160**

.118*

.088

18

Overall diversification

0.35

0.44

-.022

-.110†

.132*

.165**

.025

.094†

.069

.009

.020

19

Institutional ownership

16.27

16.56

.029

-.091

.114*

.081

.168**

.162**

.227***

-.043

-.006

20

Founder centered family firms

0.13

0.33

-.049

-.035

.001

.014

-.239***

-.284***

-.300***

.168**

.073

21

Firm age

37.22

25.55

.055

-.030

.077

.200***

.335***

.326***

.856***

-.229***

-.155**

22

Financial slack

3.44

3.76

.078

.039

-.115*

-.167**

-.114*

-.138*

-.099†

.015

-.018

23

Firm Type I

0.38

0.49

.031

-.096

.120*

.428***

.278***

.249***

.314***

.070

.232***

24

Firm Type II

0.09

0.28

.029

-.003

-.037

-.059

.151**

.164**

.148**

-.462***

-.598***

25

Firm Type III

0.46

0.50

-.051

.103†

-.091

-.327***

-.281***

-.264***

-.347***

.367***

.366***

26

Firm Type IV

0.07

0.25

.010

-.016

-.012

-.112*

-.149***

-.143*

-.085

-.348***

-.501***

27

Firm size

1.77

.078

-.138*

.114*

.143*

.167**

.219***

.330***

-.195***

-.111*

5.52
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Table 3.4 Continued: Descriptive statistics and correlation table (N=416)
Variables
10

Identification with the firm (I)

11

Bind social ties (B)

12

Emotional attachment (E)

13

Renewal of family bond (R)

14

Family name

15

Internally generate decline

16

Tobin's Q

17

International diversification

18

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

1
.223***

1

.164**

.921***

1

.159***

.952***

.934***

1

.213***

.075

.027

.038

1

-.109†

-.004

-.016

.024

-.026

1

-.085

-.309***

-.283***

-.293***

-.042

.029

1

-.150**

-.061

-.033

-.009

-.206***

.007

.079

1

Overall diversification

.078

.098†

.073

.089

.235***

.098*

-.037

.012

1

19

Institutional ownership

.177**

.166**

.139*

.126*

.191***

.108*

-.214***

-.073

-.069

1

20

Founder centered family firms

-.000

.129*

.106†

.119*

-.096*

-.011

.081

.146**

.038

21

Firm age

.272***

.021

.001

-.015

.147**

.033

-.153**

-.022

.057

-.007
.196***

22

Financial slack

-.152**

-.199***

-.198***

-.174**

-.035

.029

.174**

.175**

-.159**

-.039

23

Firm Type I

.900***

.223***

.164**

.159**

.213***

.036

-.085

-.124**

.076

.157**

24

Firm Type II

.243***

-.038

-.208

-.036

.130**

-.018

-.059

-.185***

.009

.069

25

Firm Type III

-.732***

-.178**

-.157*

-.132*

-.219***

-.033

.083

.272***

-.056

26

Firm Type IV

-.212***

-.034

.026

-.005

-.123*

.014

.067

-.058

-.046

-.199***
.013

.247***
27 Firm size
† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

.311***

.271***

.261***

.303***

-.022

-.443***

-.027

.186***

.305***
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Table 3.4 Continued: Descriptive statistics and correlation table (N=416)
Variables
20

Founder centered family firms

21

Firm age

22

Financial slack

23

Firm Type I

24

Firm Type II

25

Firm Type III

26

Firm Type IV

27 Firm size
† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

1
-.351***

1

.257***

-.147**

1

-.000
-.116*

.271***

-.152**

1

.126*

-.071

-.243***

1

.058

-.286***

.141*

-.732***

-.285***

1

.015

-.098***

.094

-.212***

-.083

-.249***

1

-.133**

.372***

-.271***

.247***

.135**

-.291***

-.053
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1

Table 3.5: Feasible generalized least square a models for the main effect of the FIBER
dimensions on asset retrenchment (H. 1a, and 2a)
DV: Asset Retrenchment
b

Null Model A
b

Variables

Model 1a

z

b

Model 2a
z

b

Identification of family members
with the firm

z

-2.519

-0.46

Family control and influence
Family ownership (FO)
Family director (FD)
Family involvement (FI)

-0.135

*

-1.96

5.472

†

1.89

-1.928

-0.68

Generational involvement (GI)

0.015

0.13

Family CEO duality

2.452

0.62

Family CEO

0.011

0

Controls
Family nameb

0.114

0.03

0.311

0.07

0.114

0.03

Internally generate declineb

2.363

0.16

3.348

0.23

2.363

0.16

-1.99

-2.176

-1.27

-3.276

-0.56

-6.369

-0.93

Tobin's Q

-3.276

International diversification

-6.369

-0.93

-4.458

Overall diversification

-3.992

-1.24

-4.408

Institutional ownership

-0.113

-1.54

-0.173

Founder centered family firms

-6.163

-1.05

Firm age

-0.023

-0.39

Financial slack
Firm Type Ib
Firm Type IIb
Firm Type III

b

Firm size

0.811

*

†

-1.3

-3.992

-1.24

-0.113

-1.54

-3.992

-0.58

-6.163

-1.05

-0.030

-0.24

-0.023

-0.39

†

0.907

1.92

0.811

-0.46

-3.633

-0.49

0.000

-6.564

-1.06

-10.219

-1.34

-6.564

-1.06

-2.418

-0.46

-5.186

-0.72

-2.418

-0.46

1.267

1.28

1.267

1.28

2.196

†

1.89

p = 0.080

p = 0.100

Time dummiesb (4 categories; p)

p < 0.000

p < 0.000

p < 0.000

Observation per group

†

1.88

-2.519

p = 0.109

Number of observations (Firms)

-1.99

-2.06

*

Industry dummiesb (9 categories; p )
_cons

*

0.545

0.03

-4.581

-0.27

0.545

312(104)

312(104)

312(104)

3

3

3

Wald χ2

55.900 ***
86.070 ***
55.900 ***
† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Note a: The model corrects for autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity of the residuals. b: all variables were lagged except from those indicated with a superscript b.
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1.88

0.03

Table 3.6: Feasible generalized least square a models for the main effect of the SEW dimensions
on asset retrenchment (H. 3a,4a, and 5a)
DV: Asset Retrenchment
Variables

Model 3a

b

Model 4a

b

z

Renewal of family bonds to the firm
through dynastic succession
Emotional attachment of family
members

z

b

z

-1.991
-0.946
-1.112

Binding social ties

b

Model 5a

***

†

***

-4.42

-1.78

-3.7

Controls
Family nameb
Internally generate decline

b

-0.343

-0.1

-0.887

-0.26

-0.966

-0.29

3.059

0.23

1.919

0.14

2.908

0.21

-2.7

-5.629

Tobin's Q

-4.040

-2.7

-4.054

International diversification

-9.844

**

-1.5

-7.135

-1.04

-10.057

Overall diversification

-3.708

-1.2

-3.468

-1.12

-2.586

Institutional ownership

-0.090

-1.3

-0.103

-1.48

-0.124

Founder centered family firms

-5.262

-0.9

-6.636

-1.2

-4.857

-0.86

Firm age

-0.051

-0.9

-0.034

-0.62

-0.061

-1.07

2.42

1.054

***

-3.92
-1.41
-0.84

†

-1.7

Financial slack

0.895

2.9

1.127

Firm Type Ib

2.056

0.38

0.100

0.02

0.570

0.11

-5.413

-0.9

-5.760

-1.04

-5.484

-0.99

-1.933

-0.4

-2.307

-0.46

-3.142

-0.6

1.481

1.46

1.273

1.23

1.504

1.43

Firm Type IIb
Firm Type III

b

Firm size
Industry dummiesb (9 categories; p )
Time dummiesb (4 categories; p)
_cons
Number of observations (Firms)
Observation per group

*

**

P<0.05
p<0.000
8.023

0.51

**

p = 0.064

P<0.05

p<0.000

p<0.000

5.916

0.37

14.226

312(104)

312(104)

312(104)

3

3

3

Wald χ2

**

83.490 ***
66.510 ***
155.640 ***
† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Note a: The model corrects for autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity of the residuals. b: all variables were lagged except from those indicated with a superscript b.

208

3.2

0.89

Table 3.7: Feasible generalized least square a models for the main effect of the SEW dimensions
on cost retrenchment (H. 1b, and 2b)
DV: Cost Retrenchment
Variablesb

Null Model B
b
z

Model 1b
b

Model 2b
z

Identification of family members
with the firm

b

z

3.574

0.64

Family control and influence
Family ownership (FO)

0.166

Family director (FD)
Family involvement (FI)
Generational involvement (GI)

†

-0.571

-0.15

0.821

0.23

-0.236

Family CEO duality

9.053

Family CEO

1.83

-1.29
†

-5.473

1.83
-0.7

Controls
Family nameb

1.314

0.26

1.492

0.28

0.824

0.19

Internally generate declineb

-4.012

-0.17

-2.622

-0.12

-4.920

-0.22

Tobin's Q

-0.399

-0.27

-0.122

-0.09

0.156

0.13

-1.96

-17.984

*

-2.27

*

-1.96

-17.086

†

-1.87

-18.479

Overall diversification

-7.777

†

-1.76

-6.051

-1.4

-7.579

Institutional ownership

-0.162

-1.46

-0.115

-0.99

-0.151

-1.55

Founder centered family firms

3.028

0.45

1.726

0.26

4.931

0.85

Firm age

0.103

1.61

0.251

1.38

0.102

†

Financial slack

0.865

1.6

1.026

0.871

†

Firm Type Ib

2.050

0.33

-2.343

-0.27

5.792

0.74

9.251

1.2

7.282

1.06

5.619

0.94

1.910

0.23

6.209

1.13

1.045

0.67

0.758

0.47

0.676

0.49

International diversification

Firm Type IIb
Firm Type III

b

Firm size
Industry dummiesb
(9 categories; p )
b

Time dummies (4 categories; p)
_cons
Number of observations (Firms)
Observation per group

*

*

1.96
.

p=0.057

P<0.010

P<0.000

P<0.000

P<0.000

†

0.37

5.695

0.23

12.322

312(104)

312(104)

312(104)

3

3

3

Wald χ2

1.78
.

p<0.050
9.571

1.93

0.5

86.400 ***
78.720 ***
92.460 ***
† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Note a: The model corrects for heteroscedasticity of the residuals.
b: all variables were lagged except from those indicated with a superscript b.
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Table 3.8: Feasible generalized least square a models for the main effect of the SEW dimensions
on cost retrenchment (H. 3b,4b, and 5b)
DV: Cost Retrenchment
Variables

Model 3b

b

b

Model 4b
z

b

Model 5b
z

Renewal of family bonds to the
firm through dynastic succession
Emotional attachment of family
members
Binding social ties

-0.344

-0.88

-0.798

-1.23

b

z

-0.596

-0.99

Controls
Family nameb

0.990

0.23

0.826

0.19

0.859

0.2

b

-4.286

-0.2

-5.256

-0.25

-3.868

-0.18

0

-0.054

-0.04

-0.023

International diversification

-18.113

*

-2.29

-18.469

*

-2.36

-17.608

*

-2.23

Overall diversification

-7.564

*

-1.96

-7.492

*

-1.95

-7.457

*

-1.92

Institutional ownership

-0.147

-1.52

-0.156

†

-1.67

-0.155

-1.62

Founder centered family firms

5.700

0.97

5.683

0.99

5.661

0.97

Firm age

0.085

1.51

0.088

†

1.65

0.083

1.49

0.805

1.62

0.899

†

1.84

0.837

4.076

0.74

4.094

0.78

3.974

0.74

Internally generate decline
Tobin's Q

0.001

Financial slack
Firm Type I

b

Firm Type II

b

-0.02

†

1.69

7.647

1.11

7.752

1.15

7.614

1.12

Firm Type IIIb

6.263

1.15

6.671

1.3

6.313

1.19

Firm size
Industry dummiesb
(9 categories; p )
Time dummiesb
(4 categories; p)

0.803

0.58

0.950

0.69

0.889

0.65

_cons
Number of observations (Firms)
Observation per group

P<0.010

P<0.001

P<0.000
14.692

P<0.010

P<0.000
0.6

17.106

312(104)

312(104)

3

3

Wald χ2

P<0.000
0.7

14.918

0.61

312(104)
3

98.260 ***
104.600 ***
94.710 ***
† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Note a: The model corrects for heteroscedasticity of the residuals.
b: all variables were lagged except from those indicated with a superscript b.
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Table 3.9: Feasible generalized least square a models for the main effect of the SEW dimensions
on sales increase (H. 1c, and 2c)
DV: Sales increase
Variables

Null Model C

b

b

Model 1c
z

Model 2c

b

z

Identification of family members
with the firm

b

z

4.902

1.06

Family control and influence
Family ownership (FO)

-0.154

Family director (FD)

-0.939

-0.4

Family involvement (FI)

0.556

0.25

Generational involvement (GI)

0.001

0

-1.398

-0.35

3.623

0.65

Family CEO duality
Family CEO

*

-2.43

Controls
Family nameb

2.076

0.69

2.429

0.61

2.076

0.69

-9.078

-1.37

-7.888

-1.31

-9.078

-1.37

-0.522

-0.67

-0.268

-0.35

-0.522

-0.67

International diversification

7.475

1.28

5.597

0.84

7.475

1.28

Overall diversification

5.009

1.65

5.683

†

1.7

5.009

1.65

Institutional ownership

0.170

3.36

0.122

†

1.66

0.170

Founder centered family firms

4.866

1.05

6.659

1.26

4.866

1.05

Firm age

0.075

1.38

0.124

1

0.075

1.38

-0.646

-1.54

-0.837

-1.86

-0.646

-1.54

Internally generate decline

b

Tobin's Q

Financial slack
Firm Type I

b

Firm Type IIb
Firm Type III

b

**

†

4.902

1.06

4.368

0.67

0.000

-0.29

-3.884

-0.64

-1.606

-0.29

3.817

0.91

1.156

0.19

3.817

0.91

-0.095

-0.1

0.428

0.46

-0.095

-0.1

P<0.000

P<0.001

P<0.000

Time dummiesb (4 categories; p)

P<0.000

P<0.000

P<0.000

Number of observations (Firms)
Observation per group

3.36

-1.606

Firm size
Industry dummiesb
(9 categories; p )
_cons

**

-1.267

-0.13

-0.755

-0.08

-1.267

312(104)

312(104)

312(104)

3

3

3

Wald χ2

128.180 ***
165.190 ***
128.180 ***
† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Note a: The model corrects for autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity of the residuals. b: all variables were lagged except from those indicated with a superscript b.

211

-0.13

Table 3.10: Feasible generalized least square a models for the main effect of the SEW
dimensions on sales increase (H. 3c, 4c, and 5c).
DV: Sales increase
Variablesb

Model 3c
b

Model 4c
z

b

Model 5c
z

Renewal of family bonds to the
firm through dynastic succession

z

2.139

Emotional attachment of family
members
Binding social ties

b

2.430
1.450

***

***

***

7.92

7.79

9.00

Controls
Family nameb
Internally generate decline

b

3.114

0.93

2.513

0.73

3.065

0.93

-5.255

-0.59

-4.936

-0.58

-5.889

-0.62

Tobin's Q

0.317

0.46

0.455

0.66

0.402

0.58

International diversification

7.895

1.70

6.886

1.46

7.147

1.49

Overall diversification

5.256

1.51

3.588

1.04

4.216

1.24

Institutional ownership
Founder centered family firms
Firm age
Financial slack
Firm Type I

b

0.149

†

2.54

0.115

1.97

0.176

-0.264

-0.06

0.806

0.18

0.533

0.12

0.041

0.77

0.055

1.00

0.060

1.10

-1.86

-0.454

-1.34

-0.622

-0.622

*

†

*

**

†

3.07

-1.79

-0.615

-0.15

0.851

0.2

-0.800

-0.2

Firm Type IIb

-3.300

-0.56

-1.532

-0.27

-4.869

-0.86

Firm Type IIIb

0.208

0.06

2.248

0.59

-0.278

-0.08

-0.400

-0.43

0.099

0.11

-0.078

-0.09

Firm size
Industry dummiesb
(9 categories; p )
Time dummiesb
(4 categories; p)

P<0.001

P<0.000

P<0.000

P<0.000

P<0.000

P<0.01

_cons

-12.749

Number of observations (Firms)
Observation per group

-1.22

-16.507

312(104)

312(104)

3

3

Wald χ2

-1.59

-12.976
312(104)
3

664.710 ***
486.090 ***
279.380 ***
† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Note a: The model corrects for autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity of the residuals. b: all variables were lagged except from those indicated with a superscript b.
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Table 3.11: Heckman selection models: treatment for sample selection bias (H. 1, 2, and 3)

Dependent variablea

ART
H 1a

CRT
H 1b

SINC

ART

H 1c

H 2a

CRT
H 2b

SINC

ART

H 2c

H 3a

H 3b

H 3c

-1.887†
(1.02)

-.213
(1.810)

1.790*
(.78)

Binding social ties
Identification of family
members with the firm

9.458
(9.05)

5.279
(9.41)

CRT

SINC

-5.585
(9.22)

Family control and influence
Family ownership (FO)

-.304
.559
-.171
(.21)
(.36)
(.19)
Family director (FD)
10.769
-3.354
-1.290
(7.177)
(7.35)
(4.82)
Family involvement (FI)
-4.071
3.423
-4.78
(7.34)
(7.43)
(6.42)
Generational involvement (GI)
-.252
-.898
.266
(.25)
(.73)
(.19)
Family CEO duality
-2.684
13.382
-6.771
(14.667)
(10.28)
(6.93)
Family CEO
2.732
-1.158
14.60
(8.88)
(11.98)
(21.36)
λ (Inverse Mills Ratio)
-48.606
-57.114
45.61
-5.637
-23.163†
19.551
-13.764
-23.299†
29.432
(58.79)
(109.28)
(91.71)
(28.66)
(12.70)
(36.95)
(26.24)
(12.37)
(47.78)
† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note a: The control variables in the equations are: family name, internally generate decline, Tobin's Q, international diversification, overall diversification,
institutional ownership, founder centered family firm, firm age, financial slack, family firm type, firm size, industry dummies (9 categories), time dummies (4
categories). Standard errors from robust OLS estimations are denoted in parentheses. ART: Asset retrenchment; CRT: Cost retrenchment; SINC: Sales increase.
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Table 3.12: Heckman selection models: treatment for sample selection bias (H. 4, and 5)

Dependent variablea

ART
H 4a

CRT
H 4b

SINC

ART

H 4c

H 5a

H 5a

H 5a

-2.838*
(1.404)

-.748
(2.845)

2.905*
(1.21)

-10.994
(27.110)

-23.281
(12.522)

36.029
(48.43)

Renewal of family bonds to the
firm through dynastic succession
Emotional attachment of family
members to the firm
λ (Inverse Mills Ratio)

-2.868*
(1.422)

-1.648
( 2.793)

2.943*
(1.37)

-13.007
(26.580)

-23.084†
(12.580)

6.055
(37.34)

CRT

SINC

† p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note a: The control variables in the equations are: family name, internally generate decline, Tobin's Q, international
diversification, overall diversification, institutional ownership, founder centered family firm, firm age, financial
slack, family firm type, firm size, industry dummies (9 categories), time dummies (4 categories). Standard errors
from robust OLS estimations are denoted in parentheses. ART: Asset retrenchment; CRT: Cost retrenchment; SINC:
Sales increase

214

Table 3.13: Summary of the hypotheses and findings

SEW dimensions

Asset
Retrenchment
intensity

Costs
retrenchment
intensity

Sales increase
intensity

Family control and influence (H 1)

Partially
supported

Non supported

Partially
supported

Identification with the firm (H 2)

Non supported

Non supported

Non supported

Binding social ties (H 3)

Supported
(Negative)

Non supported

Supported
(Positive)

Emotional attachment (H 4)

Supported
(Negative)

Non supported

Supported
(Positive)

Renewal of family bonds to the firm
through dynastic succession (H 5)

Supported
(Negative)

Non supported

Supported
(Positive)

Note: Directionality of relationships are denoted in parentheses
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Figure 1.1: A comprehensive turnaround model, adapted from Arogyaswamy et al., (1995).
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Figure 1.2: A model of corporate turnaround in family business.
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Figure 1.3: Research gaps at the interface between turnaround and family firms.
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Figure 2.1: The process of organizational decline and turnaround response. Adapted from
Francis and Desai’s (2002; 2005) and Chowdhury’s (2002) original figure.
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Figure 2.2: A comprehensive turnaround model, built on Arogyaswamy et al., (1995).

220

Figure 2.3: Characteristics of decline; Severity and suddenness of decline built on Francis and
Desai (2005).
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Figure 2.4: Research model. The effect of socioemotional wealth on turnaround strategies
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A)

B)

C)

Figure 2.5: Moderation of urgency of financial decline on the relationship between SEW and retrenchment intensity
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A)

B)

Figure 2.6: Moderation of potential slack on the relationship between SEW and retrenchment
intensity
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Appendix
ALTMAN Z SCORE. The score is recognized as an efficient method for calculating the risk
of a firm’s bankruptcy within a 2-year horizon. The Z-score was first proposed as an alternative
to the single-ratio measures used to predict the risk of a firm’s bankruptcy (Beaver, 1967).
Altman (1968) proposed how the use of a discriminant function could be an effective way to
detect firms’ risk of default. The original discriminant function has been updated through follow
up studies that incorporated, in the Z-score itself, variables able to improve the accuracy of its
predictions (e.g., Altman, Haldeman, & Narayanan, 1977; Altman, 1983). In addition, over time
scholars recognized the need for the development of different discriminant functions which could
account for various contingencies. Among them were: the firm’s size, the type of industry in
which the firm is operating, publicly-traded versus private firms, and the country in which a firm
operates (Altman, 1983). The Z-score predominantly adopted in the literature, uses a Fisher’s
multivariate technique applied to a variety of accounting and corporate financial measures to
develop a discriminant function (Altman, 2000). The loads of the discriminant function help us
predict the final Z-score. The Z-score has gained high popularity in the management studies
focused on turnaround and response to performance decline. This is because the score is
particularly useful to detect firms in hardship and measures the extent to which an organizational
decline is affecting the firm’s likelihood to recover (e.g., Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Bruton et al.,
2003; Lai & Sudarsanam, 1997; Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). Consistent with previous study, the
following discriminant functions were employed to calculate the severity of organizational
decline (Altman, 2000):
Manufacturing firms: Z = 0.012X1 + 0.014X2 + 0.033X3 + 0.006X4 +0.999X5
Services firms: Z = 0.0656X1 +0.0326X2 + 0.0672X3+ 0.0105X4
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Where Z is the overall index and
X1 = working capital/total assets,
X2 = retained earnings/total assets,
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets,
X4 = market value equity/book value of total liabilities,
X5 = sales/total assets, and
The Z score zones of discrimination are the following:
Manufacturing

Service

Risk of Bankruptcy within 2 years
From Z score

To Z score

From Z score

Safe zone

2.99

-

2.60

Moderate

1.80

2.99

1.10

2.60

-

1.80

-

1.10

Highly likely

To Z score

Appendix built based on Altman (1977; 1983; 2000).
ENTROPY. Following previous studies (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Hitt et al., 1997),
I have measured the extent of diversification with the entropy index. The index is composed of
both a measure of the number of segments in which the firm operates and the percentage of the
firm’s total sales resulting from each one of the business segment. The data to measure entropy
were drawn from COMPUSTAT Business Information – Segment Company Files, which is a
database that reports the contributions of each one of a firm’s business segments to the total
firm’s sales. The segments reported in the database are self-identified by the firms. The measure
was calculated as follows:
∑ [

( )]

Where Pi represents the percentage of sales that can be ascribed to business segment i
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